The U.S., Russia and France, the three mediators of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process, have presented an amended version of the Madrid document, based on Armenian and Azerbaijani proposals. The core of the amendments initially proposed in November 2007 is that Nagorno Karabakh will receive an interim status – legalizing the status quo and hopefully pushing the peace process ahead. New difficulties may nevertheless arise connected to the attitude of the enclave’s leadership.

BACKGROUND: In recent weeks, the representatives of the mediators of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, the so-called co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, made optimistic statements about the continued process. The U.S., Russia and France made a joint statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at the presidential level during the G8 Summit on July 10 in L'Aquila, Italy. Then, the representatives of the three co-chairs acknowledged progress in agreeing on the basic principles for a settlement after a meeting in Krakow, Poland, on July 25-26. Finally, in a speech on August 7 in Tsakhkadzor, Armenia, the outgoing American co-chairman, Matthew Bryza, presented some important details on the basic principles, which are an updated version of the Madrid document presented in November 2007. During the following period, this document has been extensively discussed and amended as a result of Armenian-Azerbaijani top level dialogue, as presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev had six meetings (the latest taking place in Moscow on July 17). The presidents themselves have abstained from making optimistic statements, and the co-chairs do recognize that several details of the basic principles, though minor ones, are still to be agreed. In his August 7 speech, Bryza expressed hope that this will be achieved in September and a document about the basic principles will be signed by the two presidents as a first step toward reaching a peace agreement later. Meanwhile, the optimistic statements of the mediators, as well as details officially disclosed by them, are evidently aimed at pressuring the parties and preventing them from backtracking on what has been achieved. Evidently, preparing the public opinion of both countries for concessions is also among the mediators’ goals.

The current basic principles were first proposed by the mediators in November 2007 as the so-called Madrid document (hence the term “Madrid principles”). As outlined by the July 10 statement of the three presidents in L’Aquila, “the Basic Principles call for inter alia:

-return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; -an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance; -a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; -future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; -the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and - international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.”

Thus, the principles resulting from the recent negotiation rounds contain only one major addition, which was lacking in the initial version: the provision of an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh during the settlement process. If accepted, this document will create a new situation in the negotiation process, with new possibilities and new challenges.

IMPLICATIONS: The Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is likely to reach a turning point, through including the de facto leadership of the enclave in the settlement process. This is evidently a compromise on Azerbaijan’s part, which has always opposed such recognition. Bryza said in his Tsakhkadzor speech that “the basic idea of the agreement is that Nagorno-Karabakh will receive an interim status – which will be a legalization of the status quo... Status quo will maintain security for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh and the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh will elect their leaders, manage their economic affairs, will be in charge of their own lives, and all feeling their own destinies”.

Nevertheless, a controversy is present regarding the status quo. As understood by its current inhabitants, the status quo of Nagorno-Karabakh is that of an independent state named the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), which was founded on September 2, 1991, and approved by a referendum held three months later. Ethnic Azerbaijanis, which at that point constituted roughly a quarter of the enclave’s population, rejected to participate in the vote, and Azerbaijan has never recognized its legitimacy. Nevertheless, the NKR is recognized by its current Armenian population (the region’s Azerbaijani population was expelled during the war in 1992-94), and the leaders of the region have since been elected as those of the NKR. Since 1991, eight national votes were held in the unrecognized republic, including presidential and parliamentary elections and a constitutional referendum. Hence, if the de facto leaders of the region are involved in the process, as prescribed by the “updated Madrid principles,” they are expected by these principles to defy their own mandates as the leaders of NKR based on the 1991 December referendum and to organize another vote in the future to determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh again. Another controversy is that, according to the Constitution of the NKR, the occupied regions of Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh are declared a “Security Zone” of the republic. Under the “Madrid principles,” the NKR is expected to give up these territories against the promise of unspecified “international security guarantees”. There are numerous other factors which would make the Armenian parties, both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, cautious in accepting the above-mentioned basic principles, especially as these principles are still very loose and leave room for conflicting interpretations. They mainly arise from the lack of trust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which is regularly enhanced by the bellicose rhetoric of their leaders.

In addition, conflicts may arise between the positions of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the leadership of Armenia may not have enough influence on the Karabakh leaders to force them follow the path Yerevan chooses. Finally, President Serzh Sargsyan will evidently be under pressure of domestic political opposition claiming that he was conceding too much to Azerbaijan. Such criticism is frequently voiced by the Dashnaktsutiun party, a former member of the government coalition, which left it in April as a protest against Sargsyan’s policy toward Turkey.

CONCLUSIONS: The three mediators of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process so far seem successful in pushing Armenia and Azerbaijan toward a compromise. The parties are expected to sign a framework document later this year as an initial step of a long settlement process. In particular, the participation of the Nagorno Karabakh de-facto authorities in the process is proposed via providing them an “interim status” before the final settlement of the conflict is reached. However, heavy obstacles are still ahead, mainly caused by lack of mutual trust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Domestic political issues, especially in Armenia, could also create obstacles to the process.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Haroutiun Khachatrian is an analyst on political and economic issues based in Yerevan.