Wednesday, 06 February 2008

ARMENIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS DECIDED BY THE PAST?

Published in Analytical Articles

By Blanka Hancilova and Olga Azatyan (2/6/2008 issue of the CACI Analyst)

In fall 2007, Armenia’s first post-Soviet president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, entered the presidential race, upsetting a seemingly idyllic transfer of power from Robert Kocharyan to his long-time ally, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. Although the campaign proved livelier than expected, Ter-Petrosyan has failed to consolidate the opposition and is unlikely to succeed in his challenge.

In fall 2007, Armenia’s first post-Soviet president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, entered the presidential race, upsetting a seemingly idyllic transfer of power from Robert Kocharyan to his long-time ally, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. Although the campaign proved livelier than expected, Ter-Petrosyan has failed to consolidate the opposition and is unlikely to succeed in his challenge. He might, however, create the grounds for re-establishing a strong political presence for the years to come.

BACKGROUND: The 2008 presidential election campaign centers around two main candidates – the current Prime Minister, Serzh Sargsyan, and former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan.

Serzh Sargsyan has the outspoken support of the incumbent President, as well as the two largest parties in parliament – the Armenian Republican Party (65 seats out of 131) and the “Prosperous Armenia” party (25 seats). In addition, Sargsyan commands the full administrative levers of incumbency.

Ter-Petrosyan mounted his challenge in September 2007, lashing out at “corrupt and criminal” authorities. He accused President Kocharyan and Prime Minister Sargsyan of being part of a criminal system that tightly controls the security apparatus, the judicial system and the electronic media, and creates an “atmosphere of fear.” Kocharyan countered with charges that Ter-Petrosyan’s and his Armenian National Movement “bear responsibility for the destruction of the Armenian economy” and that they had left a “bad legacy”.

Ter-Petrosyan’s comeback was backed from the very beginning by the most radical opposition parties that are not represented in the parliament – the People’s Party of Armenia chaired by Stepan Demirchyan and the Republic Party chaired by Aram Z. Sargsyan. Opposition parties represented in the Parliament,  the Orinats Yerkir (Country of Law) party, led by another presidential candidate and former speaker of the National Assembly Artur Baghdasarian, and Zharangutiun (Heritage), initially hesitated whether to back Ter-Petrosyan, but as reported by Armenian media on February 2, Ter-Petrosyan is convinced that they will endorse his presidential bid.

Other opposition leaders, such as Vazgen Manukyan of the National Democratic Unionand Artashes Geghamyan of the National Unity party (neither represented in the parliament) and Vahan Hovannisyan of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (third strongest parliamentary party) hold old personal grudges against Ter-Petrosyan and stand for elections separately.  

IMPLICATIONS: So far, the 2008 Armenian election campaign has been marked by mutual accusations between former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the current authorities, represented by Sargsyan and Kocharyan. Both sides have focused on the past rather than formulating programmatic visions of the future.

During the pre-election period, the authorities have clearly indicated that they will go to great lengths to secure the continuity of the regime. They have shown a willingness to use control of the media, intimidate opposition sympathizers including businessmen, and to use their ‘administrative resources’ in order to secure a favorable outcome in the election.

As expected, Ter-Petrosyan and his supporters face difficulties in getting their message to the public. Practically all TV stations are under the control of the government and businessmen closely aligned with the government, while the by comparison more independent newspapers and radio stations are far less influential outlets than TV.  The regime sent a clear and strong message early on, when it clamped down on the Gyumri-based TV Gala, which broadcasted Ter-Petrosyan’s speech of September 21, 2007. The station was raided by tax authorities and visited by the national security service. (See October 31 issue of the CACI Analyst http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4727) Media outlets often provide positive coverage of Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan, while any mention of Ter-Petrosyan as rule takes place in negative context. This lack of balance in media coverage was noted by Terry Davis, the Secretary General of Council of Europe, who in a mid-December interview assessed that the situation surrounding the Armenian media “does not meet the standards of the Council of Europe to a large extent.”

Businessmen who support Ter-Petrosyan have faced difficulties with the authorities. The Sil Group, owned by influential Member of Parliament Khachatur Sukiasyan who publicly backed Ter-Petrosyan, had to deal with aggressive tax inspection in October 2007.

Several parties, including the party of Serzh Sargsyan, have had windows shot out in some of their offices, and supporters of Ter-Petrosyan have been detained following an allegedly pre-fabricated incident in which one person was beaten during a pro-Ter-Petrosyan rally held in 29 January in Talin. 

Several opposition presidential candidates criticized the results of opinion polls conducted by Baltic Surveys Ltd/Gallup Organization, based in Lithuania, in cooperation with the support of local Armenian Sociological Association led by Gevork Poghosyan. They charged that the results deliberately favored Serzh Sargsyan. As a result, the U.S. Embassy and USAID withdrew their offer to conduct exit polls, citing the inability to “resolve all of the detailed procedural questions” with all involved partners.

Ter-Petrosyan’s severe criticism of the current regime has so far not been accompanied by equally critical reflections of his own shortcomings while he served as president. Many in Armenia remember the hardships of the early 1990s, during and immediately after the war with Azerbaijan. It will therefore be a momentous task to convince them that Ter-Petrosyan is a superior choice compared to Sargsyan. Importantly, old grievances prevented Ter-Petrosyan from uniting the opposition, thus leaving the balance of power practically unaltered and in favor of the current regime.  This is certainly good news for the frontrunner, Serzh Sargsyan. Ter-Petrosyan is an easy target, his shortcomings obvious and easily exploitable.

Given the degree of polarization and the tone set by the pre-election debate, the election campaign is unlikely to be based on issue or political programs, but will rather remain a contest of personalities. So far, the presidential candidates vying for public support have been rather silent or talked in very general terms on important foreign policy issues – the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenian-Turkish relations, for example, but all of them stressed internal Armenian issues such as the improvement of welfare, economic development and rule of law, including the struggle against corruption.

CONCLUSIONS: The election campaign in Armenia centers around two candidates only – Serzh Sargsyan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan. This choice, for most Armenians, represents choosing the lesser of two evils. Reliable polling information is lacking, and it is difficult to foresee whether there will be a second round, though observers increasingly believe that none of the candidates will secure the necessary 50 percent of votes to avoid a runoff. But should a second round take place between Sargsyan and Ter-Petrosyan, several of the seven presidential candidates are likely to favor Sargsyan, primarily because of personal grudges with Ter-Petrosyan. Overall, Armenian politics seem set on a path of transition of power from Kocharyan to Sargsyan.

It remains to be seen whether the elections will be conducted in as orderly a manner as the May 2007 parliamentary polls, that were to a large degree conducted in line with international standards for democratic elections. In any case, it seems that the upcoming presidential elections are unlikely to fundamentally change the consolidated nature of Armenian politics, in which decisions on the essentials of country’s political orientation tend not to be publicly discussed.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Blanka Hancilova is analyst of international relations with a focus on the CIS and the co-founder of Apreco Consulting Group. Olga Azatyan is an analyst with Apreco Consulting Group.
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