The increasing Jihadist trend in the Chechen resistance has important implications for general U.S. policy toward Islamic extremists. This latter concern may explain the recent invitation from the State Department (some suggest that it was Bush’s personal invitation) to several muftis from the Russian North Caucasus to visit the United States. Even the nationalistic and more moderate members of the Chechen resistance are at odds with Islamists. This provides a common basis for such seemingly irreconcilable enemies as Iran and the USA, as well as a few remaining areas where Russia and the USA can cooperate.

BACKGROUND: The history of the Chechen resistance clearly shows changes in ideology and pattern. Islamic fundamentalism influenced the resistance early on, but it did not dominate the Chechen rank and file at the beginning of the struggle against Russia. Moreover, most members of the Chechen resistance have been inspired by a nationalistic animus. The discord between the two groups increased especially after the beginning of the second Chechen War in 1999. In 2006, the differences became clear in public debates between Ahmed Zakayev, who was in London as the representative of the Chechen government in exile, and Movladi Udugov, who at the time was a sort of major propagandist. Both published articles on Kavkaz Center, the major Internet locus of the Chechen resistance. Zakayev implied that the present struggle is not an isolated event and is related to the centuries-long Chechen struggle with Russia. The goal of the Chechen resistance is an independent Chechen state fully recognized by the international community.

Udugov strongly disagreed, arguing that Zakayev had made a fundamental mistake by aligning himself with Chechens as such and regarding their defense as the major goal of the resistance. This narrow nationalist view should be discarded. Udugov’s approach, surprising at first glance, could be compared structurally with the views of radical Russians by Russian Marxists at the beginning of the twentieth century. Lenin, for example, would hiss at the notion of abstract Russians. For him, Russians were divided into two groups: the exploitive elite and the toiling masses. Lenin not only proclaimed that he had dedicated his life to the liberation of the masses, but also stated (appealing of course to Marx) that the Russian masses, especially the workers, had much more in common with other workers than with native Russian capitalists.

Udugov followed the same line of thought. He did not understand why Zakayev insisted that Chechens should love other Chechens just because of similar ethnicity. Udugov saw many Chechens who, in his mind, evoked nothing but disgust. These people either are foreign to the idea of the Chechen struggle, or openly collaborate with the Russians. Even more important, they are Muslims only in name. There are ethnic Russians who are ardent Muslims. It is these people who should be regarded as brothers, not those who are just related by blood or ethnicity.

According to Udugov, another problem with Zakayev’s plans is his desire to create a Chechnya similar to states of the West, which Udugov terms unacceptable. The modern West is not much different from present-day Russia, which is ruled by an oppressive, corrupt regime. An independent Westernized Chechnya would have the same problem: a corrupt, rich, indulged elite that would oppress the common folk. One need not engage in a bloody struggle to achieve this predictable result. The goal should be not a Westernized but an Islamic state, based on strict following of Islamic doctrine and free from the oppressive elements of non-Islamic society.

IMPLICATIONS: This jihadist streak in the Chechen resistance’s political ideology has increased and apparently radicalized. The development of Chechen radical thought in this direction can be seen in the response of the Chechen resistance to Saddam Hussein’s execution. Authors on various Russian-language Islamic Internet sites stated clearly that those who executed Hussein were people who followed the bidding of the U.S., the brutal heathen aggressor. But Hussein was not a martyr. The reason for this rather sober view was clear: Hussein not only terrorized Muslims but was himself not a Muslim. His godless nationalism prevented him from understanding the real meaning of the original American friendship. He did not understand that a heathen power should not be trusted and paid dearly for it.

Indeed, it was not the nationalistic and essentially godless Bathist resistance that attracted contributors to Chechen Internet publications, but Waziristan, the quasi-state in Pakistan under Taliban influence. One Kavkaz Center contributor framed his vision of the Taliban in his general philosophy of history, a peculiar mixture of Islam and the teachings of Ali Shariati, Sayyid Qutb, and implicitly Marx. The world is dominated by heathen anti-Islamic forces. These states have entirely negative social attributes, such as oppression of the poor by the rich. It is not the proletariat, guided by social doctrine grounded in atheistic thought, that could end this world of misery. Only radical, revolutionary Islam can do so. This radical Islam would include all those who follow Allah regardless of ethnicity (here allusions to Shariati or even Marx and Lenin could be seen.)

For Marx, a self-organized proletariat would liberate itself and, finally, humanity. For Lenin, the proletariat should be led by a revolutionary party; since left alone the proletariat would not be able to accomplish their revolutionary mission. For the contributor in question, who in many ways takes his lead from Shariati, the radical Islamists will liberate all Muslims and ultimately Islamicize humanity. This new, just society will be entirely different from modern capitalist societies, with their atomized individuals and sharp divisions between rich and poor; it will be a society of brotherly solidarity and mutual help, without strong social divisions. Such a society is not a pipedream; it is already developing in the society of the Taliban. Radicalized areas of Pakistan could also be a good example.

The radicalization of the Chechens, and of the North Caucasian resistance in general, has led to increasing alienation between jihadist and nationalistic fighters. This can be seen, for example, in Internet correspondence between Chechen fighters and supporters in Waziristan. The latter saw Waziristan as the springboard of the global jihadist revolution. Interlocutors from Chechnya fully supported this view and shared the account of the events in Chechnya that, among other things, revealed distrust of nationalism. A Chechen fighter stated that one reason the Chechen resistance had not achieved what it could have achieved was the erroneous beliefs of numerous members. These people were inspired by nationalistic feeling and saw their conflict with the Russians as similar to the national liberation movements of the past, when peoples tried to break free from colonial rule. Nothing good can come from nationalism and worshiping one’s ethnicity. The results of the liberation movements of past decades show that the end result of even the most virtuous movement is just a re-creation of other repressive states. Furthermore, those who put their trust not in Allah but in nationalism are not a people ready for death. For this reason, the nationalistically inspired members of the resistance are poor fighters. Moreover, they are ready to collaborate with the Russian government. Quite a few have already joined Kadyrov’s forces and, implicitly, become the enemies of the fighters – those who are inspired not by nationalism but by Allah.

CONCLUSIONS: This increasing radicalization of Islamic forces has manifold implications for Russian authorities. On one hand, the increasing radicalization of the resistance movement of at least part of Chechnya, the North Caucasus in general, implies increasing tension or open hostility between Islamists and nationalists. The contributors to the North Caucasian resistance’s Internet publications express concern that Zakayev is ready to provide amnesty to some of Kadyrov’s men and does not regard all those in Kadyrov’s forces as sworn enemies. They become outraged when Zakayev hints that the Chechen resistance could negotiate with Russian authorities.

On the other hand, the spread of universal jihadism implies that the terrorist underground will outgrow the confines of Chechnya, even of the North Caucasus, and most likely spread in various ethnic groups, including ethnic Russians. For the United States, it also implies a continuous integration of Chechen jihadism in the global extremist network. Chechnya could become one of the centers of the global jihadist movement, just like the tribal areas of Pakistan. This concern with the spread of Islamic extremism in the North Caucasus might be a reason why groups of muftis from the North Caucasus visited the USA.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is associate professor of world history at Indiana University-South Bend.