Since his inauguration as Russia’s president in May 2008, Dmitri Medvedev has pursued a distinctive cadre policy in respect of the Northern Caucasus. In a little under two years in office, Medvedev has replaced the leaders of three republics – Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan – and has even appointed a new envoy-minister to oversee the region. Recent events have given rise to speculation about Medvedev’s intentions toward Chechnya’s current pro-Moscow political elite, led by Ramzan Kadyrov. Are Medvedev’s intentions toward Kadyrov benign or otherwise? Moreover, in what ways has Medvedev’s presidency changed the decision making hierarchy established by his predecessor in this critical area of Russia’s regional policy?

BACKGROUND: In late March, Chechnya’s pro-Moscow parliament issued a statement criticising the newly appointed presidential representative to the North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO), Alexander Khloponin. The parliamentarians complained that Khloponin – appointed by President Medvedev in January – was not acknowledging Chechnya’s pre-eminent status among the republics of the Northern Caucasus. They also alluded negatively to rumours that Khloponin was considering appointing Bislan Gantemirov and Akhmed Khasambekov to his staff. Both of these individuals have quarrelled with Kadyrov in the past and are personae non gratae in their homeland. In this instance, as in most others, the Chechen parliament was merely voicing Kadyrov’s personal opinions. Kadyrov received Khloponin’s initial appointment somewhat reservedly, telling journalists: “If there are intermediaries between the government authorities of the Russian Federation and presidents of the republics, it is already a weakness.”

In March, Khloponin criticized Chechen officials – including Kadyrov – for travelling to Middle Eastern countries without coordinating their activities with the Russian ministry of foreign affairs. However, the prospect of Bislan Gantemirov gaining access to the new envoy-minister seems to have brought matters to a head for Kadyrov and his advisors. Khloponin has not confirmed that he is considering Gantemirov’s candidacy for this role, but the very fact that Kadyrov believes that such deliberations are taking place demonstrates an element of uncertainty in his relationship with Khloponin, and by extension, with Medvedev.

There was no such uncertainty in Kadyrov’s relationship with Medvedev’s predecessor. During Vladimir Putin’s time as president, Kadyrov had ready access to him through the office of Vladislav Surkov, then Putin’s deputy chief of staff. Putin and Surkov were the key decision makers with respect to Chechnya until Medvedev’s election in 2008, and both have remained voices of considerable import in this especially secretive sphere of official decision making. Nevertheless, Medvedev’s election has coincided with the broadening – some would say the dichotomization – of Moscow’s decision making process with respect to Chechnya and the rest of the Northern Caucasus. Aside from Khloponin, Medvedev has introduced his chief of staff, Sergei Naryshkin, into this process. Indeed, Naryshkin has already made his influence felt, successfully lobbying for Yunas-Bek Yevkurov to be appointed president of Ingushetia. Naryshkin was also reportedly in favor of appointing Magomed Abdullayev as president of Dagestan in February. The fact that Magomedsalam Magomedov was ultimately chosen instead of Abdullayev (who was appointed prime minister) suggests that Naryshkin’s influence remains limited. Indeed, the prolonged delay which preceded the announcement of Dagestan’s new president suggested a difference of opinion at the federal level between those who supported Abdullayev’s candidacy and those who recommended a more seasoned candidate. If the prolonged presidential vetting process in the case of Dagestan was indicative of a slightly less exclusive decision making process at federal level, it also demonstrated how opaque this process continues to be.

IMPLICATIONS: The introduction of Naryshkin and Khloponin (and Medvedev, of course) into this decision making dynamic has affected successive changes of leadership in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Ingushetia and Dagestan. As yet, there are no indications that Medvedev and his advisors are contemplating regime change in Chechnya. Were such deliberations taking place, however, it is unlikely that Medvedev, Naryshkin and Khloponin would be able to keep their discussions a secret from Surkov, who has stayed on in the Kremlin as Naryshkin’s assistant. With Putin’s departure for the Russian White House, Surkov is now Kadyrov’s sole high-level benefactor in the Kremlin.

