No other country celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the People’s Republic of China with such an alacrity as did Pakistan. For over a week, activities such as exhibitions, banquets, meetings and seminars were held, both in capital Islamabad and in provincial and military headquarters in which top ranking members of the political and military leadership participated. Although the Saudi Embassy in Islamabad also celebrated its seventy-ninth anniversary shortly afterwards — Saudi Arabia being a country with which Pakistan enjoys deep religious affinity — the attention paid to the Chinese anniversary was incomparable. This aptly demonstrates the significance Pakistan attaches to its relations with China.

BACKGROUND: The messages sent by Pakistani leaders to their Chinese counterparts on China’s anniversary further explained the nature of this relationship. President Asif Ali Zardari stated on the occasion that no “third element” could ever obstruct the evergreen Pakistan-China friendship — an implied reference to India and the U.S.. He termed the renaissance of China’s civilization a defining theme of the twenty-first century and a factor of stability in the world. This statement demonstrated that Pakistan does not share the Western concerns over the rise or threat of China. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani left no ambiguity in stating that China was, and would continue to be, a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Chinese officials also eulogized relations with Pakistan and expressed their gratitude to Islamabad for its valuable support to Beijing on vital issues such as Xinjiang, Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights. They assured that China, as in the past, would stand by Pakistan.

As a contribution to the celebration of China’s anniversary, Pakistan issued a postage stamp and a commemorative coin of 10 rupees with the inscribed flags of China and Pakistan. While a symbolic gesture, it is unique that another country’s flag is inscribed on Pakistan’s national currency. Yet another development was the inauguration of a think tank, the Pakistan-China Institute, which will employ an equal number of scholars from both countries and devote its entire research to various aspects of China-Pakistan relations. In addition, the three branches of Pakistan’s armed forces (the Army, Air Force, and Navy), which all enjoy robust ties with their Chinese counterparts, also arranged certain events to highlight the strategic dimension of this relationship. Strategic cooperation is and will continue to be the bedrock of overall Sino-Pakistan relations.

Interestingly, the burgeoning Sino-Pakistan relations run parallel to deteriorating Sino-Indian relations which have recently been rocked by a series of events. In July 2009, one month before the thirteenth round of Sino-Indian border talks, China opposed the Indian request for a US$2.9 billion loan from the Asian Development Bank on the grounds that part of it would be utilized in the Indian-controlled Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims in its entirety. Subsequently, reports of a Chinese “incursion” into Indian territory, along with the publication of an online article (which was later removed) by a Chinese scholar on the iiss.cn website proposing the dismemberment of India into 30 independent states, and the October 2009 issuing of visas by the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to applicants from Jammu, Kashmir and Arunchal Paradesh on separate pages of their passports (showing that they hail from disputed territories), sparked anger in Indian media. The Indian government, under strong domestic pressure, increased its air and land forces along the Chinese and Pakistani borders in response. While some time has passed after these events, Sino-Indian relations are still tense. Such situations usually benefit Pakistan and provide additional glue to the Sino-Pakistan entente.

IMPLICATIONS: The Sino-Pakistan entente has been significantly strengthened in recent years. The current government of the Pakistan People’s Party, whose founder Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is considered to the architect of the Sino-Pakistan entente (first as a Foreign Minister during the 1960s, and later as Prime Minister during the 1970s), is strongly determined to push these relations forward. This was underlined by four visits by Zardari and three by Gilani to China since early 2008. During these visits, the two countries identified more than fifty new initiatives for joint collaboration and signed over three dozen accords and memoranda of understanding. China recently agreed to assist Pakistan in building 14 dams and a satellite. Over 10,000 Chinese are currently working on 120 projects in Pakistan. The presence of such a huge number of Chinese, when other countries have reduced their presence in Pakistan in the face of terrorism, is yet another reminder of China’s commitment to Pakistan. China’s investments in constructing infrastructure in Pakistan such as the Gwadar port, nuclear power plants, dams, coal and zinc fields, highways, telecommunications and railways will play a significant role in Pakistan’s economic development, bringing Pakistan further closer to China.

Another important aspect of these relations is that it is a two-way relationship, which is in fact one of the reasons for its durability. Pakistan, too, has supported China in many significant ways. In the past, Pakistan helped China to break its isolation especially during the 1960s and 1970s, as it functioned as a bridge between China and the Islamic world, facilitated the Sino-U.S. rapprochement (Henry Kissinger’s first secret visit to China via Pakistan in July 1971 paved the way for Sino-U.S. normalization) and staunchly supported China’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council, which Beijing finally secured in October 1971. Presently, Pakistan stands by China on human rights issues, democracy, Taiwan and Xingjian. All these issues occupy central positions in China’s foreign policy. For instance, during the recent ethnic riots in Xinjiang, Pakistan was the first country to issue a statement supporting Beijing’s measures to quell them. Furthermore, Pakistan used its clout in the Islamic world to prevent certain countries from taking the issue of violence in Xinjiang to the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This, according to the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Lou Zhaohui, saved Beijing from embarrassment.

CONCLUSIONS: Islamabad’s enthusiastic celebration of China’s sixtieth anniversary in general and the recent developments in Sino-Pakistan relations in particular all indicate the continuation and consolidation of this “special relationship”. Although many proverbs are attached to this relationship—“all-weather”, “time-tested” and “a model relationship” — this is in essence a pragmatic and practical partnership based on geographical proximity, mutual needs and varying degrees of shared hostility towards India. The early and mutually agreed solution to their un-demarcated border in 1963, regular exchange of visits at highest level, mutual consultation and support for each other’s polices at various forms and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs further strengthened this relationship.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Ghulam Ali is a PhD candidate at Monash University, Australia. His research interests focus on China’s external relations especially with South Asian countries.