BACKGROUND: The dangers of military service in Russia were highlighted last year by a high-profile case involving one Andrei Sychev, a private in the Russian army who had to have both his legs amputated following a particularly brutal assault by other servicemen. The Sychev case clearly illustrated that ethnicity alone does not determine who shall bully and who shall be bullied; but it is clear that the Russian army has a long-standing reputation as a particularly inhospitable environment for ethnic minorities. Hence minority groups within the Russian Federation are naturally especially apprehensive about military service. Apart from the threat of “dyedovshchina”, servicemen from a minority background must also contend with a barracks culture which is often entirely alien to them. The majority of Muslims presently serving in Russia’s armed forces come from the North Caucasus region. The vast majority of North Caucasians who object to conscription worry less about cultural alienation than they do about dyedovshchina, however. Simply put, they do not trust the army to safeguard their rights should they, or their sons, choose to enlist. Essentially, the Russian state has failed to secure the “contingent consent” of the local population. As the social scientist Margaret Levi has put it: “To the extent that a group of citizens perceives its interests as insufficiently represented, government actors as untrustworthy, and institutions incapable of compelling promise-keeping, that set of citizens will refuse their consent”. Without the contingent consent of the republic’s populace, therefore, how can Chechnya’s pro-Moscow government hope to recruit 30,000 conscripts? Although in private they must surely realize that their chances of sourcing that many conscripts are virtually nil, the Grozny administration is not, in principle, opposed to the concept of conscription. Early last year, for instance, recently deposed pro-Moscow Chechen President Alu Alkhanov stated: “I am convinced that young men in Chechnya must go through army service. This will have a positive effect on their upbringing, enhance their feeling of patriotism and give them life experience.” It should be noted, however, that Chechnya’s strongman and recently appointed President, Ramzan Kadyrov, has yet to weigh in decisively on this issue. Although Kadyrov is known to hold the Russian army in very low esteem, this does not necessarily mean that he would reject the introduction of conscription out of hand. Quite the opposite in fact, for the mass provision of Chechen conscripts could function as a useful bargaining chip in his future relations with Moscow. IMPLICATIONS: With the term of obligatory military service set to be cut to a single year in 2008, it is estimated that Russia will have to adapt by calling up 700,000 recruits yearly instead of 350,000. With most speculation now suggesting that President Putin will indeed relinquish office in 2008, a resultant reappraisal of relations between Kadyrov and the federal centre would seem to beckon. Kadyrov’s political pre-eminence in Chechnya arises mainly from his excellent personal relations with Putin. Should Putin leave office, then Kadyrov will be forced to cultivate a new relationship with his successor. What better way to inaugurate this new relationship than by offering to help bail Russia out of its conscript shortfall through the provision of Chechen manpower? Should Russia’s current Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, accede to the presidency, then Kadyrov’s offer would be particularly welcome given that Ivanov’s structural reforms are directly responsible for the projected shortfall. There are other reasons why Kadyrov might wish to furnish the Russian armed forces with Chechen conscripts. Firstly, a steady stream of conscripts departing Chechnya for foreign postings might act as a pressure valve domestically. Despite Kadyrov’s protestations to the contrary, Chechnya is certainly not on the verge of an economic boom. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev, another presidential contender, recently described the progress of Chechnya’s reconstruction scheme in distinctly prosaic terms, labelling it “fairly good.” Thus, with high levels of unemployment set to endure for the foreseeable future, Kadyrov may undertake to occupy Chechnya’s idle youth through introducing compulsory military service. It is also possible that Kadyrov might use the conscript shortfall as a bargaining chip in order to gain greater autonomy for Chechnya. Of course, whether or not Moscow would be willing to make a deal along these lines is very much open to question. There is, however, considerable historical precedent of governments bargaining with representatives of minority constituents in this manner. For instance, during the First World War the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, seemed willing to offer Ireland Home Rule in return for a plentiful supply of Irish conscripts. In the final analysis, however, it was not the Home Rulers who prospered from this agreement, for the unwelcome spectre of conscription helped to drive large numbers of otherwise apolitical Irish into the arms of the radical, anti-conscription party, Sinn Fein. So unpopular is the prospect of compulsory military service among Chechens that it is quite feasible that a concerted attempt to enforce conscription in the republic might lead to a dramatic upsurge in popular support for the rebel insurgency. Dokka Umarov and his followers must be hoping that Kadyrov’s undisguised political ambition, allied with his ever-lengthening list of political opponents and the uncertainty engendered by Russia’s pending presidential succession, will lead the young prime minister to take a rash gamble and play the conscription card. CONCLUSIONS: Given the present political climate in Chechnya, any attempt to enforce conscription would play directly into the hands of Dokka Umarov. In the minds of most ordinary Chechens, conscription into the Russian army is synonymous with beatings, overt discrimination and mistreatment generally. The rebel movement represents a natural political sanctuary for those (and their families) who might be threatened with forcible enlistment at some future point. Chechens’ aversion to military service is evidently shared by the Russian masses who continue to evade conscription in their droves. In the future, mutual opposition to conscription might aid in bringing down the cultural and political barriers that presently separate Russians and Chechens. Indeed, such is the undisguised political potential of popular anti-conscription sentiment that the Economist was moved in 2005 to opine “…if anything could alienate ordinary Russians from Mr. Putin’s still popular regime, the prospect of tens of thousands of their sons being called up just might be it.” This warning also rings true for Chechnya’s pro-Moscow rulers, whose popularity (according to most anecdotal accounts) pales in comparison to that enjoyed by Mr. Putin. AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree form University College York, Ireland.