By Rafis Abazov (2/21/2007 issue of the CACI Analyst)
BACKGROUND: The election of a new president is an important event for every country, but elections in secretive and closed societies, such as that of Turkmenistan, stir an especially big wave of speculation. Turkmenistan definitely is one of the most reclusive and isolated countries in the world, as almost all human rights and freedom of the press organizations put Turkmenistan on a par with North Korea. Saparmurat Niyazov Turkmenbashi was the only president in the former Soviet space who fiercely resisted any kind of reforms in the social, economic and political arenas.
BACKGROUND: The election of a new president is an important event for every country, but elections in secretive and closed societies, such as that of Turkmenistan, stir an especially big wave of speculation. Turkmenistan definitely is one of the most reclusive and isolated countries in the world, as almost all human rights and freedom of the press organizations put Turkmenistan on a par with North Korea. Saparmurat Niyazov Turkmenbashi was the only president in the former Soviet space who fiercely resisted any kind of reforms in the social, economic and political arenas. Most enterprises and plants were kept under tight state control and management practices remained unchanged. Turkmenistan is also the only country in the ex-USSR that retains the one-party political system. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) remains the only political party officially allowed in the political arena, even neighboring Uzbekistan has at least five officially registered political parties. Turkmenistan isolated itself from the outside world to such a degree that even marriages by Turkmens to foreign nationals are banned, unless a prospective foreign bridegroom or fiancé pays ten thousands dollars as a kind of state “tax”.
The first news from Turkmenistan are not encouraging. Although Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov belongs to an entirely new generation of politicians in his country, and like Gorbachev and Ahmadinejad, was elected to the presidential post at a relatively young age, he has promised to keep stability by preserving continuity in both domestic and foreign policies. He has talked about only minor reforms limited to some adjustments in education and to allowing the general population to have access to the Internet. Thus, some observers might dismiss him as another dictator who will continue the old policies and do little to open the country to new ideas and the powerful forces of globalization.
In a sense, this could be true. The ruling elite, who are those that benefit the most from the current arrangements and policies, selected Mr. Berdymukhammedov to lead the regime exactly for this purpose: to save it from both unwanted changes and from collapse. However, one has to remember that his two other counterparts – Mikhail Gorbachev and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were chosen for their positions with exactly the same mandate – to preserve the regime. Yet, one turned out to become a great reformer while the other has turned out to be a staunch guardian of the status quo.
In order to understand this paradox, one has to look at the first steps of those two leaders, the ways in which those closed systems have operated and how those leaders have understood the idea of preservation of the regime. On the surface many closed political systems look more or less cohesive and the ruling elite always tries to display unity and comradeship. Under the surface however, various fractions, groupings and competing networks or clans exist even within the ruling elite and the governing party in the most authoritarian regimes. Though the competing fractions generally agree on the major strategic issue – keeping a tough grip on power – they often disagree on many specific tactical issues. After all, they have to maintain some sense of legitimacy and at least some forms of support from the general population, and they have to craft policies that appease the majority of the population. Without consultations in the form of fair elections and referenda or open and trustworthy opinion polls, they always face the key problem: how to choose the best policies to keep the regime going.
There is no doubt that Comrade Gorbachev initially attempted to save the regime by trying to optimize the existing institutions. In fact, his first motto was uskorenie (acceleration), not perestroika (changes). It took him about two years and serious engagement with the international community to understand that the Soviet Union needed radical changes in order to avoid a complete economic collapse and to become a well-respected member of the international community. Only then could he say the single most important word of his career – perestroika. Ahmadinejad still believes that his country needs just to optimize the existing institutions in order to solve all problems in his country, and hence there is little engagement with the international community on the issue of reforms.
IMPLICATIONS: The newly elected president Berdymukhamedov has a difficult choice, as he has to work with two constituencies – the ruling nomenklatura and the general population. On the one hand, he must appease the ruling nomenklatura and clans who brought him to power by maintaining stability and emphasizing the continuity of the regime and all existing arrangements. On the other hand, he has to address growing discontent among the general public, especially in the major urban centers, as people are increasingly frustrated with their very low living standards, the absence of opportunities for entrepreneurial activities, education, medical and social services, etc. These days, practically everyone on the streets of Ashgabat talks about mismanagement and chronic corruption in the ranks of government officials and in the state-controlled agencies and enterprises. Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov has to address those issues in order to maintain stability and boost his popularity. Otherwise, the ruling elite will be inclined to replace him with another leader in order to avoid any social cataclysms. In this social and political environment, Turkmenistan’s president cannot jump immediately into introducing an open democratic process, a multiparty system and an open press. However, like Michael Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, he might be willing to conduct a series of small steps and actions in order to address the most looming problems.
CONCLUSIONS: President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov might have a preference to move at a very slow and cautious speed, spreading reforms into the five-year planning cycle. The problem is that Turkmenistan does not have the strong institutions necessary to manage its complex economic system and its international trade and move forward, unless there are changes. Globalization tremendously speeds up all processes and all governments around the world have to react to the challenges of globalization and the changing economic, trade and security environments as quickly as possible. The president has to convince his entourage and the ruling elite that cosmetic tweaking in Turkmenistan will not help – the country needs significant reforms in order to stabilize the social and economic situation.
Here, the role of the international community is very important. Instead of exclusively focusing on criticizing the regime for human rights violations or keeping Ashgabat isolated by demanding immediate radical reforms, international organizations and individual international players should be involved in a greater dialogue with the regime through all possible formal and informal channels. For example, the international community might help Turkmenistan in reforming its educational system at all levels in the country and supporting Turkmen students to study abroad. The assistance can also be extended into reforming the healthcare and social welfare systems. Dialogue and international cooperation helped Gorbachev to make his reforms happen in the Soviet Union, while isolation has limited opportunities for change in Iran.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is an adjunct Assistant Professor at the Harriman Institute at the Columbia University (New York). He is author of the Historical Dictionary of Turkmenistan (2005) and The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007). The author wishes to thank Mr. Daniel Zaretsky, President of CAMEDA, for his help in preparing this article.