The January 5 presidential elections vindicated Georgia’s democratic credentials. It brought Mikheil Saakashvili a second term in power, but one which will be distinctively different from his first. With Georgia’s post-revolutionary period coming to an end, parliamentary elections this spring are certain to yield a much more diverse and contested political scene. This political scene is intensely polarized and subjected to both external and asymmetric threats, posing substantial challenges for the consolidation of Georgian democracy and stability.

BACKGROUND: On January 5, Georgia held its first competitive presidential elections since the Rose Revolution – the 2004 election that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power with ca. 95% of the vote was, for all practical purposes, a referendum legitimizing the revolution. Preliminary results indicate Mr. Saakashvili won a victory in the first round, narrowly exceeding the 50% of the vote needed. He is thus escaping a second round against his main opponent Levan Gachechiladze, the candidate of a unified opposition bloc, who received only half the number of votes. In two parallel referenda, clear majorities of the Georgian electorate voted in favor of both NATO accession, and for holding parliamentary elections in the spring of 2008.

International monitoring bodies deemed the Georgian election process to be mainly in accordance with democratic principles, vindicating Saakashvili’s democratic credentials. However, monitors expressed criticism of some irregularities, mainly with regard to the use of administrative resources in the campaign. The EU has now called on all political actors to respect the election results, and to engage in securing the democratic development of the Georgian state, particularly with a view to upcoming parliamentary elections. While final official results are yet to be announced, and in spite of international recognition of the elections, the opposition is contesting the validity of the electoral process and calling on its supporters to unite in new demonstrations on Rustaveli Avenue on January 13.

The decision to hold early presidential elections was taken by then-President Saakashvili in November 2007, shortly after the crackdown on unrest in Tbilisi. On November 2-7, protesters and opposition activists took to the streets of Tbilisi, demanding early parliamentary elections, amendments to the electoral system, and – following the second day of protests – Saakashvili’s resignation. The demonstrations ended in a serious stand-off between riot police and protesters on November 7, resulting in a harsh crackdown by police, the closure of the oppositional Imedi TV channel, and the announcement of a state of emergency that lasted nine days. On November 25, Saakashvili resigned to campaign for a second presidential term.

Having won an overwhelming victory in the 2004 presidential election, Saakashvili faced a highly polarized campaign climate. His main opponents, a nine-party coalition formed in September 2007 shortly after the arrest of ex-defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, has spared no effort in portraying the ex-president as an autocratic leader, likely to manipulate the election results in order to secure his second term in power. Early on, the opposition stated that any victory for Saakashvili would indicate rigged elections, implying their refusal to accept such an outcome and their readiness to once again take the streets to challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent elite.

Over the course of his campaign, Saakashvili has struggled to project a more modest and down-to-earth image, in order to regain some of his lost credibility in the eyes of the public. The ruling party has also sought to legitimize its November crackdown on the opposition, through presenting credible evidence that it in November last year was faced with a coup attempt, staged by oligarch and presidential candidate Arkady (Badri) Patarkatsishvili. Nonetheless, in spite of what appears to have amounted to a landslide victory for Saakashvili, the election results indicate that events of the last few months damaged to the image of Saakashvili and his allies. This is the case particularly in the Tbilisi area, where Saakashvili only came in second in the election. Meanwhile, Saakashvili won by large margins in many of Georgia’s most rural and densely minority-populated areas. This indicates on the one hand the potent regional divisions in the country, but also that Mr. Saakashvili is acquiring a status as the protector of national minority communities. This is not an unproblematic image in the still very segregated Georgian political climate, and is already being played on by the opposition to further weaken Saakashvili.

IMPLICATIONS: The January 5 election has multiple implications. First and most obviously, it constituted a democratic landmark in Georgia’s history. Indeed, it is the first national election in the country – and one of the very first in the entire CIS – to be considered mainly in accordance with democratic principles. Given the unruly political climate in the country, the Government deserves merit for this achievement, which has implications beyond Georgia: it shows that with enough political will, a post-Soviet state can overcome the legacy of the Soviet past as well as present-day instability, and hold democratic elections.

