BACKGROUND: The Wider Black Sea region is a patchwork of overlapping political areas and spheres of influence. Bulgaria and Romania are NATO members and soon-to-be EU members. Ukraine is caught between the West and Russia. Georgia leans toward the West, but borders on Russia’s soft underbelly. Turkey vacillates between East and West, pulled in different directions by national interests and national pride. Russia, in a more pronounced way, it staking its own course. The Black Sea’s six littoral states (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Turkey) and several additional countries in the wider region are beginning to tentatively construct a regional identity just as foreign powers and outside forces are searching for footholds in their vicinity. The region is geopolitically significant precisely because it is a nexus of cultures, international trade (legal and illicit), ideas, and influences. Oil and gas from Central Asia and the Middle East move along Black Sea shipping lanes and pipelines to Europe and other points west. These same shipping lanes are used for smuggling of narcotics, persons (including terrorists), conventional weapons, and components for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The Black Sea region can be a launching platform for military, reconstruction, and stabilization operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly Iran and for the protection of energy shipping lanes between the Caspian region and Western markets. It is also Europe’s new southeastern border. Thus, both the European Union and the U.S. have strong interests in safeguarding the movement of some goods, preventing the movement of others, and maintaining a presence in the Black Sea region. Turkey and Russia are key powers uneasy about the U.S. presence in the Black Sea basin. Turkey desires stability in the Black Sea, but the moderate Islamist AK Party government in Ankara does not see eye to eye with its Western partners over how to achieve this. Turkey’s perception of the United States was profoundly changed by the Iraq war. Long an ally of the West and an EU aspirant, Turkey has recently distanced itself from the U.S. and NATO. In response to its real or perceived grievances with the U.S. and the EU, Turkey is seeking a stronger position from which it can pursue its own ends without interference. Turkey’s most recent National Security Policy Document emphasizes the importance of Turkey using its geopolitical position to become a hub for energy storage and transit between suppliers in Russia, the Middle East, and Central Asia and markets in the West. Russia, even more than Turkey, has been increasingly moving away from the West and is focused on maintaining regional hegemony. The Kremlin has been using Russia’s recently acquired economic might, by virtue of the high price of oil and unprecedented demand for natural gas, to pursue its foreign policy goals. One of those goals is to become the world’s primary supplier of energy resources. Òhat requires a tight grip on purchasing and transporting of the oil and gas resources of the former Soviet Union. IMPLICATIONS: Russia has turned a generous profit as the middleman between cheap Central Asian oil and gas and energy-hungry economies in the West. By selling Central Asian oil and gas at a premium abroad, Russia has earned windfall profits and undertaken obligations to supply countries such as the EU and China well beyond its own abilities to produce. Russia also supplies two thirds of Turkey’s natural gas and roughly 40 percent of the EU’s—a position that may be in jeopardy if the pipelines through Turkey are built using non-Russian sources of supply. Further complicating regional security in the wider Black Sea region are the unresolved conflicts in the region: South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova, as well as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. These conflicts raise two primary concerns. First, they threaten the territorial integrity of internationally recognized states. Implications for separatists in Chechnya, Daghestan, Kurdistan, Khouzistan, Baluchistan, and even Xinjiang are easy to imagine, to say the least. Second, the local governments of the secessionist regions operate according to their own “laws”, not those of the central governments, resulting in insufficient oversight and crime prevention. These lawless enclaves have become breeding grounds for international smuggling and other illicit activities. Until the conflicts are resolved, ruling elites in these statelets will frustrate efforts to establish a lasting peace, which is a precondition for stability, security, and economic growth in the broader region. Because the U.S. does not have a free rein in the Black Sea region, it is essential that the countries in the region develop their own intraregional capabilities in maritime security, counterterrorism, disaster preparedness, and other aspects of securing their waterways and coastlines. However, the Black Sea littoral states are operating according to their own distinct agendas, and there is no consensus about how to achieve common security goals. Tensions over status within the region, conflicting allegiances, and varying perceptions of what constitutes stability are preventing these states from finding mutually acceptable ways to combat their common problems. U.S. presence currently has the support of Bulgaria and Romania, but U.S. relations with Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are on shaky ground. Neither Turkey nor Russia supported U.S. operations in Iraq, and relations with both countries have taken a downturn ever since. Ukraine has adopted a more pro-Russian stance since Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich took office. Georgia is under severe economic and political pressure from Russia and preoccupied with internal conflicts and is thus ill-equipped to act as a strong U.S. ally. This tangled web of interests and alliances and the recent rapprochement of Russia and Turkey, which has anti-American implications, may hamper U.S. activities in the area. CONCLUSIONS: To maintain a presence in the region, the United States needs a realistic strategy to enhance the security and stability of the Black Sea region. This specifically involves coordinating U.S. and EU policies in the region, especially with regards to the European Neighborhood Policy. It also involves increasing NATO cooperation with non-NATO countries through Partnership for Peace by offering technical and training assistance in security areas, and strengthen bilateral military ties with Ukraine. Other elements could include sponsoring trilateral military exchanges and consultations between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to assuage Turkish concerns about losing its dominant position in the Black Sea basin to the growing influence of the U.S. America can contribute to existing regional security structures either as a participant or as an observer. This could include providing crucial technical intelligence capabilities, airlift, and other specialty capacities. These structures could also be included in NATO military and disaster preparedness exercises to improve interoperability. A stable Black Sea region must include urging Russia to lift sanctions against Georgia and pushing for renewed multilateral talks over the resolution of the region’s “frozen conflicts”, particularly acute in the case of Georgia. This includes promoting the replacement of Russian/CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with international peacekeeping forces – under the EU or UN umbrella, or otherwise constituted. Even with all of the current U.S. foreign policy concerns (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea), the U.S. would be unwise to concentrate on these crises to the exclusion of all others. Shoring up alliances and improving relations with states in strategic areas bordering on main theaters of operation, such as the Greater Middle East, is of utmost importance in developing future geopolitical arrangements, enhancing strategic stability, and assuring military egress and re-supply. Given the current state of U.S. relations with Turkey and Russia, the only way for the U.S. to maintain and strengthen its footholds in the Black Sea is to develop cooperation across a broad spectrum of issues of common interest and mutual concern. The U.S. needs to learn to tread lightly, offering support where possible and backing off where necessary. This is not an impossible balance to achieve. If successful, it could be used as a model for cementing U.S. presence in other strategic areas, such as Central Asia. It is time for the U.S. to launch a coordinated policy effort in the Wider Black Sea region to gain support for addressing some of the most pressing issues of the decade: the rise of Iran, WMD proliferation, cooperation in the global war on terrorism, and energy security. AUTHORS’ BIO: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at The Heritage Foundation. Conway Irwin is an energy writer with Argus Media.