The frequency of Kadyrov’s contact with Putin has been curtailed in recent years. With Surkov remaining in the Kremlin, the role of liaison between Putin and Kadyrov had apparently devolved onto Sergei Sobyanin, one of Putin’s deputies. Kadyrov established a sound, albeit fleeting, relationship with Sobyanin, even speaking of him in the same breath as Surkov and publicly recommending him for the envoy-minister post ultimately filled by Khloponin. In Kadyrov’s view, Khloponin’s appointment represented an unnecessary complication in his relationship with Moscow. The fact that Khloponin was made a deputy prime minister as well as a presidential envoy was particularly provocative, Kadyrov perceiving it as an attempt to sever his link with Putin via Sobyanin.

Against this unnerving backdrop, Kadyrov succumbed to the mendacity of hearsay, commissioning his agents in Chechnya’s parliament to publicly criticize Khloponin for allegedly associating with two of his political enemies. On April 8, Khloponin arrived in Chechnya on an official visit.  There was no evidence of any great tension between the two principals, Kadyrov greeting Khloponin cordially at Grozny airport before conducting him on a tour of his father’s gravesite, a visit that has become customary for visiting dignitaries from Moscow.

The two men later fielded questions from journalists, Khloponin declaring himself ‘very pleased’ with the progress made in rebuilding the republic’s infrastructure. The success of Khloponin’s visit suggests that his relationship with the Chechen leader will improve over time. Even a superficial analysis of Kadyrov’s political career reveals his proneness to overreaction in the face of perceived slights. (Recall, for example, Kadyrov’s overreaction to the Mohammed cartoon controversy in February 2006; also Kadyrov’s extreme overreaction in April 2006 when he was excluded from a meeting between Chechnya’s then-president, Alu Alkhanov, and Sergei Stepashin.) Medvedev’s decision to install Khloponin as a bureaucratic umpire governing Kadyrov’s access (and that of other leaders in the SKFO) to both branches of the federal government undoubtedly bothered the Chechen president. There is also the fact that in contrast to his two immediate predecessors in the envoy role, Khloponin is a capable, high-profile politician with considerable personal wealth. Kadyrov, who has sound political instincts, has sensed that Khloponin is not an individual who is easily intimidated, manipulated or circumnavigated. As such, the recent demarche issued by Chechnya’s parliamentarians is more usefully categorized as a plea for attention and reassurance from Kadyrov rather than as a personality clash between him and Khloponin.  

CONCLUSIONS: It was perhaps inevitable that a Medvedev presidency would lead to changes in the pre-existing decision making process regarding Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus. In assessing the current group of decision makers in this sphere – Medvedev, Putin, Naryshkin, Khloponin, Surkov – one must be careful not to divine rivalries where there are none. The dynamics of Moscow’s decision making in the North Caucasus cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy such as ‘Medvedev’s team’ versus ‘Putin’s team’. For instance, the rapid career advancement of Sergei Naryshkin – a politician usually associated with Medvedev – arguably owes more to Vladimir Putin than to anybody else – Naryshkin worked for Putin in the mayor’s office in St. Petersburg in the early nineties. He also served an apprenticeship on Putin’s staff from 2004. Also, how could such a simplistic formula explain the role of Vladislav Surkov, an influential politician to whom both Putin and Medvedev owe a great deal? Instead, it is best to consider this sphere of decision making as a highly exclusive forum, whose members lobby one another on behalf of respective – or mutual – clients who are political or financial stakeholders in various parts of the Northern Caucasus. Sometimes, with respect to major decisions, a broad consensus is arrived at by all of the participants in this process – the appointment of Yevkurov as president of Ingushetia, for example. On other occasions – the recent selection of a new president of Dagestan, for instance – there is no consensus and the interested parties must bargain and compromise. By making this decision making process slightly less exclusive, Medvedev is automatically reducing the likelihood that consensus will be achieved in respect of any upcoming personnel choices in the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College Cork, Ireland.