The crisis initiated by last month’s disputed elections in Armenia and the violence of March 1 has confronted the international community with hard choices. On the one hand, the elections were imperfect. On the other hand, the opposition is led by a flawed man whose supporters contributed to the violence. Unlike in other former Soviet republics, however, the current crisis has not evolved into an open dispute between Russia and the West.

BACKGROUND: On February 24, Armenia's central electoral commission declared that Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan narrowly won the election outright in the first round, obtaining an absolute majority and thereby avoiding a run-off. Opposition leaders cited evidence of fraud and demanded annulment of the February 19 results and the holding of another ballot.

On March 1, following weeks of street protests and mass rallies, violence erupted when the police tried to evict the protesters from parts of downtown Yerevan. Levon Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s first president and the main opposition candidate, criticized international observers for endorsing the elections and called on foreign governments to renounce the regime: “I hope the international community understands that the regime in Armenia does not have the support of the people. This conflict will now last for five years, with full-time violence.”

International observers had offered varying assessments of the elections. The monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) found many local irregularities, especially in the vote counting. Even so, in their February 22 report, they concluded that the process was “mostly in line with the country's international commitments” and represented an improvement over past ballots.

Some world leaders have congratulated Sargsyan on winning the election. Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to endorse the result. He described the election of Sargsyan, considered favorably disposed toward Moscow, as “contributing to the stability in the Caucasus.”

Armenia is Russia’s closest ally in the South Caucasus. Armenians have long considered Russians their great power protector against Turkey. At present, Armenia hosts an important military base at Gyumri, located about 120 kilometers from the Yerevan. About 5,000 Russian military personnel are currently deployed there. Armenia is also a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Russian-Armenian economic ties are also strong. In 2007, trade between the two countries grew by 65 percent. Russia is Armenia’s leading economic partner, accounting for over 16 percent of Armenia’s foreign trade and supplying its largest source of foreign investment. According to official sources, Russian investors accounted for a third of total accrued investment in the Armenian economy.  From 1991 to 2007, Russians invested a total of $1 billion in Armenia’s banking, communications, information technology, transport, chemicals, mining and other sectors. 

Two weeks before the elections, Sargsyan signed a number of commercial agreements with a visiting Russian government delegation led by Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov. For example, Sargsyan agreed to participate in the planned Russian-led international nuclear fuels service center in Angarsk, Siberia. At that same February 6 meeting, the two prime ministers declared their joint goal of bringing the current level of bilateral trade of $0.7 billion to $1 billion within the next few years. Although none of the visiting Russians endorsed Sargsyan’s election, observers interpreted Zubkov’s presence so close to the presidential ballot as an effort to bolster Sargsyan’s election prospects.

IMPLICATIONS: Despite these extensive military and economic ties, which lead many Russians to consider Armenia as falling within Moscow’s sphere of influence, the Russian government and media have adopted a low profile during the recent election crisis. Their limited visibility might have resulted from Russians’ preoccupation with their own complex presidential transition, or from an appreciation that visibly siding with one party could easily backfire, either by discrediting it among Armenian nationalists or, as in Ukraine, creating problems if Moscow’s favorite candidate lost.

It was only after two weeks of mass protests and the “Bloody Saturday” clash that the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a brief four-sentence “commentary” on the situation. The statement, besides regretting at the loss of life, expressed “hope that the measures taken by the Armenian leaders will bring about the settlement of the domestic political situation ... ensuring the security of the Armenian people and the country’s stable development.”

Unlike Russia, most Western governments have withheld formal endorsement of the election results. For example, the U.S. State Department issued a statement simply congratulating the Armenia people for holding the election. On March 1, following the armed clash in Yerevan, U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack issued a press release that “calls on all sides to avoid further violence, act fully within the law, exercise maximum restraint, and resume political dialogue.” The statement related that Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried had delivered this message to Sargsyan, while the U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Yerevan had communicated the same points to opposition leaders.  

The State Department subsequently announced that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza would travel to Armenia to help “facilitate discussions” between the government and the opposition. Although McCormack said Bryza would not carry out “formal mediation,” his presence would still prove useful because “we need to see both the parties work with one another, engage in dialogue, not violence.”

On February 26, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Finnish Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva, visited Yerevan to meet with Armenian leaders in an unsuccessful effort to promote a negotiated solution to the election deadlock. He found the political situation too polarized to achieve any meaningful results, telling reporters that, “the post-election period at the moment is quite complicated and the post-election tensions are obvious.”

After the March 1 violence, Kanerva urged the authorities “to use maximum restraint.”  He sent Ambassador Heikki Talvitie as his Special Envoy to Yerevan to meet with Armenia’s leading politicians to encourage them to seek a resolution of their differences through negotiations. After meeting with the government and opposition, Talvitie told the media that Ter-Petrosyan and the government were not yet ready to engage in meaningful negotiations.

The European Union has also sought a peaceful resolution to the crisis. EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana appealed to “all parties to exercise restraint so as to facilitate a quick return to normality.” Solana expressed European concerns to Kocharyan over the phone, but the EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, traveled to Yerevan to assess the crisis first hand as well as engage in some on-site diplomacy.

The day after the February 19 ballot, Turkish President Abdullah Gul sent a message of congratulations to Sargsyan in which he expressed hope that the elections would lead to an improvement of relations between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey has no formal diplomatic relations with Armenia and has closed its land border to protest Armenia’s occupation of territory belonging to Azerbaijan, Turkey’s closest ally in the region. Although Sargsyan, like Kocharyan, is a native of Nagorno-Karabakh and a former separatist military commander, Turkish leaders may have hoped that he will moderate his predecessor’s hard-line position on the disputed region. In any case, before the elections, he told the Turkish press he hoped to improve relations.

Developments in recent days, however, suggest that, even if he assumes office, Sargsyan would find himself in a precarious domestic political position. As a result, he would find it difficult to make meaningful concessions on an issue that so captivates Armenian nationalists, who could easily turn against him. Vahan Hovhannisian, who ran as candidate for the nationalist Dashnaktsutiun party, insisted that Armenia should not even negotiate with Azerbaijan until its government signs a non-aggression pact with Armenia, effectively renouncing its threat to retake its lost territories by force.

During the campaign, Sargsyan said he would welcome Kosovo’s independence since it would then be harder for the international community to deny recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. Sargsyan also attacked Ter-Petrossian for being soft on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in the past – he lost power in 1998 due in part to his advocacy of making limited concessions – and for holding a “defeatist” attitude and seeking to surrender the region at present.  Ter-Petrossian argued that Armenia should more actively seek a settlement since the country’s bargaining position would worsen over time due to Azerbaijan’s surging economy and resulting military buildup. He also alleged that Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and current foreign minister Vardan Oskanian were prepared in 1999 to exchange the southern Meghri region of Armenia for Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjoining Lachin district.

CONCLUSIONS: Although Russia remains Armenia’s closest ally, Western governments enjoy some influence. The Armenian leadership has sought to develop good ties in Western countries, partly to avoid becoming too dependent on Russia, and partly due to Armenia’s self-perception as a European nation. Armenia participates in various EU and NATO programs, including the EU European Neighborhood Policy and NATO’s Partnership for Peace, which provides the country with certain economic, military, and diplomatic benefits. The Armenian Diaspora, especially influential in France and the United States, also pulls Armenians westward.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director for Project Management at the Hudson Institute.