It would have been difficult to imagine the signing of protocols on the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations on October 10 without coinciding interests on the part of major stakeholders. While a testament to cooperation between the regional parties, the protocols are also a reflection of global and regional strategic competition in Eurasia among small, medium and great powers. Placing the interests of the actors in proper context is therefore necessary when assessing the transformations in Eurasia in relation to power reconfigurations, unresolved conflicts, and energy security.

BACKGROUND: On October 10, 2009, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian and his Turkish colleague Ahmet Davutoglu signed protocols in Zurich on the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations and the opening of their land border. Turkey closed the border after Armenia occupied Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas in 1992-1993. Armenia, on its part, has long demanded Turkey to recognize the massacre of over a million Armenians in 1915 as genocide. The role of Russia, the U.S., France, and Switzerland was crucial in brokering the agreement.

No statements were made following the ceremony. This was perhaps part of a compromise during the negotiations, which could have failed had it not been for U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s active intervention and words of encouragement to both sides: “…This has to be seen through. You’ve gone too far.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was very pleased with the outcome, adding that “it is essential that they [the protocols] be swiftly ratified and implemented.” Nationalist forces in Armenia and Turkey, however, pose substantial challenges. But the very fact that the deal took place points to a convergence of interests on the part of regional actors.

Armenia did not press Turkey to recognize the 1915 massacres as genocide during the signing ceremony, while Turkey’s previous rhetoric on Nagorno-Karabakh was muted. Through this deal Armenia, the U.S. and the EU each seeks to reduce Russia’s leverage and bring Armenia out of the isolation imposed by the Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship. The protocols help Turkey and Armenia enhance their trade relations and influence in the region, as well as diversify energy routes in the future. Russia’s advances after its war with Georgia and its ability to threaten the BTC pipeline made Turkey substitute rhetoric for pragmatism in the Caucasus, even if it entails establishing relations with Armenia.

Azerbaijan and Georgia, however, missed out on the deal and convergence of interests. The deal delivered a blow to the “one nation, two states” concept of relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The latter has pushed the former not to improve relations with Yerevan until the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is resolved. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev already warned that Azerbaijan would look for alternative energy routes and increase the price of gas for Turkey, stressing: “It is not a secret to anyone that for many years Azerbaijan has been selling its gas to Turkey at one-third of market prices.” Several days after these warnings, Davutoglu stated that “Azeri soil is as sacred for us as our own” and “liberating this soil from occupation is one of our primary national issues.”

Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister David Jalagania welcomed the agreement: “We consider the step necessary for enhancing regional security.” However, Georgia will lose transport fees from Armenian importers if the border is opened, and its importance as an energy bridge and focus of the attention of great powers could diminish, especially if Armenia-Azerbaijan relations improve.

The deal helps Russia expand trade and energy ties with Turkey, facilitate the transportation of supplies to its military base in Gyumri (Armenia), draw Azerbaijan closer into its orbit, and use a more “active Armenian card” in the region. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin expressed Russia’s readiness to complement the protocols with energy and transportation projects. Russia has about US$2.5 billion-worth of economic interests in Armenia, including in strategic assets such as nuclear and power stations. Recently, Nalbandian emphasized that Russia is Armenia’s “strategic ally” and will be its partner in a new nuclear project.

IMPLICATIONS: How could the interests of so many actors bring about the deal? The key is that the major parties treat tactical cooperation, resting on a coincidence of short-term interests at this particular juncture, as part of their long-term strategies for competition in Eurasia. Transformations are already underway in the Caucasus and will only intensify in the future, making regional actors keen on seizing the initiative now. Three regional and global features of these transformations stand out in the context of competition in Eurasia: power reconfiguration, “frozen” conflicts, and energy security.

The Russian-Georgian war made the West and Turkey pursue more assertive policies to halt Russia’s advances and support pro-democratic aspirations in the Caucasus. The dwindling U.S. global power leaves it no choice but to work through proxies – Turkey and Western Europe – to influence relations between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Thus, the West treats the protocols as a way of shrinking Russia’s “zone of privileged interests” through Turkey’s policies.

Their plans, however, may backfire if Russia keeps Azerbaijan and Georgia in line more effectively after changes in the balance of power and improvements in Russian-Turkish-Armenian relations. Russia can also promote its image of a peace- rather than trouble-maker in the Caucasus, while reaping short-term benefits in the course of negotiations, and then choosing to derail them at any time.

For now the protocols will help Russia get Turkey’s support on energy projects and put a wedge in the relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Currently, two-thirds of Turkish gas needs are met by Russia. Turkey, in turn, wants to strengthen the bilateral relationship as an end in itself and as a means to push the EU to play fair when it comes to Turkey’s EU membership plans. The EU demands that border conflicts among its member states are eliminated, and many EU members have also pressed Turkey to recognize the 1915 massacres as genocide.

The regional changes might positively impact the resolution of the region’s unresolved conflicts. The evolution of the trilateral Azerbaijan-Armenia-Turkey relations will show if this could prove a possibility, but the improvement of ties between Armenia and Turkey could imply far-reaching implications for regional security and the resolution of conflicts in light of ensuing economic interdependence.    

Furthermore, the improvement of relations between Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan may literally open their borders to more pipelines and enhance energy security. “Turkey has prospects in the Caucasus both in terms of Turkey-Armenia and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations,” – said Ahmet Davutoglu. For now, however, the protocols have undermined Azerbaijan’s position, making it easier for Russia to enlist Azerbaijan’s support for its South Stream scheme and halt the Western-backed Nabucco project. Azerbaijan already agreed to sell Russia 500 million cubic meters of gas annually, beginning in 2010, after the protocols were signed. Aliyev also stated there was “no upper limit” to gas amounts in the future.

CONCLUSIONS: While the converging interests of the involved actors made the deal possible, the agreement points to long-term strategic competition in Eurasia and globally. Russia’s advances after its war with Georgia prompted the EU, U.S., and Turkey to become more assertive in the Caucasus. Improving relations between Turkey and Armenia may be a key here, including in the field of conflict resolution and energy security, but it comes with a short-term cost to the West. The enhanced Russia-Turkey-Armenia partnership draws Azerbaijan closer to Russia, undermines Georgia’s influence, and might yet weaken EU’s energy diversification plans and make Turkey-West relations more vulnerable. Transformations in Eurasia are well under way. So is long-term strategic competition among powers of all sizes to shape them.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Roman Muzalevsky is an international affairs and security analyst on Caucasus and Central Asia. He is also Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.