A confidential assessment of the situation in Afghanistan by the head of NATO troops, General Stanley McChrystal, points to a light in the dark tunnel that can only be sustained if Presdient Barack Obama approves McChrystal’s request for up to 40,000 additional U.S. troops in Afghanistan. McChrystal’s proposed options might be correct and timely, but they are also an indication of the allies’ inability to achieve strategic victory in Afghanistan. In the circumstances of mismatched original ends and currently available means, as well as decreasing domestic support for the war, the proposed strategy appears a mere attempt to maintain an acceptable level of security on the ground, where narcotics cultivation has increased but the probability of strategic victory has declined. It may be time to redefine victory in Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND: After 9/11 the U.S. and its NATO allies invaded Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaida, demolish the Taliban regime, and reconstruct Afghanistan as a secure and accountable state in the international system. That a strategic victory in Afghanistan, involving reconstruction of major state institutions, is currently unachievable without substantial troops is understandable. But failing attempts to assure political and military gains over the course of eight years now are not.

McChrystal’s assessment, sent to Defense Secretary Robert Gates on August 30 and currently under review by the Obama administration, and leaked in the Washington Post on September 21, put it well: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) - while Afghan security capacity matures – risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” In short, “while the situation is serious” – says McCrystal – “success is still achievable.” Hence a request for up to 40,000 additional U.S. troops, increased focus on civilian-military interaction, and protection of civilians. McCrystalMcCrystalMc envisions the Afghan army and police to be 240,000 and 160,000 strong respectively, but he needs more troops to achieve that, as well.

The U.S. had already approved deploying 17,700 troops and 4,000 trainers to Afghanistan early in 2009. Although there are now 65,000 U.S. and 39,000 allied troops in the country, no significant political and military gains have been achieved. Hamid Karzai’s rigged August 20 elections have undermined the legitimacy of allied efforts. Corruption has been rampant. Support for the war has been on the decline. A recent CNN poll showed that 58 percent of Americans opposed the war and 39 percent were in favor. A case in point: 2009 marked the year of the biggest number of U.S. casualties in Afghanistan since the war started in 2001, with 48 U.S. troops killed in August.

The problem is further complicated by the drug industry in Afghanistan. A recent CRS report states that drug revenues of US$70-100 million per year constitute almost half the Taliban annual income. Drug and war lords, terrorists and officials continue to benefit from this revenue stream, undermining the campaign in Afghanistan.

U.S. political circles recognize the gravity of the situation portrayed by the military, but they are also adamant to find a formula of success in Afghanistan. President Obama, who staked his election campaign on Afghanistan issues, noted: “There is no immediate decision pending on resources. You have to get the strategy right and then make the determination about resources.” Vice President Joe Biden called any discussion on future troop deployments premature. The Head of the U.S. Central Command General David Petraeus, however, has backed McCrystal’s assessment. Admiral Mullen emphasized that the deployment of more troops was “probable.” Initially concerned that U.S. might be viewed as an occupier, Defense Secretary Gates now seems to agree that additional troops might be required.

IMPLICATIONS: The NATO allies set out to complete what now seems to be unachievable: destroying Al Qaida, the Taliban regime and insurgency, and rebuilding a secure and legitimate state of Afghanistan. While partially effective in dealing with the Taliban in urban areas and destroying Al Qaida, the allies have failed to defeat the insurgency in the tribal regions. The Taliban enjoy support among numerous tribes in Pakistan and Afghanistan who feel alienated by the Karzai regime and detached from policies of the allies. The allies enjoy a technological superiority but lack human intelligence and local popular support.

McChrystal’s strategy seeks to extend a protective shield to the Afghans rather than continue unleashing a sword against the Taliban. McChrystal stressed: “Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us – physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to protect… The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.” The strategy aims to enlist the support of the indigenous population, but corruption and lack of legitimacy of the Karzai government stand in the way of cornering the Taliban in the struggle for loyalties.

Not much, at least in the press, has been said about the Northern Distribution Networks (NDN) and its role in the U.S. and NATO strategy in Afghanistan. As supply routes via Pakistan are threatened, deliveries of supplies through NDN in Eurasia are critical, and not only from a military perspective. The economic, trade, and strategic implications of the NDN for Afghanistan and Eurasia are far-reaching and have the potential to reinforce the military aspect of the campaign in Afghanistan, paving the way for an array of strategic gains in the region.

In the end, McCrystal’s strategy may herald an impending triumph or create conditions where subsequent force deployments pull the U.S. into quagmire, making the Taliban and Al Qaida, at least from the perspective of informational and ideological propaganda, the true masters of warcraft and strategy (recall their claims on defeating the British and Soviet empires in Afghanistan). The Obama administration faces a number of challenges complicating its agenda in Afghanistan, from doubts of some within the Democratic Party on the issue of additional deployments to accusations of the Republicans for the lack of resolution to do more sooner rather than later. NATO allies are not ready to fully commit either. Britain, Germany and France called for timetables for Afghanistan to assume a greater role in its own security. Political circles in Poland, perhaps spurred by the U.S. decision to cancel the deployment of anti-missile defense systems on Polish territory, have called for talks on the future of its mission in Afghanistan.

Currently, the following three likely options are available for the Obama administration. It can pursue McChrystal’s new strategy emphasizing additional troops, civilian-military cooperation, and increased civilian protection. It can continue the failing strategy with existing troop levels in the effort to delay failure or victory for better timing and political circumstances. Lastly, it can choose to withdraw from Afghanistan, but only with face-saving involving substantial gains to the Taliban in return for the latter’s denial of sanctuary to Al-Qaeda and moderation of Taliban political rule. On balance, redefining victory in Afghanistan might be a quicker, though not necessarily better, way out.

CONCLUSIONS: The allies have partially succeeded in defeating Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but have failed to undermine the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaida sanctuaries in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. They have also failed to build robust government security forces and attain a strategic victory. It is in this context of limited means that the allies may be forced to redefine victory yet still win the war. McCrystal’s strategy in Afghanistan makes sense, but only as far as it matches ends and means and has a clear definition of what an acceptable victory in Afghanistan for US and NATO really is. The next months will show whether this is the case, provided Obama chooses to implement the new proposal.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Roman Muzalevsky is an international affairs and security analyst on the Caucasus and Central Asia. He is also Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.