Secondly, the January 5 election marks the beginning of a new political era in Georgia. It is clear that the post-revolution process, in which the ruling elite was able to push its reformist agenda through its uncontested domination of the political scene, has come to an end. This gives rise to both challenges and opportunities. Indeed, the run-up to the January 5 election highlighted the institutional shortcomings of the current Georgian political party system. Throughout the election process, both the ruling party and arguably to an even larger extent the opposition were reluctant to engage in constructive political debate, focusing their campaigns on the promotion of personalities rather than their respective political agendas. The current lack of dialogue, political compromise and respect for political diversity on the part of all parties is troublesome in light of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The deeply fragmented political scene clouds the prospects of constructive cooperation in the next parliament. Ultimately, this may have a paralyzing effect on the progress of reforms in the country.

Third, this also indicates the weakness of the political party structures in Georgia. In fact, neither the national movement nor the opposition parties are true political parties in the western sense. The national movement breaks down into several constituent units with quite diverse political agendas, united mainly by the personality of president Saakashvili. Likewise, none of the opposition political parties would be likely to survive the departure of their current leaders. A further weakness of the party structure is that opposition figures without political affiliation received more support than established parties: indeed, Gachechiladze and Patarkatsishvili received more votes than Labor party candidate Shalva Natelashvili and New Rights’ candidate Davit Gamkrelidze.

At the same time, the end of the National Movement’s political dominance and the weakness of the political party structure carries opportunities for the development of new political actors and formations on the Georgian political scene. The strengthening of a political party system, and a culture of compromise and dialogue, are nevertheless unlikely to develop without strong and support of Georgia’s western allies.

Fourth, the opposition’s tendency of taking to the streets instead of communicating its demands within the country’s institutional framework continues to undermine the legitimacy of state institutions. As experienced before in Georgia, national unrest and a weakened state apparatus opens up to exploitation of Georgia’s national interests by foreign and transnational actors. Primary among these is of course the role of Russia, which can be counted upon to exploit any weakening of the Georgian state. The election campaign also highlighted the danger that asymmetric threats can pose to a nascent democracy. In Georgia, the main asymmetric threat to the political system is the role played by Patarkatsishvili, the country’s richest man. Patarkatsishvili has for some time exploited the openness of Georgia’s political system for his political aims. Indeed, he has founded a TV station that served as a mouthpiece for increasingly fierce anti-government rhetoric; used his fortune to finance opposition political parties and forces, and organizing protestors. The dangers posed were clearly indicated by audio and video evidence presented by the government, which credibly shows that Patarkatsishvili plotted to utilize the elections to foment a coup against the authorities. This was done by seeking to bribe a high-level police figure to ‘reveal’ made-up evidence of electoral fraud on election day, which in turn would be used to bring out popular anger and topple the government. Had Georgian authorities not been able to expose this plot, it could have made serious damage to the election process. Indeed, the episode highlights the difficulty faced by democratic states in countering non-democratic opponents seeking to exploit and abuse the democratic system and the popular mood.

The external (Russian) as well as asymmetric threats are serious impediments to Georgia’s prospects of consolidating democracy. Indeed, should these threats continue while the Georgian political system remains weak, authoritarian sentiments could easily be rekindled among Georgia’s political forces, some of which may conclude that Georgia cannot, under current circumstances, afford the ‘luxury’ of democracy. This prospect makes it all the more necessary for Georgia’s western partners to invest into engagement and dialogue with all legitimate political forces in Georgia to strengthen democratic institutions.

CONCLUSIONS: The heavily polarized political scene that has emerged in Georgia over the last year poses a particular challenge for Georgia western allies, especially Europe. As noted above, Georgia is unlikely to overcome this polarization without the positive assistance of its Western partners. Having recognized the accomplishments in Georgia, it is nonetheless important to avoid complacency. It would be logical for Georgia’s Western partners to engage even further to help build a plural and balanced political scene, rather than one marked by intense and personalized controversy. This engagement will necessarily include dialogue with political forces, not neglecting the importance of working with opposition forces to strengthen their respect for the democratic process and divert their attention from street politics.

Georgia has taken an important step toward sustainable democracy. But challenges are many, and most are immediate. Key among these will be, aside from implementing the recommendations of the international observation mission, to help reduce the intense polarization of the political system. Moreover, looking toward the future, a key element for Georgian democracy to take root will be to build the capacity of state institutions to defend, by democratic means, Georgia’s democracy from external and asymmetric threats. Western policies will play a crucial role in determining whether this will succeed or not.

AUTHORS’ BIO: Temuri Yakobashvili is Executive Vice President of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. Johanna Popjanevski is Deputy Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, based in Stockholm.