From June 12 to 15, an extraordinary conference of signatory countries to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) convened in Vienna. The Russian government called the meeting, the first of its kind in the CFE’s 17-year history, to resolve various disputes that had arisen between Moscow and other signatories. One of the main items in dispute concerns Russian military activities in Georgia. The conference failed to resolve this or other issues in contention, leaving uncertain the status of both the Treaty and the Russian military presence in Georgia.

BACKGROUND: The governments belonging to NATO and the now dismantled Warsaw Pact signed the original CFE Treaty in 1990. This complex document established equal ceilings of major conventional weapons (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) for each bloc and within specified geographic regions. The treaty required the destruction of all armaments held in excess of these limits and established an elaborate inspection system to verify its fulfillment.

All 30 parties signed a CFE Adaptation Agreement at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999. The amended version replaced the obsolete bloc-to-bloc and zonal limits with a system of national and territorial boundaries. At present, only four of the signatories—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia—have ratified the 1999 Adaptation Agreement. NATO governments have refused to do so until Russia fulfills the commitments made at the Istanbul summit to withdraw all its military bases from Georgia as well as Transdniestria, Moldova.

At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet armed forces occupied four military bases in Georgia. In 2001, Russia transferred the Vaziani military airfield outside Tbilisi to the Georgian government. It was not until May 31, 2005, however, that the Russian and Georgian governments signed bilateral agreements in Sochi regarding two remaining bases. Under their terms, the Russia pledged to remove its military personnel and equipment from the bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi by the end of 2007 and 2008, respectively. Georgia and the other CFE signatories agree that the Russian military is fulfilling these agreements according to schedule.

Nevertheless, controversy persists regarding the fourth facility. According to Moscow, the Russian military ceased using the base at Gudauta for combat operations in October 2001. The Russian government reports that only some 400 Russian military personnel remain there, and that half of these are retirees and dependents. It acknowledges that several combat and transport helicopters as well as other military vehicles and facilities also exist at the base, but affirms that their function is strictly to support the Russian troops assigned to the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia.

The Georgian government, along with other CFE members, has called for establishing a multinational inspection mission (including some Georgian nationals) at the base to evaluate the Russian claims and monitor military activities there. Thus far, however, the separatist authorities in Abkhazia, backed by Moscow, have denied the Georgian government access to the Gudauta base.

Russian representatives deny that the CFE Treaty or Yeltsin’s Istanbul commitments require them to authorize the creation of such an observation mission. At most, they have indicated interest in arranging for a one-time visit by foreign observers to certify the base’s closure. Although they have participated in trilateral talks on the issue with German and Georgian representatives, Russian officials advocate bilateral talks between Russia and Georgia to resolve all remaining disputes.

Russian government officials also argue they need to support “peacekeeping” forces in Abkhazia and the other so-called “frozen” conflict regions of the former Soviet Union pending their resolution. The CFE Treaty does not directly limit the size or activities of peacekeeping units, many of which consist of former Soviet military personnel. The elaborate CFE inspection regime also does not encompass the “unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment” possessed by separatist forces in Abkhazia and other conflict regions of the former Soviet Union. Much of this equipment is thought to be of Russian origin and has become a source for small arms traffickers throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa.

In addition, Russian policy makers insist their country needs more flexibility to deploy larger troop concentrations in southern Russian to counter Islamist-inspired terrorism in Chechnya and other areas. The CFE Treaty contains certain special “flank restrictions” to prevent the concentration of conventional heavy equipment in northeastern and southeastern Russia (primarily near Norway and Turkey, respectively). Russian officials also express concern that the treaty’s provisions do not apply to U.S. military deployments in Bulgaria and Romania. They have called for more constraints on NATO military activities in southeastern Europe as well as the three Baltic states.

NATO representatives insist that their military activities in the Baltic region comply with existing CFE provisions. The Baltic governments, which gained their independence after the drafting of the original CFE Treaty, have agreed to sign the Adapted CFE Treaty upon its coming into force. U.S. officials deny plans to establish large military bases in Bulgaria and Romania, describing them as “joint training facilities” that would only host U.S. forces on short-term rotations.

IMPLICATIONS: In his controversial February 2007 presentation before the Munich Security Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that, “Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows.” In his state of the nation address in April 2007, Putin argued that the CFE Treaty “is not in any way legally bound to the Istanbul Agreements.” He announced that the Russian government might impose a “moratorium” on its participation in the CFE process unless the other parties fulfilled their commitments. The Russian government subsequently called for the extraordinary CFE conference to address their concerns.

Before the Vienna conference, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried said that NATO countries would “make every effort to address Russian concerns seriously and creatively, but we will also keep faith both with our own principles and countries like Georgia and Moldova.” Fried indicated that the U.S. government would consider further revisions in the treaty to meet Russia’s concerns regarding its flank deployments, but only after Russia fulfilled its Istanbul commitments to withdraw its troops and munitions from Georgia and Moldova.

In the case of Gudauta, Fried indicated during the conference that the United States favored sending a “fact-finding” mission—which presumably sounded less confrontational to Moscow than a formal “inspection” mission—to clarify the situation there. He stressed Washington’s flexibility regarding the precise modalities of any such inspection: “there are various ways in which it could be arranged. We’re not rigid about this, so we hope it will be taken up.”

At the extraordinary Vienna meeting, Anatoly Antonov, chief of the Foreign Ministry’s Security and Disarmament Department and head of the Russian delegation, reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to conventional arms control in Europe. Nevertheless, he and the other Russian government officials continued to denounce the “artificial links” between Russian military troop withdrawal and CFE ratification.

After the session ended, Antonov complained that “no one listened to us. They continued to admonish us.” To counter perceptions of being isolated, Russia secured a declaration supporting its position from its allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The statement appeared to have little practical effect since Armenia has yet to ratify the Adaptation Agreement and CSTO members Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are not even parties to the CFE Treaty.

CONCLUSIONS: Antonov reasserted Putin’s earlier warning that Russia might impose a unilateral “moratorium” on its CFE participation unless NATO countries ratified the 1999 Adaptation Agreement. Although the CFE does not have a clause regarding suspension, such a moratorium could include ignoring CFE provisions requiring inspections of Russian military forces or the pre-notification of major military movements. A moratorium could also see Russia concentrate more forces along its flanks than permitted by the CFE Treaty’s quantitative limits.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director for Project Management at the Hudson Institute.