Wednesday, 20 August 2008

GUAM AND THE GEORGIAN WAR

Published in Analytical Articles

By Richard Weitz (8/20/2008 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The members of GUAM had long sought to avoid further Russian military intervention on their territory, by seeking the resolution of the “frozen conflicts” in Georgia and other former countries of the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, GUAM proved unable to make much of a contribution in resolving these conflicts, which constantly threatened to thaw, due to Russian opposition, West European indifference, and growing problems with wayward Moldova.

The members of GUAM had long sought to avoid further Russian military intervention on their territory, by seeking the resolution of the “frozen conflicts” in Georgia and other former countries of the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, GUAM proved unable to make much of a contribution in resolving these conflicts, which constantly threatened to thaw, due to Russian opposition, West European indifference, and growing problems with wayward Moldova.

BACKGROUND: At the July 2008 GUAM summit in Batumi, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine all urged the organization to become more active in resolving the so-called “frozen conflicts” existing in three member countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and adversely affecting Ukraine, the fourth GUAM member. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, whose term as rotating GUAM chair ended with the Batumi summit, underscored the need for GUAM and the rest of the international community to address the protracted conflicts in the former Soviet republics: “Issues of regional security cannot be ignored because our future development, economic and social progress will depend on regional security.” Aliyev also praised the solidarity shown by GUAM members in supporting one another’s efforts within the United Nations to deal with separatist issues. “Azerbaijan is very grateful to all the members of GUAM for strong support to our initiative in the United Nations General Assembly session on the resolution of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. All the members of GUAM voted in favor of this resolution,” he remarked at the post-summit joint press conference. “The same unity and solidarity we enjoyed when Georgia issued a resolution related to their territorial integrity.” 

After thanking his guests for coming at the post-summit press conference, President Saakashvili warned that “there is an attempt to impose on Georgia a scenario similar to the one that was imposed on Europe and implemented in respect of Czechoslovakia through the Munich agreement, as well as in respect of Poland and the Baltic states through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.” Alluding to the unwillingness of some EU and NATO members to commit to Georgia’s defense against Russian predation, he expressed “hope that a new “Munich” and “Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact”—dividing Europe into spheres of influence, partitioning territories and revising borders, will not be implemented in today’s world.”

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko observed that the Batumi summit participants discussed “projects important not only for the region, but the whole of Europe.” After describing the members’ recent activities in the areas of transportation, energy, and other projects, Yushchenko singled out the importance of dealing with the frozen conflicts because they threaten general Eurasian stability and security. Noting the absence of an agreed settlement plan regarding some conflicts and the lack of even an active negotiating process in others, the Ukrainian president argued that “GUAM needs to strengthen its efforts” in promoting creative solutions regarding both settlement terms and negotiating formats.

As if on cue, Polish President Lech Kaczynski and Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, who both attended the summit, reaffirmed their support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Kaczynski observed that, “No country can demonstrate tolerance to the presence of troops of other countries in its territory.” Adamkus added that, “Invasion of one country into the territory of another one and unresolved conflicts cannot be acceptable.” Both presidents extended support for granting Georgia and Ukraine a NATO Membership Action Plan at the alliance’s Council of Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled for December 2008.

The five presidents present at Batumi signed a declaration entitled, “GUAM—Uniting Europe’s East.’ The document reaffirms their concerns about the threats caused by aggressive separatism, religious and ethnic extremism, and international terrorism. The Batumi declaration restates the members’ readiness to counter such dangers through collective measures in close cooperation with other countries and international institutions. They pledge “to stand jointly against common risks and threats” and to support “peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the GUAM region on the basis of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

IMPLICATIONS: The appeal by the three GUAM heads of state represented yet another attempt to address within GUAM the protracted separatist conflicts that has bedeviled its members since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The crisis over Georgia’s two pro-Moscow separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had long threatened to escalate, while those involving Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh remain explosively unstable. Ukraine is also acutely vulnerable to their negative consequences. Not only do the conflicts impede Ukrainian efforts to benefit from optimal east-west trade and transport routes connecting Europe with Asia through the South Caucasus, but some Russian officials are now threatening Ukraine with dismemberment should it enter NATO or decline to extend basing rights for the Russian Black Sea Fleet after 2017.

The GUAM governments have long lobbied to “internationalize” the frozen conflicts by encouraging other governments and international institutions to contribute to their resolution. Their intent is to break the current stalemate among the conflict parties. GUAM members have pursued several joint initiatives within the UN, OSCE, and other fora aimed at resolving the conflicts in Transnistria, Nagarno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

For example, in December 2007, the GUAM submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly calling on UN members to express support for the territorial integrity of states suffering from such frozen conflicts. They termed the conflicts in the GUAM area threats to peace, and called on all states and international organizations to help resolve them. GUAM members have also jointly worked within the OSCE to induce that organization into endorsing “international mediation efforts aimed at peaceful settlement of these conflicts on the basis of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of internationally recognized borders.”

Furthermore, GUAM representatives have discussed deploying peacekeeping forces from the UN and other organizations into the conflict regions as well as developing their own peacekeeping capabilities. A GUAM peacekeeping contingent might have deployed in the conflict zones along with, or in place of, the existing Russian and CIS peacekeeping forces. With regard to the latter alternative, GUAM members have discussed possibly sending civilian police forces from GUAM states into Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

It is possible that their presence might have averted the latest crisis, though representatives of the separatist authorities in the breakaway regions had expressed opposition to the entry of GUAM peacekeepers into the conflict zones. The Russian authorities shared this negative view. The organization’s official documents specify that GUAM is “not directed against anyone.” In addition, while the United States and some former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe have supported the organization, most NATO and EU members have largely ignored it. Even so, observers in Russia and elsewhere have long seen the institution as an anti-Russian bloc. Although GUAM members all belong (until Georgia’s post-war withdrawal) to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), they generally have shown more interest than other CIS members in developing ties with Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the EU.

The proposal to establish a GUAM peacekeeping force has also divided the members, with Azerbaijani and Moldovan authorities evincing less support than their Georgian and Ukrainian colleagues. In June 2008, however, Ukrainian Defense Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov announced that Georgia and Ukraine would begin creating a joint peacekeeping unit by themselves, which would be open to other GUAM members. “We are now starting together with Georgia practical consultations on what configuration this unit should have and how specific tasks should be carried out,” he declared at a press conference in Tbilisi. How these plans will survive the recent Georgian War remains unclear.

CONCLUSIONS: The Russian invasion of Georgia will presumably derail GUAM’s peacekeeping capabilities for the time being. It is possible that the members will seek to strengthen their collective defenses against further Russian predations, especially given recent Russian threats against Ukraine after that country’s leadership sided with fellow GUAM member Georgia in the recent war. Although the government of Azerbaijan failed to offer similar overt support for Tbilisi, the most vulnerable GUAM member appears to be Moldova. Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin skipped the annual GUAM leadership summit once again this year. Hints of Russian negotiating flexibility regarding Transdniestria combined with Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy imports might lead to the defection of yet another GUAM member. Some Russian strategists might hope to repeat the events of 2002-2005, when Islam Karimov gradually withdrew Uzbekistan from the organization to improve ties with Moscow by realigning his foreign policy away from its previous western orientation.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director for Project Management at the Hudson Institute.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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