By Harutioun Khachatrian (3/21/2007 issue of the CACI Analyst)
BACKGROUND: According to the Strategy, there are five “fundamental values” of Armenia’s national security: Independence, Safety of state and the people, Peace and international cooperation, Protection of Armenian identity (“Hayapahpanutiun”) and Well-being. Protection of Armenian identity will be the job of the Armenian state both in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora, which is at least twice as numerous as the population of the Republic of Armenia. The document divides the threats to national security into two categories: the external and the internal realm.
BACKGROUND: According to the Strategy, there are five “fundamental values” of Armenia’s national security: Independence, Safety of state and the people, Peace and international cooperation, Protection of Armenian identity (“Hayapahpanutiun”) and Well-being. Protection of Armenian identity will be the job of the Armenian state both in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora, which is at least twice as numerous as the population of the Republic of Armenia. The document divides the threats to national security into two categories: the external and the internal realm. The former group includes eight elements: 1. Application of military force from Azerbaijan, probably supported by Turkey; 2. Internal conflicts in bordering countries; 3. Sabotage of transit routes in bordering countries; 4. Terrorism and trans-border crime; 5. Energy dependency; 6. Isolation of Armenia from regional programs; 7. Weakening of national-cultural identity of Diaspora; 8. Epidemics and catastrophes. The list of internal threats includes the following 12 items: 1.Decrease of the efficiency of the state governance system, and lack of confidence towards the judicial system; 2. Imperfection of the political system; 3. Insufficient level of democracy; 4. Polarization of society; 5. Urbanization; 6.Challenges of the formation of market economy and fiscal management; 7.Unsufficient level of infrastructural network; 8. Low efficiency of the science and education systems; 9. Shortcomings of moral-psychological and patriotic training; 10. Negative demographic trends; 11. Environmental problems and inefficient management of natural resources.
Accordingly, the document discerns two strategies, for internal and external security. Strategies in internal security has four components. Whereas the first two, “effective state governance” and “development of the Army”, are relatively standard and contain more or less typical provisions, the two others, “liberal economy” and “new quality of life and the moral-psychological atmosphere”, are less banal. The liberal economy section contains an elaborate description of the complex of interconnected measures aimed at securing sustainable economic growth. Among the main components are: deepening of financial intermediation, prevention of monopolies, stimulation of knowledge-efficient economy, enhancement of energy security (via diversification of supplies), utilization of environment-friendly technologies, etc. The last section includes an even longer list of ambitious measures ranging from those aimed at “constant increase in living standards” to those for stimulating “continuous development of the spiritual-cultural sphere.” Examples of measures in this category include the commercialization of the scientific production, prevention of brain drain, cooperation with foreign countries in preserving cultural monuments on their territories, protection of the ethnic identity of national minorities living in Armenia, and the development of Armenian content on the Internet.
As for the foreign security strategy, it is based on the trademark of Armenian foreign policy, complementarity, that is a policy of having as good relations as possible with all powers with an interest in the region in an effort to harmonize these interests and avoiding conflicts. This section presents the traditional lines of Armenian foreign policy in recent years. These include the strategic partnership with Russia together with multilateral (including military) cooperation with the U.S. and Greece, membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and close co-operation with NATO, as well as a priority task to develop relations with the EU. That said, there is no stated goal to become a member of the EU, contrary to Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian’s 1999 statement. The importance of membership in the CIS and OSCE, importance of friendly ties with Iran and Georgia and openness for improvement of relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan (e.g., through regional and cross-border programs), are also stressed. A separate section states that Azerbaijan’s threats to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict “through achieving military supremacy over Armenia” is a threat to the national security of Armenia. The document claims that any solution to the problem should be a compromise aimed at fixing the de facto existence of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Finally, the complex of issues related to the Armenian Diaspora is recognized as an “important peculiarity” of the national security of the country. Armenia is said to undertake efforts to prevent the assimilation of the Diaspora Armenians, and the Diaspora is expected to be an important factor of development of Armenia as it is seen as “a bridge between Armenia and the world community.”
IMPLICATIONS: As the first-ever attempt to co-ordinate the activities of all state bodies of Armenia, the strategy is set as a guide to develop specific spheres of activity. The document’s concluding section stipulates that the government has to develop special programs in eleven specific spheres, from military to cultural, based on the provisions of the Strategy. The Presidential decree on the adoption of the Strategy also contains a commission to the government to start developing the mentioned branch programs, although not specifying the terms. Despite the suggestions made during two-year long public discussions, the Strategy was not given the status of a law, in order to leave the executive branch more room for amending it if necessary.
The Strategy was developed by a task force headed by Defense Minister Serge Sargsian, who is also the Secretary of the National Security Council. Sargsian is a leading candidate to replace Kocharyan as President, and the elaboration and discussion processes served, among other, as a pre-election tool for the minister. The adopted Strategy will likely serve the same purpose in the future.
However, its value in the long run looks even more significant. The current government has two months of life left before the May 12 parliamentary elections. For now, it is not evident that Sargsian’s Republican Party of Armenia will be able to keep its lead in the government. The prospects of the presidential elections to be held in March 2008 are even less clear. Nevertheless, it is likely that the current policy, as detailed in the Strategy, will be there for several years to come. Whatever the outcome of the two national elections, the provisions of the Strategy are unlikely to be seriously revised in the near future. This is the case first of all because the most likely successors to the current government are members of the current ruling elite and share their approaches. In particular, the Bargavach Hayastan (“Prosperous Armenia”) party, which is the RPA’s most serious rival (and evidently sponsored by Kocharyan), does not differ from the RPA in terms of either programs or tactics. The second reason is that the majority of the provisions of the Strategy have few alternatives that are being supported in Armenia. Among the few provisions of the Strategy that are challenged are the relations with Russia and the West. However, the parties having a strong pro-Western orientation, such as Orinats Yerkir (“Country of land”, led by the former speaker Arthur Baghdasarian), are very unlikely to take the lead. Another controversy regards the policy of supporting recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 by other states. Some parties claim that Armenia should not do so, in order to improve relations with Turkey. However, this issue has not even been touched upon in the Strategy, and future governments can freely abandon these tactics, if necessary.
CONCLUSIONS: The National Security Strategy of Armenia may be helpful in making the policy of the Armenian government more coordinated and straightforward, especially when special programs for specific spheres are prepared. A key issue is that, while remaining allied with Russia, Armenia declares itself to adhere to Western values, democracy and market economy, and to consider these the fundamentals of its national security. A novel element brought about by the Strategy may be a much more extensive intervention of the government in the spheres of culture, moral and psychological issues. Finally, it is likely that, if the strategy starts being enacted immediately, then the current ruling triumvirate – President Robert Kocharyan, Prime Minister Andranik Margarian and Defense Minister Serge Sargsian – will secure the continuity of their current policy, no matter if they personally will keep top government positions or not.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Haroutiun Khachatrian is an analyst on political and economic issues based in Yerevan, Armenia.