On December 12, the Russian government “suspended” its obligations regarding the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The immediate effect of the suspension, an option not even provided for in the original 1990 treaty, has been that Moscow has stopped providing information about the size, location, and activities of its military forces west of the Ural Mountains, the Russian territory covered by the treaty. Another consequence, however, has been to exacerbate security concerns in countries located near Russia, especially in Georgia and Turkey.

BACKGROUND: The decision of the Russian government to suspend its CFE obligations could allow it to ignore the treaty’s numerical limitations and increase the aggregate size of Russia’s conventional forces, which are already the largest of any European country. At present, such a decision is unlikely given Russian leaders’ intent to limit conventional defense expenditures and instead generally pursue less costly “asymmetric” responses to foreign military threats. 

A more likely Russian response would be violating the CFE Treaty’s sub-regional “flank” limits. These restrictions prevent the concentration of heavy conventional weapons in northeastern and southeastern Russia (primarily near Norway and Turkey, respectively). In their criticisms of the treaty, Russian officials have singled out these limits for constraining Moscow’s ability to move forces within Russia’s borders (specifically the northwest Leningrad military district and the North Caucasus military district).

Russian officials claim that the flank provisions are discriminatory in that they do not similarly constrain NATO military deployments in the Baltic republics – which gained independence only after the original the treaty was signed – or in southeast Europe. Russian representatives continue to express concerns about U.S. military activities in Bulgaria and Romania, two former Warsaw Pact members that recently joined NATO. In his controversial February 2007 presentation before the Munich Security Conference, President Vladimir Putin cited U.S. military deployments in Romania and Bulgaria, which he intimated violated the spirit if not the letter of the CFE Treaty, to justify his assessment that the treaty was in “pitiable condition.” After returning from a December 8 meeting of the NATO-Russian Council, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov likewise accused NATO of disrupting European arms control by increasing its military presence along both of Russia’s flanks – in the Black Sea states of Romania and Bulgaria as well as in the three Baltic republics.

In a news conference held after the moratorium went into effect, the head of the Russian General Staff, General Yury Baluyevsky, disclaimed any plans for a major near-term increase in the size of Russia’s military contingents in the CFE-governed regions around Russia’s borders: “We woke up on December 12 in the same situation. It doesn’t mean there will be a massive arms build-up to the north, to the south and to the west.” Nevertheless, General Baluyevsky acknowledged that, “at least I, as head of the armed forces, can exercise complete freedom in the movement of the armed forces on Russian territory.  I didn’t have that right prior to December 12.” During a visit to Washington a few days before the moratorium went into effect, General Baluyevsky said that the suspension decision would “remove discriminatory flank limitations under the treaty” and “untie Russia’s hands on its own territory,” much like the CFE treaty allows NATO to freely re-deploy its forces anywhere in Europe.  

Representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense have confirmed that contingency plans are being developed to increase military deployments in western Russia. “We are carrying out work as regards the issue,” First Deputy Defense Minister General Alexander Kolmakov told the Russian media, though he added that no decision had been made yet to implement the plans. 

IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s southern neighbors are more likely than those to Moscow’s northwest to experience a local Russian military buildup. The thrust of Russian complaints about their northwestern flank is that, since the Baltic states gained independence after the original CFE Treaty went into force, and NATO has refused to ratify the revised 1999 CFE Adaptation agreement until Russia fulfills its concurrent Istanbul Commitments, the Baltic region has become a “grey zone” uncovered by any conventional arms control agreement. Russian policy has focused on inducing NATO to ratify the 1999 accord, which would then allow the Baltic countries to adhere to the Treaty, as they have pledged to do.

In contrast, the Russian defense community has repeatedly insisted they need more flexibility to deploy larger troop concentrations along their southern flank to counter Islamist-inspired terrorism in Chechnya and other areas. Putin has described the North Caucasus as still “the most dangerous” region for Russian security. In announcing the suspension decision, the Russian Foreign Ministry called on NATO to abolish the flank limitations because “they hinder our common struggle against terrorism.” 

In the past, Moscow has accused Georgian authorities of taking inadequate measures to prevent extremists based on Georgian territory from providing logistical support for terrorists in the North Caucasus. Russian leaders have sometimes expressed the opinion that they might need to conduct military operations in Georgia to neutralize these alleged terrorist backers, a move that would violate the now suspended CFE Treaty. Russian representatives have also intimated that they might increase their military presence in Georgia’s separatist regions in retaliation for NATO governments’ recognition of Kosovo’s independence from Russia’s ally Serbia.

Turkey’s proximity to Russia has long made its government one of the strongest supporters of the CFE accord, especially its flank limitations. A member of the Turkish delegation to NATO in Brussels told the Turkish Daily News that Ankara is now worried about a possible increase in Russian troop levels along its southern flank. The concern was less that Russia’s move would adversely affect its military balance with Turkey, and more that new Russian military deployments in the Caucasus would increase tensions in the region, most notably between Russia and Georgia.

An official in the Turkish Foreign Ministry also found unconvincing Moscow’s claim that Russia needed to increase its defenses along its southwestern border to counter terrorism: “Russia claims it is facing a terrorism threat and cannot deal with it properly due to the restrictions imposed on it by the Treaty. We have told the Russians that we cannot see any immediate terrorism threat directed toward them.” The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the Russian suspension decision “particularly perplexing” given the “multidimensional dialogue” that Turkey and other NATO governments had conducted with Russia, which offered “a constructive way forward that would preserve the integrity of the Treaty with all its elements including the Flank regime, and would allow the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty responding to Russian concerns”.

Russia’s move to reopen the CFE Treaty to further revisions has already exacerbated tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which remain in a state of conflict over the territory of Mounatinous Karabakh. At the OSCE Council of Ministers meeting in late November 2007, Armenian Defense Minister Vardan Oskanian claimed that Azerbaijan was exceeding its CFE armaments limits. Although insisting that his country was fulfilling its current obligations, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov echoed Moscow’s call to revise the treaty. As justification, he cited the need to deal with Armenia’s occupation of one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory following the Mountainous Karabakh, conflict, which resulted in “weapons [being] unlawfully kept on this territory.”  Vaan Ovannisian, the deputy speaker of the Armenian parliament, replied that Armenia would withdraw from the treaty entirely if Azerbaijan attempted to revise its provisions.

CONLUSIONS: NATO spokesman James Appathurai acknowledged that the alliance was worried by the potential of a military buildup in western Russia, saying that “to see large amounts of what is now treaty-limited equipment suddenly moving ... would be a concern to NATO countries.” Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether NATO collectively would agree to do anything more than verbally protest a Russian military upsurge along its southern border. Alliance members are already deeply divided over whether to consider even offering possible membership to Georgia or Azerbaijan. In addition, relations between Turkey and other NATO members remain strained over the Iraq War and Turkey’s frustrated EU membership aspirations. Russian officials might conclude that increasing military tensions in the South Caucasus could actually help induce cautious NATO members to resist deepening the alliance’s involvement in the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director for Project Management at the Hudson Institute.