With the recent efforts to make President Nazarbayev president for life, it is useful to compare the Central Asian approach to governance to that in the single party states, China and Vietnam. Despite criticism about their deficiencies in democracy and human rights, these two countries have made great progress in developing their economies, opening up their societies, and finding a political system that both works now and can also evolve. Since democracy is slow to take root in Central Asia, analysis of other political systems that local elites accept may produce better outcomes than are now prevailing. 

BACKGROUND: Although many have advocated the virtues of democracy in Central Asia it has not taken root. As a result, all the political leaders in the region, once in power, stay there until death or a very extreme situation. Proposals by the ruling Otan Party to make President Nursultan Nazarbayev president for life are part of a pattern in the region. President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan formally received such a title, and Presidents Islam Karimov and Imomali Rakhmon show no sign of leaving. President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan left after large protests, but his successor President Kurmanbek Bakiyev won the July 2009 elections by biasing the system strongly in his favor. Remaining in power until the end was also a pattern in the Soviet Union for all leaders except for Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Beyond the obvious self interest, the lack of change at the top may also be due to beliefs that election-based democracy is inappropriate for Central Asia’s undeveloped political institutions. An incumbent has little incentive to permit a free election if the result would be a major reversal of the current policies, or if the new leader will just bias the system to stay in power himself. Unfortunately, governance tends to suffer with long ruling leaders. Even if polices were sound at the start of the regime, once regime survival starts to be a major focus, repression and weak governance can stifle innovation and policy development.

The more developed transition countries (in the Baltics, and Central and Eastern Europe) have successfully used democracy to foster robust political, social, and economic development, but this should not be the only option. The current election - focused approach to improving governance is not gaining acceptance in Central Asia. In response, donor engagement is evolving to also build up institutions needed for a democracy, such as for accountability and the rule of law. But without further improvements in high level governance, it is difficult for this technical work to bring on fundamental change. In contrast, China and Vietnam have developed their economies very successfully despite their nondemocratic one-party political systems. This economic transformation could not have been achieved without flexibility in these political systems since top-down dictatorships are very poor in managing change.

IMPLICATIONS: Asian political pragmatism was born out of economic necessity. After the economic failures of the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s personality cult in China, and the early post-war reconstruction in Vietnam, it became clear that a rigid ideological economic model would not work. In developing their reforms, the leaderships realized that the problem was not only economic but also political. As a result, both countries adopted various elements of political pragmatism.

The key characteristics of the leadership of the Communist Parties of China (CPC) and especially Vietnam (CPV) are both their collective nature and periodic changes. In both cases the president needs to rule by consensus, at least within the Politburo. In Vietnam, the leadership is split between the president, prime minister and the general secretary. Leaders change in China after two five–year terms, and in Vietnam, single 5–year terms are not uncommon. While the selection process is nontransparent negotiation, it does provide for some evolution of policies, as the faction with the more economic success can typically get greater representation. Leadership changes also prevent personal interests from becoming too entrenched, thereby limiting corruption (although no one denies that it is still a major problem) especially because the most egregious cases can be prosecuted by the new leadership.

The term step-by-step approach to economic reform in China and Vietnam referred not so much to the pace, as the breaking down of the process into bite size pieces that could be tested and analyzed. This was adopted because there was no reliable experience with transition, especially as the interaction with other distortions made policy results hard to predict. For this approach to be successful, considerable differences in policy approach and debate from a relatively representative group of the population needed to be tolerated and the analysis of the results had to be reasonably objective. While not freedom of speech in the full democratic sense, the freedoms are considerably more extensive than in the pre-reform period.

The opening to the outside world meant opening not only to goods, but also to ideas. On the goods front, the competition from an export orientation strengthened industry. More importantly, in a dynamic sense incorporating useful foreign ideas and knowledge are essential for long run competitiveness. The internet is but the latest form of information transfer that has been accepted to promote technological advancement, despite its ability to also spread unwanted information. Attempts to filter such information have rarely had a sustained success as technological bypasses have always been found. Substantial numbers of middle class Chinese travel and study abroad, and observe democratic countries, but they return to China and live within the system.

One key difference with East Asia is that Central Asian economies depend on natural resource exports and aid flows. These reduce the impact from international factors that force economies to be competitive. Of course, these resources can be used to build up the physical and human capital base when used productively. In particular, fostering the non-resource sectors will typically require a more skilled labor force to offset the higher wages from resource development. Such higher skills and education could lead to a more pluralistic society in time. However, experience shows that resource and aid inflows are not always used productively. Outside pressures for transparency and governance standards pertaining to those receipts can help, but this remains a major challenge.

CONCLUSIONS: The lesson from China and Vietnam is primarily the importance of each country adopting its own path for development, especially for sensitive political issues. While there are many differences between Central and East Asia, utilizing appropriate international experience can expedite this process by showing how politics, governance, and the economy can interact.

Rather than focusing on the lack of democracy in Central Asia, a broader dialogue on the relationship between politics and development could be useful. Institutionalized leadership change can help build in evolutionary policy changes and to give the current leadership a role (but not the only voice) is the selection of the new generation. Thus leadership change will not be seen as failure but as passing the torch. Managed change can also broaden the base of expertise as others in the hierarchy are moved. Despite the trappings of democracy, Russia has adopted this approach, with Yeltsin’s nomination of Putin as successor, and then Putin’s nomination of Medvedev. Frederick Starr has pointed out the role of such behind-the-scenes negotiation by leaders in his work on clans and informal power centers in Central Asia. The balancing of factions, when complemented by a focus on economic growth and foreign competition, can also help to avoid growth-stifling corruption. While less representative than in a fully functioning democracy, a consensus based system could provide more flexibility and policy pragmatism than a system of long-ruling leaders.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Peter J. Winglee is an experienced international economist with experience working in international financial institutions, who has led several missions to support reforms in transition economies in Central and Southeast Asian countries.