Chechnya’s pro-Moscow administration was recently subject to a sweeping government reshuffle. Like any other reshuffle, this one produced both winners and losers. While riding President Ramzan Kadyrov’s coat-tails has undoubtedly helped kick-start the careers of certain non-descript functionaries like the new Premier, Odes Baisultanov, other more zestful Kadyrovites are being frustrated by their leader’s inherent suspicion of political ambition per se.

BACKGROUND: It should be clear by now to all seasoned observers of Ramzan Kadyrov that the qualities he treasures least in those he has political dealings with are candor and independence. It should come as no surprise, therefore, to learn that Odes Baisultanov is possessed of neither of these traits. In a sense, his current role as prime minister is his birth-right given that he is a maternal cousin of Kadyrov’s. Generally regarded as a man of unremarkable intelligence, Baisultanov made his name through his involvement in two pet-projects long associated with Chechnya’s pro-Moscow authorities, namely the restoration of Grozny’s civilian airport and the construction of a cement factory in the town of Chiri-Yurt. Although Baisultanov received some acclaim for his involvement in these endeavors – particularly for his involvement in the Grozny airport project – in terms of real political influence, he is merely a cipher. There is reason to suggest that Kadyrov realizes his prime minister’s limitations. For example, Kadyrov personally led the Chechen delegation to the St. Petersburg economic forum held earlier this year even though Baisultanov – as Prime Minister, officially the government’s main political economist – would have been the black and white choice to head the contingent.

In all likelihood, Kadyrov simply couldn’t resist the glamour of this occasion, but perhaps he also feared that Baisultanov, who has a reputation for uncouthness according to some, would inadequately represent the republic at such a prestigious, and potentially lucrative, function. It is tempting to regard Baisultanov as a ready-made lightening rod for the Kadyrov government. That is, should something politically inopportune come to pass, such as a major rebel attack within Chechnya for instance, the eminently replaceable Baisultanov could be wheeled out as a scapegoat for such a travesty. The role of prime minister has proven to be a poisoned chalice for all previous incumbents save Ramzan Kadyrov, and Baisultanov is unlikely to fare any better than his Russian predecessors.

The other person who seems to have most benefited from the recent government reshuffle is Adam Demilkhanov, now Chechnya’s First Deputy Prime Minister. Although recently relieved of his formal responsibilities for managing the republic’s law-enforcement organs, Demilkhanov undoubtedly remains the government’s strong man. He has previously been tasked with organizing what would be termed in the West “black operations” such as the kidnapping of rebel leader Dokka Umarov’s relatives and the elimination of Kadyrov ally turned critic, Movladi Baisarov, in downtown Moscow late last year. More recently, Demilkhanov has had the opportunity to craft a political profile for himself through his involvement in the successful campaign to repatriate Chechen convicts serving time elsewhere in the Russian Federation and by joining the chorus of criticism directed at the controversial ORB-2 bureau by other pro-Moscow stalwarts. But Baisarov and Demilkhanov are political lightweights in comparison to certain other, more dynamic, members of Kadyrov’s inner circle.

IMPLICATIONS: The speaker of Chechnya’s pro-Moscow parliament, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, is a close confidante of President Kadyrov and remains a voice of considerable import in all political decision making. If Demilkhanov is a silovik in the broad, generic sense of the word, Abdurakhmanov is a political silovik. He, along with his unofficial deputy, the republic’s human rights ombudsman Nurdi Nukhazhiev, serves as Kadyrov’s de facto spokesman. These two PR-savvy individuals function, in effect, as Kadyrov’s criers.

Abdurakhmanov was an invaluable tool for Kadyrov during his two and a half-year conflict with Alu Alkhanov. The speaker proved himself – as this “art” is known in Russia – a “political technologist” of some ability, briefing against the beleaguered Alkhanov, organizing dubious opinion polls damaging to the then-president, while pronouncing on a range of sensitive political issues at local, regional and even national level. This relentless campaign considerably raised Abdurakhmanov’s political profile and made him one of Chechnya’s most recognizable political figures.

Since Kadyrov’s ascension to the presidency, however, it is noticeable that Abdurakhmanov no longer speaks for Kadyrov on matters of a domestic nature. Instead, this brief has been allotted to Nukhazhiev who has spared little time in addressing popular domestic political issues like the prisoner repatriation initiative, the ORB-2 controversy, conscription, the exhumation of mass graves around Chechnya and so on. Abdurakhmanov, meanwhile, has busied himself by talking up the idea of a third term for President Putin, demanding federal compensation for damage done to Chechnya’s infrastructure by Russian forces, and again revisiting the idea of a territorial merger between Chechnya and neighbouring Ingushetia.

It is interesting that Abdurakhmanov has refrained – by choice or otherwise, we cannot be sure – from making statements on matters of domestic significance. Could it be that Kadyrov, alarmed by the undeniable growth in Abdurakhmanov’s public profile during 2006, has decided to clip his chief spokesman’s wings? As mentioned at the outset, Kadyrov resents any appearance (imagined or otherwise) of independence among those in his entourage. This is the reason he could not co-exist with Hussein Dzhabrailov, a successful Chechen entrepreneur who arrived in the republic as a much-touted deputy prime minister last autumn. However, Dzhabrailov was too wealthy, and therefore too independent, for Kadyrov’s taste and was quietly relieved of his post last March. Abdurakhmanov will also no doubt recall how his predecessor in the role of “Kadyrov’s crier”, Taus Dzhabrailov, vanished from Chechnya’s political radar following a quarrel with Kadyrov in 2005. Amid these circumstances, it would be highly imprudent of Abdurakhmanov to attempt to build on his standing within Chechnya lest it be perceived as a sign of greater ambition.

CONCLUSIONS: The contrast between Baisultanov, the unremarkable bureaucrat, and Abdurakhmanov, the wily, ambitious, not untalented political operator encapsulates the dilemma facing some of the younger, brasher Kadyrovites. Kadyrov’s elevation to the presidency has meant promotion for Baisultanov and his ilk while Abdurakhmanov has seen his political brief diminished and may even have become the newest object of the young president’s suspicion. We cannot say with certainty whether political siloviki like Abdurakhmanov and Nukhazhiev are presently dissatisfied with their political prospects. But as long as Ramzan Kadyrov is in power, relatively dynamic political operators like Abdurakhmanov must take care to conceal any grand political ambitions they may harbor. Both Demilkhanov and Baisultanov, aside from being bound by blood to Kadyrov (like Baisultanov, Demilkhanov is Kadyrov’s cousin), are reconciled, even content with, their current roles. For more dynamic, more intelligent figures, Kadyrov’s Chechnya must be akin to a grinding purgatory: the president’s contempt for ostentation, independence, candor and above all, ambition, creates a contradictory situation where the brightest, most capable Kadyrovites can only seethe, watching while other less capable courtiers receive political promotions. But as Edmund Burke once noted, “ambition can creep as well as soar”; with Kremlin-connected analyst Sergei Markov recently suggesting that Kadyrov could rule for 40 years, some of his followers (perhaps even those whom Kadyrov has promoted) must be wondering whether they will ever be free of the watchful eye of their capricious patron. Time, as frequently happens in scenarios like this one, will almost certainly increase their resentment toward Kadyrov and toward each other.  In this way, the political stagnation engendered by Kadyrov’s fearsome persona may eventually undermine the cohesion of his political “team”.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College Cork, Ireland.