BACKGROUND: On December 21, 2006, Turkmenistan woke up to a very strange morning. The first and life president, who had been able to decide about the fate of any Turkmenistani, was no more. His nation was as abandoned as an orphan after the earthquake that devastated Ashgabat in 1948 “much like Niyazov himself, in other words. Nevertheless, not everybody was really surprised. The Turkmen elites were evidently able to manage the new situation quite well. There are also rumours about the earlier date of the Serdar\'s death. According to some of them, the death was announced only after Russian president Vladimir Putin repeatedly demanded to speak with Turkmenbashi. If this information is well-founded, Niyazov would have been dead for several days before the news came out, and the elite would have enough time to agree on their next steps. Analyzing the elites in Turkmenistan in the last days of Niyazov\'s life, analysts often refer to traditional clan or tribal connections that could play an important role in the expected succession struggle. The majority of Turkmenistan\'s elite is indeed predominantly from the Akhal tribe from the central region of Turkmenistan. Representatives of other elites are able to play only a secondary role in the state hierarchy. However, the role of the clan system appears to be exaggerated. The traditional tribal question does not appear to have played a decisive role in the recent regime transformation. However, it is possible to speak of political or power clans, with patron-client relations, and these participated in the recent events. After the purges of Spring 2006, when powerful Prosecutor General Kurbanbibi Atajanova was jailed, only two main centers of power maintained their influence on Turkmenbashi. The first was the Presidential Guards, under the leadership of Akmurat Rejepov. He successfully placed his people (absolutely loyal to him) into the major power structures, including the Defense Ministry, the National Security Ministry, etc. The second important power body was formed around the Presidential Administration. There were several influential people that were almost unknown and even mysterious. The most important of them were Alexandr Zhadan, Victor Khramov and Vladimir Umnov. All of them worked as advisors to the President and were probably responsible for most ideological matters, as well as for the foreign and internal policies in Turkmenistan. These people were considered to be the most powerful persons in Turkmenbashi\'s inner circle. Their role now, and even their whereabouts, are unclear. IMPLICATIONS: While there will undoubtedly be much speculation about Turkmenbashi’s death – what its real cause was, and whether it was unnatural, etc., the first visible steps of the new establishment are of greater significance. The death of powerful leaders leaving no designated and strong successor usually results in instability, and a power struggle, whose \'winner\' takes the highest seat, but normally without reaching the level of power as the predecessor. In Turkmenistan, although there was no strong successor in the leadership, the struggle for power finished almost before it started. The most informed and powerful individuals in the state took advantage of their positions. Presently, the above-mentioned Akmurat Rejepov appears to be the most powerful figure in the country. However, he will probably prefer to stay behind the scene and put Acting President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov through as a formal figurehead. The constitutional (or rather pseudo-constitutional) shifts in the Halk Maslahaty (the Supreme constitutional organ in the country) session on December 26, 2006, merely confirmed the existence of an elite agreement. Ovezgeldy Atayev, the chairman of Turkmen parliament (mejlis) who was supposed to take up the function of acting president according to Article 61 of the previous version of the Turkmen Constitution, was completely set aside. The new text of the relevant Article says that the rights of the President in case of his incapability to execute his function are transferred to the vice-chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers (i.e. Berdymuhammedov). Berdymuhammedov, moreover, has not achieved the necessary age minimum to be elected, and hence the Constitution was modified to fit to this situation: now the President could be any person from age 40 to 70. Similar ad hoc Constitutional amendments are quite typical for this type of regime changes, as the case of Syria demonstrates. The amendments to the Constitution made the National Security Council (with Rejepov at its head) the most powerful organ in Turkmenistan, along with the Presidency. The current Constitution incorporated this organ to be a new power institution. It also provides the Council the right to convene a meeting of the Halk Maslahaty in case the President is unable to hold office. In such a case the Council, appointing an ad interim President, lacks any counterweight. And since there is no definition of the President\'s \'incapability\', he could practically be impeached by the Council (i. e. Rejepov now) at any moment and could conceivably be replaced by a more suitable person according to these provisions. The new elites have been playing the game according to their own rules, and appear to consider neither the Halk Maslahaty nor the Turkmen Constitution to be the key fundaments of the state. Thus, the laws and particularly the Constitution could stay behind again in case another need arises to legitimize some new situation. Concerning Turkmenbashi\'s closest \"circle\", its role in the new regime is quite unclear. But at least in following months, Turkmenbashi\'s former advisors will be useful for their contacts abroad (mainly in Russia), as well as for the information they and probably only they possess concerning Turkmenbashi\'s financial transfers. The opposition parties in exile became perhaps the main losers of the whole game. Though they declared their unity and preparedness to take the initiative in case of Turkmenbashi\'s departure, their actions demonstrated the contrary. They were not even able to find a common candidate for the presidential elections, even though this step would be just a formal gesture. Furthermore, the regime clearly presented its steadiness and its reluctance to allow any kind of competitors, and simply refused to allow the opposition leaders to enter the country. The impact of the exiled opposition on Turkmen politics will be highly doubtful in the future. CONCLUSIONS: The new rulers of Turkmenistan seem determined. Barring a dramatic turn of events, Berdymuhammedov\'s victory in formal presidential elections is almost guaranteed. However, the next steps of the new leadership remain uncertain. The power given to Rejepov according to the constitutional amendments affect the President\'s power. But the scenario with Berdymuhammedov as Rejepov\'s puppet is not the only possibility. In modern history, several analogies exist where compromise figures such as Anwar as-Sa\'adat in Egypt in the 1970s have been appointed, and these show that Berdymuhammedov could, in the future, use the Constitutional as well as informal practices to achieve real power and purge all potential rivals. Therefore, the Rejepov-Berdymuhammedov tandem and the relationship between the two leaders will be crucial for the country\'s short-term development. In any case, given the weakness of both state institutions and society in present-day Turkmenistan, the continued dominance of a strong leader and a narrow elite appears the only realistic direction that maintains stability. Otherwise, the clashes among presently unsatisfied power elites competing as pretenders for power could be expected. On the other hand, it is also likely that the strong cult of personality that surrounded Niyazov will not return with the new leadership. The title of \"The Father of Turkmen\" will be left behind Turkmenbashi. His Ruhnama and his monuments will probably remain in the country at least for some time as the ideological icons of a post-totalitarian society. Finally, the formation of a new authoritarian regime could be expected, which may or may not in the next few months include the break-up of the current tandem in clashes over formal legislative competences and (perhaps more importantly) informal power. The potential winner of this struggle could stay in power for a number of years. Both Rejepov and Berdymuhammedov have this opportunity. At this time, the appearance of a rival does not appear feasible, but could not be excluded. Of the two leaders, Berdymuhammedov is helped by his new-won status as interim president, while present informal power and Constitutional background give good chances to Rejepov. AUTHOR\'S BIO: Slavomir Horak is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. He is specialized in internal social and political development in Central Asia.