Security Relations between Kazakhstan and China, though traditionally low-key and not widely publicized, have been growing steadily. Given the enhanced security cooperation within the SCO to combat terrorism, as witnessed in the highly publicized SCO ‘Peace Mission 2007’ antiterrorist exercises in China and Russia August 9-17, 2007, combined with China’s evolving energy interests in Kazakhstan, both countries appear set to enhance their military cooperation. This will bring China into the security dynamics at play around the Caspian Sea, and complicate yet more the complex web of security assistance provided to Kazakhstan by the U.S., Turkey, the U.K, and other western countries as well as by NATO.

BACKGROUND: China’s President Hu Jintao declared that the purpose of his state visit to Kazakhstan on August 18, 2007, was to raise ‘pragmatic cooperation,’ as well as suggesting that he wanted to improve the quality of the ‘strategic partnership’ between China and Kazakhstan. The countries signed political, economic and trade agreements, with an emphasis on energy and transportation.

In 2006, the China-Kazakhstan trade volume reached $8.36 billion, up 22.8 per cent on the previous year. In the first half on 2007, it reached $5.97 billion, an increase of 60.4 per cent on the same period in 2006. On August 18, 2007 during bilateral talks with the Chinese President, Nazarbayev offered strong political support for China’s position on Taiwan. Nazarbayev, suggesting closer security cooperation was essential for both countries, also saying that “Kazakhstan will not allow threats to the territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China to emanate from our territory,” suggesting that the Kazakhstan National Security Service (KNB) will step up the monitoring of Uighurs in eastern Kazakhstan and increase intelligence exchanges with China.

President Hu praised the existing level of cooperation between China and Kazakhstan, through bodies such as the UN, SCO and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Hu expressed interest in deepening cooperation with Kazakhstan in five key areas: High level exchange visits between related governmental departments; expanding cooperation in trade, energy, transportation and promoting economic growth; deepening security cooperation against ‘new threats’ in the region; intensifying multilateral cooperation (UN,SCO, CICA); and expanding media and cultural ties.

Although the security factor came only third on Hu’s list, it was notable that their security cooperation was almost taken to be in the process of expansion, since both leaders had come from seeing the concluding day of the SCO antiterrorist exercises ‘Peace Mission 2007’ in Chelyabinsk, Russia, as well as attending the SCO Summit in Bishkek.

The critical agreement in Astana related to energy, and appears set to widen China’s security interests in Kazakhstan further. Astana and Beijing agreed on the construction of a second section of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China, and a gas pipeline to transit Kazakhstan, taking Turkmen gas to China. Kazakhstan’s national oil and gas company KazMunayGaz agreed on the principles of cooperation with China’s CNPC, on the building of the second section of the oil pipeline. On the significance of the agreement, Nazarbayev remarked that “the largest of these is an extension of the already built Kenkiyak-Kumkol oil pipeline, which will reach the Caspian.” In fact Nazarbayev reiterated and stressed the point: “That is, the Caspian will be linked with western China.”

This level of energy cooperation also reflects Nazarbayev’s ambitions for the already booming levels of trade; he claimed that in 2008, bilateral trade will reach $12 billion. Both sides are interested in developing this level of trade over the next few years. After meeting President Hu, Nazarbayev commented, “Today we talked in detail about cooperation in the energy, oil and gas, petrochemical, oil refining, tourism, transport and communication spheres.” It is precisely these areas that are driving Kazakhstan’s interests in deepening security cooperation with Beijing.

IMPLICATIONS: Kazakhstan has already declared a high level of interest in developing its strategic partnership with China, which was reflected in its new military doctrine in April 2007. The military doctrine attaches importance to Kazakhstan’s bilateral security relations with Russia and China, and mentions enhancing these relations with the latter also through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the military doctrine places much further down the list, Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the U.S. and NATO). Nazarbayev has political and economic reasons for attempting to strengthen Kazakhstan’s military and security ties with Beijing, stemming from trade, transportation and energy ties with China.

These security ties, already progressing annually, mostly relate to training and education, with small numbers of Kazakhstani military personnel being sent to China for training and exchanges. Equally, there is interest within Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense in procuring more military equipment from the PLA. Here there is room for optimism, but this could stem from the fact that the PLA is modernizing its weapons and equipment, and as this process unfolds, Astana may hope to receive gratis transfers of decommissioned military assets.

The PLA is of interest to Kazakhstan’s MoD in as much as China has strengthened its own Special Forces, which are so essential for antiterrorist operations. Kazakhstan hopes to tap into this expertise and learn how the PLA plan, train and utilizes such forces. These units are beginning to work together, as seen in the potential which arose from Tien-Shan 2006, when Kazakhstan and China held bilateral antiterrorist exercises. Moreover, during the SCO antiterrorist exercises ‘Peace Mission 2007’, the participation of elements of Kazakhstan’s airmobile forces, based in Kapshagai, from which its peacekeeping units are drawn (KAZBAT, which is being expanded to KAZBRIG through assistance from the U.S. and NATO), alongside their counterparts in the PLA, raised more interest in Sino-Kazakhstan security cooperation.

Astana and Beijing have shared security concerns from extremist groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and the officially designated terrorist group, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Indeed, recently more arrests have been made in southern Kazakhstan of alleged terrorists. Hu and Nazarbayev want to show they are doing something practical about these apparent threats.

There are problems, however, which Kazakhstan’s military planners will need to work hard to overcome. The most pressing of these is the language challenge: Kazakhstan has a severe shortage of military linguists that are educated and capable of teaching Chinese to cadets. At this point, the Defense Institute of Foreign Languages (DIFL) headquartered in Almaty only possesses one part-time qualified Chinese instructor. Such issues will require careful planning and prioritizing as Kazakhstan’s security relationship with China grows.

CONCLUSIONS: Intelligence cooperation between Kazakhstan and China exists not only on a bilateral basis, but through the SCO’s Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. Hu secured agreement from his SCO counterparts during the SCO Summit in Bishkek on August 16 that SCO members will assist in providing security for China in connection with Beijing Olympics in 2008; binding the SCO intelligence agencies to cooperate specifically for the help of Beijing’s Olympic security operation. Cooperation in counter-terrorism, as well as pursuing joint measures to tackle separatism, extremism and other non-traditional security threats, will tie Kazakhstan to deeper security cooperation with Beijing in the foreseeable future. Added to economic links and the energy cooperation vector, there is strong interest inside the Kazakhstani MoD in benefiting from more practical military cooperation with China.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Roger N McDermott is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC.