Turkey and Armenia have declared their intention to sign two Protocols next month, aimed at normalizing their relations and opening their common border, which has been closed by Turkey since 1993. To that end, Turkey has seemingly eased some of its previous preconditions, including on the genocide question and demands for progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan’s favor. However, further progress seems difficult, as strong opposition to the process exists in both countries, providing significant obstacles to the signing and implementation of the agreements.

BACKGROUND: On August 31, Turkey and Armenia made public the initiated texts of two draft Protocols aimed at normalizing and further developing relations between the two countries. In an accompanying joint press release by the foreign ministries of these countries and the Swiss federal department of foreign affairs, which had acted as a mediator in the Armenian-Turkish negotiations since 2005, the parties stated: “The two Protocols provide for a framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations within a reasonable timeframe.”

Under the Protocols, both countries will hold internal political consultations during the next six weeks, thereafter the Protocols will be signed and submitted for ratification to the respective parliaments. They are to enter into force in the month following the exchange of the instruments of ratification. Two months later, a working group will be formed to prepare “the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions,” and the common border between the two countries is expected to open by that time as well.

Turkey recognized the Republic of Armenia immediately after the breakdown of the Soviet Union in late 1991. However, Ankara refused to establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan until two preconditions were fulfilled: recognition of the common border and abolition of the Armenian policy to gain worldwide recognition of the 1915 massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. Turkey added one more precondition in 1993, namely that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh should be resolved prior to the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. In April 1993, Turkey closed its border with Armenia after the Armenian forces occupied the Kelbajar region, the second of seven occupied Azerbaijani regions surrounding the Armenian-populated enclave. Since then, Turkey has largely reiterated Azerbaijan’s demands toward Armenia. Armenia has always said it favoured normalization without any preconditions.

The Protocols seem to imply that Turkey may have decided to abandon two of the three above preconditions, regarding the genocide and Nagorno-Karabakh, for normalizing its relations with Armenia. This is in line with the Turkey’s “No problems with neighbors” policy and reflects its efforts to strengthen its role in the South Caucasus after the Georgian-Russian war last August. The protocols were supported by the U.S. (Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had phone conversations with the leaders of Armenia and Turkey late in August), as well as by the EU and Russia.

IMPLICATIONS: If implemented, these Protocols may result in drastic changes in the regional political pattern. First of all, a more balanced Turkish policy toward Armenia could result in decreasing tension in the region. However, Azerbaijan, which has repeatedly said that it does not exclude new military action in Nagorno-Karabakh, has declared that Turkey’s move contradicts its national interests. It is reportedly pressuring Turkish authorities via its lobby in Turkey. Turkey could also potentially benefit from tightening its political and economic ties with the South Caucasus, in particular through the Kars-Gyumri railroad which has been idle since 1993. New regional communication projects involving Armenia are expected to become easier to implement, as Azerbaijan’s ability to prevent Armenian participation in these is reduced. Finally, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement may contribute to pulling Armenia out of the Russian sphere of influence. However, Moscow reacted positively to the Protocols as the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border would ease its access to Armenia, which is now constrained due to its strained relations with Georgia.

Armenia would benefit greatly from a normalization of its relations with Turkey in two respects. First, it will rid itself of its one-sided dependence on communication routes through Georgia, including its only railroad access. Currently, over 70 percent of Armenian cargo traffic goes through Georgia, and the vulnerability of these routes was demonstrated during last year’s war. Another benefit to Armenia would be the opening of the Turkish market for Armenian goods. Since 1993, there is an unofficial embargo on the import of Armenian goods to Turkey, whereas there is no restriction in the opposite direction and Turkish exports to Armenia reached US$200 million last year.

Opposition to these Protocols is nevertheless strong in both countries. In Turkey, they are viewed as abandoning Turkey’s with its “brotherly nation,” Azerbaijan. This forces government officials to make conflicting statements about the Protocols and their relations to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. The anti-Armenian moods in Turkish society, among state officials and in the “Deep State”, create additional obstacles to adopting the Protocols. All of these factors have hindered progress on the issue. The Protocols were reportedly agreed on as early as in April 2009, but their publication became possible only in August, ahead of the expected visit of the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to Turkey on October 14 (the next stage of the so-called Football diplomacy).

In Armenia, three main issues of controversy exist. Critics claim that, despite the statements of the Armenian leaders, these Protocols do contain hidden preconditions set by Turkey. First, although they do not mention the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, they still contain the possibility to connect Armenian-Turkish normalization with the conflict through delaying its ratification by the Turkish parliament. Second, the Protocols envisage the formation of a joint “sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations”. The opposition claims that by this provision, Turkey retains a possibility to revise the 1915 Genocide issue and to prevent other countries from recognizing it. Third, the critics are unhappy with the clause in the Protocol “confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries.” They claim the current de-facto border inherited from the Soviet Union was formed under the Treaty of Kars signed in 1921 between Soviet Armenia and the government of Mustafa Kemal, at a time when neither were legal subjects of international law. Instead, it is claimed, the legal Armenian-Turkish border was established in 1919 by the Arbitrary Award of the U.S president Woodrow Wilson and is located west of the current border. Thus, above all the Dashnaktsutiun nationalist party are campaigning against the government’s signing of the protocols in their current form.

CONCLUSIONS: Armenia and Turkey have launched a bold initiative aimed at establishing normal interstate relations between two nations carrying heavy historical burden of mutual mistrust. The breakthrough has become possible as Turkey has apparently moved toward changing its previous stance of linking its policy toward Armenia to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. If the procedure prescribed by the published Protocols is followed, diplomatic relations can be established and the Turkish-Armenian border can be opened in less than half a year. This could create quite a new situation in the region, by influencing the resolution of regional conflicts and implementing joint regional projects. However, strong opposition to the process exists in both countries, providing a significant obstacle to the signing and implementation of the agreements.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Haroutiun Khachatrian is an analyst on political and economic problems in Yerevan, Armenia.