On October 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin named Grigori Rapota as his new plenipotentiary representative to Russia’s Southern Federal District (YUFO). Rapota’s appointment was a surprise. Latterly secretary of the Eurasian Economic Association, Rapota is known as a low-profile, somewhat demure official. Following his appointment as Putin’s plenipotentiary to YUFO, several media outlets misidentified him as “Georgi Rapota” - a relatively inconsequential faux pas which nevertheless underscored Mr. Rapota’s undeniably flimsy political profile. But what are the reasons behind Rapota’s appointment? Could it portent a serious reassessment of the Kremlin’s administrative machinery in YUFO?

BACKGROUND: Grigori Rapota now occupies a post which thoroughly exasperated its previous incumbent. Named as Russia’s new minister for regional development on September 12, Dmitry Kozak, who served as the president’s plenipotentiary to YUFO for three years, had been seeking to divest himself of these responsibilities for some time. Kozak assumed his previous posting in September 2004 shortly after the tragedy at school no. 1 in Beslan. Kozak brought zeal and diligence to this difficult job. He stood out from the previous occupants of this position for his urbanity as much as anything else, which kindled forlorn hope that the Kremlin had finally realized that the application of brute force alone could not quiet the restless North Caucasus.

Despite a number of early tactical victories - removing the figureheads of entrenched local clan interests in North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan, for example - in April 2006 Kozak suffered an embarrassing, well-publicized setback while trying to affect a territorial merger between Adygeya and Krasnodar Krai. Adygeya’s then-president, Khazret Sovmen, supported by local Circassian nationalists, took exception to this plan and directed his ire almost exclusively at Kozak although the plan itself appears to have been sanctioned at the highest levels in Moscow.

Although Kozak has since had his revenge - showcasing impressive conspiratorial skills to bring about Sovmen’s eventual replacement by the more agreeable Aslan Tkhakushinov - the popular anger unleashed by the merger proposal forced the Kremlin to set aside its plans to simplify the region’s jurisdictional landscape. As plenipotentiary to YUFO, Kozak was mandated with ensuring the smooth operation of administrative organs throughout the region. Quite demonstrably, however, this mandate did not apply to the region’s most strategically significant republic - Chechnya. Decision-making with respect to Chechnya has remained the prerogative of President Putin and a small cabal of advisors since the beginning of the current phase of hostilities between the Russian state and the Chechen rebel movement.

Kozak consistently butted heads with Putin’s favored proxy in Chechnya, the powerful Kadyrov clan, and his relations with Ramzan Kadyrov, the republic’s pro-Moscow president, were believed to be strained. Kozak did not deem Kadyrov experienced enough to head Chechnya’s political system, but these reservations were disregarded by Putin. This was hardly surprising: a churl might suggest that Kozak’s most enduring legacy in respect of Chechen affairs has been to persuade Ramzan to abandon his much-maligned penchant for garish shell-suits in favor of the well-tailored suits favored by other regional leaders.

IMPLICATIONS: The fact that it took the Kremlin over three weeks to announce Grigori Rapota as Kozak’s replacement is curious and mandates discussion. In the past, when Putin has resolved to reassign or remove officials, the process has usually been carried out smoothly and decisively. The puzzling delay in filling the vacant plenipotentiary post suggests that Rapota’s eventual appointment was subject to considerable deliberation.

Indeed, we cannot assume that Rapota was the first choice candidate to fill the post; perhaps this onerous task was offered to others who declined it. Above all, Rapota is a consensual appointment. Naturally, Putin and Kozak have both categorically endorsed him. So too have most leaders in the North Caucasus - among them the influential Ramzan Kadyrov. Rapota’s arrival in YUFO may also be one of the first attempts by Sergei Ivanov - despite the current hullabaloo surrounding Russia’s new premier, Victor Zubkov, still a leading candidate to replace Putin as president next year - to exert influence over Russia’s policy toward the North Caucasus. Some reports identify Rapota as “Ivanov’s man”. These reports are credible in that, according to information in the public domain, both would likely have worked together in the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, Finland at some point during the 1980s.

It is not difficult to imagine these two men striking up an easy rapport. They have similar professional and educational backgrounds: both cut their teeth in the SVR (Soviet/Russian external intelligence) and both are linguists of some ability (both are fluent in English and Swedish). Like Ivanov, Rapota scaled Russia’s notoriously slippery political ladder as a protégé of the prototypical “silovik”, the former prime minister and intelligence chief, Yevgeni Primakov. From 1993 until late 1998, Rapota served as deputy director of the SVR. He also functioned as undersecretary of the National Security Council for eight months beginning in April 1998. Primakov then proposed his candidature for the directorship of Russia’s state-owned arms export organization - a job he performed for less than a year. He then worked as first deputy minister for industry, science and technologies for a short time until September 2001, when he was made chief of the Eurasian Economic Association. But assuming that Ivanov successfully lobbied for Rapota, does his appointment as plenipotentiary really represent a bona fide political triumph for the ambitious first deputy prime minister? The office of plenipotentiary to the southern federal district was undoubtedly lent a certain prestige by its previous incumbent. Rapota’s surprising appointment has triggered a chorus of skeptical commentaries regarding the continued efficacy of this office. Some believe that the appointment of the distinctly low-profile Rapota might well presage the abolition of the plenipotentiary post. Others, meanwhile, have speculated that the functions of this office might be subsumed into Kozak’s ministry for regional development, thereby enabling the former plenipotentiary to retain influence in the North Caucasus at a safe remove.

CONCLUSION: Could the scene be set for an old-fashioned turf battle between Ivanov and Kozak? There have already been indications that these two political heavyweights are at loggerheads. While Ivanov is a frontrunner to become the next Russian president, Kozak has previously been mentioned as a potential dark horse candidate. Now seated comfortably at the cabinet table in Moscow following his recent return from Rostov-on-Don, the idea of Kozak emerging as “the man from nowhere” does not appear so exotic a prospect. Both of these men will be mindful of how the North Caucasus emerged as the cradle of Vladimir Putin’s presidency back in 1999. Within this context, Grigori Rapota’s arrival in YUFO will please both Ivanov and Kozak - but for very different reasons. Despite his return to Moscow, Kozak will continue to wield influence in the wider North Caucasus in his capacity as minister for regional development. Furthermore, many of the local leaders still owe their allegiance to him. Rapota will therefore not prevent him from wielding continued influence in the region. By contriving to have Rapota named plenipotentiary to YUFO, Ivanov may be attempting to carve out his own niche in the North Caucasus. Historically, however, the efficacy of the plenipotentiary office has rested on the strength of personality brought to bear by its incumbent. It is far from certain whether Mr. Rapota is possessed of such resolve; if his reassignment to YUFO was indeed made at Ivanov’s behest, it is unlikely to yield the latter any concrete political influence in the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College Cork, Ireland.