Plans to send more contract troops to the northern Caucasus, trained specifically for mountain and counterinsurgency operations, is a sign that the Russian defense ministry has a firm grasp of the security needs for the region. Still, despite some progress on the security front, poverty and lawlessness remain acute problems in Dagestan, as elsewhere in the Caucasus. The appointment of a new, reform-minded president, and the reported deaths of significant terrorist leaders, suggests authorities may be replicating Chechnya’s modest success. But, Moscow will be hard-pressed to build upon progress in Dagestan as long as it is focused on Chechnya and the rapidly deteriorating situation in Ingushetia.

BACKGROUND: On Sept. 17, 2007, Federal Security Service (FSB) troops in Dagestan, including special forces members of the “V” Directorate, surrounded insurgent leader Rappani Khalilov in the village of Novy Sulak in the Kizilyurt district. The special forces operation killed Khalilov and an aide and netted several important detainees. Khalilov commanded the insurgent group that bombed the city of Kaspiisk – located on the Caspian Sea coastline – in May 2002, killing 43 people and wounding 170. Since 2006, he commanded the entire Dagestan “front” for the Islamist rebellion against Russian authority in the North Caucasus.

Just three days later, conflicting reports emerged from Dagestan’s capital Makhachkala regarding the apprehension of Omar Sheikhulaev and Shamil Gasanov, leaders of the “Jamaat Sharia,” a Dagestani-based terrorist group. Those reports were not subsequently confirmed, but news of the story originally emerged when a citizen tipped off local security forces about suspicious renters. The Jamaat Sharia of Dagestan (formerly known as Dzhennet or “Paradise”) has been responsible for numerous attacks on security officers in the republic, including the 2006 assassination of Buinaksk prosecutor Bitar Bitarov.

Whether or not the Jamaat Sharia leadership is apprehended in follow-up police sweeps and patrols, the republic’s overall security situation is a far cry from August 1999, when Rappani Khalilov helped lead the Chechen invasion of Dagestan that saw 1,500 ethnic Avars, Dargins, Chechens and Arabs seize several border villages in the Botlikh and Tsumadi districts. The invaders announced the creation of an “independent Islamic State of Dagestan”, but Dagestani security forces and the Russian army, joined by militia volunteers, eventually drove the invaders out. Despite this resounding victory against insurgents in Dagestan, Moscow continued to ignore Dagestan’s security needs and poor economic development; instead, the government focused massive manpower and materiel on the second Chechen War. Thus, Dagestan today remains the second most dangerous region in Russia, and the number of armed encounters with insurgents has at times surpassed that in Chechnya. That said, the official number of terrorist attacks has recently dropped. The Deputy head of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee Department, Sergei Bezmin, recently reported a drop in terror attacks in Dagestan between 2005 and 2006, from 77 to 17. However, several days later Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev underscored the state of disorder in the southern region, noting “16,000 crimes were registered in the republic, an increase of 21 percent [from 2005].” In just the first four months of 2007, 6,000 crimes were reported.

Furthermore, terrorists still commonly target local leaders and security officials. In August of last year and again in February, insurgents attempted to assassinate Dagestani Interior Minister Adilgerei Magomedtagirov (replaced this September by Magomed Gazimagomedov). Magomedtagirov escaped a roadside bombing on Feb. 4, 2007 because he wasn’t traveling in his official vehicle at the time of the attack. Instead, the two artillery shells detonated and killed an OMON officer and Magomed Osmanov, a senior officer with the Dagestani Interior Ministry’s internal affairs department. Later that month, assassins killed Dagir Kachayev, an imam at a mosque in the capital. In August, assailants killed Lt. Col. Abdulmashid Rasulov, deputy chief of interior affairs for the Buinaksk department.

IMPLICATIONS: Continued levels of violence in Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus requires a sustained military and security apparatus presence. Terror attacks may be down, but personal security from shootings, bombings and other assassination attempts remains elusive, even in Makhachkala. The expected December arrival of two mountain brigades – the 33rd and 34th - comprised of contract troops, appears insufficient to eliminate these threats. The brigades will be based in Dagestan and Karachayevo-Cherkessia, according to land forces commander General Alexei Maslov. The deployment of mountain-capable forces is evidence Moscow recognizes the need to expand state authority to rugged rural areas, but securitization of urban centers remains incomplete.

Killing rebel leaders is an important psychological and tactical part of Moscow’s effort to stamp out and weaken insurgencies in the Caucasus. The deaths of: Rappani Khalilov, leader of the Dagestan front; Rustam Bashayev, an operations financier and regional terrorist leader for Khasavyurt, Novolakskoye and Kazbegi; and Shamil Gasanov (if ultimately confirmed), leading member of the Jamaat Sharia of Dagestan, may provide loyal politicians greater influence in the republic to carry out federal policies. Killing insurgent leaders gives the state space to offer citizens and fighters various services (payments, programs, amnesties) that will hopefully draw the populace closer to the authorities. Deaths temporarily weaken terrorist command structures and lessen the technical expertise of insurgents as well, but as in any counterinsurgency, replacements will almost certainly step up.

While the hunt for small cells and terrorist leaders continues, the government of Dagestan has still failed to provide a secure environment for local officials, religious leaders and officers with the security forces. There are weekly attacks against the police, routine assassination attempts against high-ranking officials, and pressure applied to youths to join insurgents. “Nearly 200 members of the security forces have been killed since 1999,” said Eduard Urazaev, Dagestan’s minister for national policy, information and external relations. Armored cars and personal security details do not guarantee VIPs’ safety, even in the republic’s capital.

A new president, Mukhu Aliyev, took office in early 2006, promising to clean up Dagestan’s security forces and protect citizens from routine abuse. A month after his confirmation by the National Assembly, Aliyev announced his intentions for a kinder, gentler administration: “People are being faced with injustice, callousness and indifferent bureaucracy, have lost faith in the government, have become disillusioned and cannot find their place in life. It’s time for us to understand this, to make the correct deductions, to work persistently on the elimination of public mistakes, oversights and causes leading people to extremism.”

In neighboring Chechnya, a semblance of normalcy returned in 2006-2007. The death of notorious terrorist Shamil Basayev, relative calm in the capital Grozny and the beginnings of reconstruction are indicators that the insurgency is finally under control in Chechnya (or petered out from exhaustion). Still, this progress was achieved only after significant investment and support from Moscow. The blowup in recent weeks in nearby Ingushetia, despite the arrival of 2,000 additional troops over the summer, could divert future deployments and funding.

CONCLUSIONS: The overall situation in Dagestan seems poised for improvement, following on the heels of progress in neighboring Chechnya. The new president, Mukhu Aliyev, has promised to reform the government and fund economic and education programs. Top terrorist leaders have been captured, killed or are on the run. However, like Chechnya, Dagestan suffers from crushing poverty. The United Nations estimated in 2007 that 77 percent of Dagestan’s budget comes from Moscow. Overall unemployment exceeds 27 percent, and for people under 30 years of age, unemployment reaches 70 percent. Such statistics necessitate considerable support from the center.

Given recent violence in nearby Ingushetia, requiring the additional presence of thousands of troops, it seems likely that Moscow will once again ignore Makhachkala, diverting attention and resources to a more immediate security concern. Much as Moscow devoted federal power and resources after the 1999 invasion of Dagestan to a second Chechen war, the 2007 crisis in Ingushetia could once again come at the expense of long-term stability in Dagestan.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Michael Coffey is a postgraduate in European and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University.