Tajikistani President Emomali Rahmon’s state visit to Moscow in October resolved none of the major divisive issues marring the relations between Moscow and Dushanbe. The Tajik leader failed to convince President Medvedev to pay Tajikistan a rent for Russia’s military base in Tajikistan, and to participate in the Rogun power station project. Despite this, security considerations have pushed Dushanbe and Moscow to agree to step up military cooperation. This, however, is more a matter of necessity than choice for the both sides, and is unlikely to produce a lasting normalization of relations between the two countries.

BACKGROUND: Over the last two years, Tajikistan’s relationship with Russia has deteriorated to its worst level since independence. The major reason for Tajik frustration with Russia has been what many in Tajikistan view as a failure on Moscow’s part to honor its commitment to build the Rogun power station. Under the 2004 deal, Russian aluminum giant Rusal pledged to invest roughly US$2 billion in building the Soviet-planned power giant. In return, Dushanbe agreed to the reorganization of Russia’s 201^st Motor Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan into a permanent military base to be deployed in the country free of charge. Under the same deal, Moscow wrote off US$242 million of Tajik debt, and Dushanbe handed over a major space-surveillance facility to the Russian space forces.

Despite the signing of the deal, brokered personally by the then-president Vladimir Putin, Russia has not yet invested in the Rogun project. Facing strong pressure from Uzbekistan, Rusal attempted to persuade Dushanbe to change the height and type of the dam. Unwilling to agree to a lower dam project, Dushanbe cancelled the deal with Rusal in 2007 and pressed Moscow for an alternative arrangement to build the power station. These efforts have so far yielded no result.

Rising power demand, failing infrastructure and inability to negotiate transit of electricity from neighboring states through Uzbek territory during the last several winters led Dushanbe to introduce strict power supply rationing and leave entire regions without electricity and heating. The Rogun power station is currently seen as the only feasible project that could not only resolve Tajikistan’s electricity deficits but also make the country a net power exporter. Therefore, the construction of the Rogun power plant has become a matter of necessity rather than choice for Tajikistan. Dushanbe began building the power station on its own, investing US$120 million in the project in 2009, and planning to spend roughly US$150 million from the state budget in 2010.

Disappointed with Moscow’s reluctance to deliver the promised investment in the Rogun project, Tajik media, intellectuals and part of the political elite began demanding that the government revisit the 2004 deal and begin charging Russia for hosting its military base. Both Tajik and Russian media cited unnamed sources in Tajikistan’s defense ministry as suggesting that Dushanbe had demanded US$300 million in annual rent fees from Moscow. Moreover, as discussed in previous issues of the CACI Analyst, many in Tajikstan have felt offended by Moscow’s stance on water management issues in the region, an inability to stem the wave of ethnically motivated attacks on Tajik migrants in Russia, and media coverage they perceived as insulting.

It was widely expected that President Emomali Rakhmon’s state visit to Moscow on October 21-23 would bring about an agreement on either an alternative arrangement for Russia’s participation in the Rogun energy project or on rent payments for Moscow’s military outpost in Tajikistan. Instead, however, the Russian and Tajik leaders preferred to leave everything as it is and focus on strengthening cooperation in defense and security.

IMPLICATIONS: The decision to put aside disagreements and strengthen military and security cooperation between the two countries can be attributed to their mutual fear of further deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. There is increasing evidence of deteriorating security conditions and an upsurge of violence in northern Afghanistan which has recently experienced the arrival of numerous Islamist militant groups. Afghan officials, including President Hamid Karzai, claim that since the beginning of the year, hundreds of Taliban-linked insurgents have fled the major Pakistani ground offensive in South Waziristan and attacks by U.S. UAVs. These fighters appear to have relocated to the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan and Balkh, which border Tajikistan.

The regrouping of Islamist insurgents in northern Afghanistan has major security implications both for Dushanbe and Moscow. The fear in Dushanbe is that these militants might further radicalize Tajikistan’s own Islamist groups or mount military incursions across the largely porous Tajik-Afghan border. Tajik authorities also fear that by allowing their territory to be used to bring in military cargo to Afghanistan via the northern route, they have made Tajikistan increasingly vulnerable as a likely target for Taliban militants seeking to disrupt NATO’s supply routes.

These fears have been reinforced by a recent upsurge of violence in Central Asia. Over the spring and summer, the Tajik government conducted a large-scale police and military operation in the Rasht Valley, hunting a civil-war era warlord who had returned to Tajikistan with a large group of Islamic militants after reportedly spending the last nine years with Taliban allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The instability in the Rasht Valley has been followed by a series of armed attacks in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Aware of its own vulnerability in case of spillover of the Afghan conflict into Central Asia, Dushanbe increasingly looks towards Russia with its sizable military force in the region as a guarantor of security.

Moscow also fears that the inability of the U.S.-led coalition forces to prevent the resurgence of Islamist militancy in northern Afghanistan might lead the conflict to spill over into its “near abroad.” Such a spillover would not only threaten Russia’s energy interests in Central Asia but also have major security implications for the North Caucasus as well as for Russia proper. Therefore, it is in Russia’s interests to step up military aid to and cooperation with increasingly vulnerable Tajikistan, positioned on the frontline of Central Asia’s border with Afghanistan.

CONCLUSIONS: Security concerns are pushing Dushanbe and Moscow to put aside major disagreements and focus on military cooperation to counter threats stemming from the resurgence of Islamist insurgency in northern Afghanistan and the spillover of the Afghan conflict into Central Asia. It is highly unlikely, however, that this refocusing will bring about a sustainable normalization of the relationship between the two countries. Russia is steadily losing its status as Tajikistan’s favored or “strategic” international partner. Reluctant to assist Tajikistan in resolving its energy problems, Moscow is pushing Dushanbe to look for other partners. As China’s economic power and influence in Tajikistan grows, Dushanbe will increasingly look towards Beijing for security cooperation and guarantees.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Alexander Sodiqov is a lecturer at the International Relations Department, Russian-Tajik Slavonic University in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.