BACKGROUND: The ineffectiveness of the public services in independent Kyrgyzstan is in sharp contrast to the experience of the Soviet era. Then, ordinary people received their salaries and pensions in time, law and order was enforced effectively if not brutally, and comprehensive welfare and healthcare systems provided services to ordinary people. These public goods were delivered by a distant cousin of the public service – the Soviet nomenklatura – that was created in the country under Stalin’s motto “The cadres determine everything!” in the 1930s and 1940s. True, it was built on very different principles and served a totalitarian state. Yet, among other things the nomenklatura workers provided comprehensive administrative services and strong governance. The strength of the nomenklatura system was that it had been built and functioned under a very clear system of rules, rewards and penalties. In the center of this system was a ruling communist party that developed comprehensive rules and norms for running the public sector and clear cut criteria for recruiting new members into the system. Some of these rules were very much a product of the dogmatic totalitarian system; yet many others incorporated norms and traditions seen in some western countries, such as France. An example of the former was criteria for recruiting new members – loyalty to the ruling party and the Soviet state. An example of the latter was a systematic approach to developing a professional, effective and cohesive system capable of completing most comprehensive and difficult tasks. Those who ran this system took very seriously the issue of professional recruitment and development. The search for young talents started at the early stage at technical colleges (proftech uchiliche) and universities. Through various outreach and internship programs the cadres were carefully selected and recruited into administrative and managerial positions. There also was a large scale training and retraining system that helped young people enrich their expertise and network with others. Only those who passed certain levels of evaluations and interviews were finally included into exclusive ranks of the nomenklatura from where top administrators, government officials and enterprise managers were recruited on more or less clear principles. Of course, like in France or the USA, the state could not offer the highest salaries to public service workers, but this shortcoming was compensated for by offering social welfare and healthcare benefits and good pensions. Like any other system, there were political appointees whose main assets were political connections and the ability to deliver politically correct speeches and to run Soviet-style election campaigns. Numerous reasons contributed to the fact that by the late 1970s and mid-1980s, this system became increasingly corrupt and less efficient in servicing its own corporate interests at the expense of ordinary citizens. Yet, in general this system was capable of generating and recruiting well trained technocrats capable of governing institutions, managing various projects and running the day-to-day activities of large state agencies. The situation radically changed with independence. The democratically elected government of President Askar Akayev and its foreign advisers harbored a deep mistrust of the existing public service workers. In addition, international organizations demanded deep cuts on all public expenditures, including on public sector workers. IMPLICATIONS: The new government wowed to destroy the old nomenklatura system and replace it with a professional, modern and lean one. However, in the end the old system was destroyed, but a new system was not really established. First, old rules, norms and clear cut criteria for recruitment into public sector services and for professional growth were thrown away, but new ones were never created. Political appointments became the norm and many positions were filled by people without adequate expertise or experience. A lot of people entered the system because of their political or personal loyalties or tribal/clan affiliations. New ministers, governors or even department chiefs in state agencies would replace most of the personnel in the workplace. On many occasions international organizations contributed to this chaos, as they often lobbied for the appointment of outsiders whose main assets were knowledge of English or who managed to impress a high ranking foreigner during a reception. Second, the deep cuts in the state budget led to steep cuts in salaries and benefits. Public sector workers now found that they had token salaries and practically no welfare or healthcare benefits. For example, in the mid-1990s the salary of people working in a governor’s office could hardly cover five days of decent living and even people in the presidential office joked that their official monthly salaries were good enough to buy ten pounds of meat or half a jacket in a bazaar. Of course, under these circumstances many public service employees increasingly supplemented their incomes through activities outside of their professional duties, including the abuse of public goods and corruption. Third, training and retraining was largely transferred to the domain of international organizations who, no doubt, introduced new ideas, concepts and skills. However, they did so in extremely departmentalized ways. Many programs were run more for the needs of those international organizations than for the needs of the Kyrgyz civil service, and duplication became the norm. Fourth, the civil service sector experienced a steady outflow of the most talented and capable technocrats and skillful managers. These individuals were often recruited to international organizations, local enterprises and foreign subsidiaries or simply gave up as they were unable to survive on tiny salaries. For example, in one case a former finance minister received a salary several times higher after becoming a mid-level consultant to an international donor organization. By and large, all these changes and the ensuing chaos effectively turned the public service into a huge and deeply corrupt machine whose main interest and work culture was increasingly built around extracting rent from ordinary people. The results of the public service crisis can be seen during President Akayev’s last term. The Akayev-led administration failed to contain a looming political crisis that was largely fueled by the ineffectiveness of the government’s economic policies as well as mass poverty and mismanagement of international assistance. One example of the dysfunctional public service is the so-called passport fiasco: for years, government-controlled agencies were unable to deliver new passports to Kyrgyz citizens, though a bribe could make the passports available within hours. It was this dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness and corruption of Akayev’s administration that brought people to the streets and ultimately led to the “Tulip Revolution” in March 2005. The issue of the effectiveness of the public service was at the very heart of the revolution: people went to the streets complaining against the absence of actual policies, bureaucratic red tape, corruption, the inefficiency of public institutions and their inability to provide public goods to general population.

CONCLUSIONS: There is no doubt that Kyrgyzstan, like many other former Communist countries, needs political reforms, constitutional changes and a new strategy for economic development. President Bakiyev came to power on a promise to fight corruption, to fix public services and in the end to reduce mass poverty. People were extremely dissatisfied with the policies of the previous administration, but they have also become increasingly frustrated with the current administration too. Despite the promised changes, a decent public service is not in place in Kyrgyzstan. There is an urgent need to establish a clean, lean and independent public service system whose employees would serve the ordinary citizens of Kyrgyzstan, but not individual politicians. There are various components of this. First, there is a need to increase substantially public service salaries and benefits. Though this is a politically sensitive decision in this very poor country, the example of Georgia shows that it is worth trying to motivate public service workers through serious and clearly defined financial incentives. Second, there is a need to streamline the most important appointments, promotions and dismissals by taking them away from well-connected individuals and creating a truly independent public sector. Third, there is a need for international organizations to stop running their individual training programs and to support the establishment of a national training institution. This initiative might take place under the Institute of State Management under the President or under the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan, though it should be run by an international board of trustees. Overall, the country needs a highly motivated and capable team of technocrats capable of delivering fruits of the changes to ordinary people through good governance but not another revolution.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is an adjunct Assistant Professor at the Harriman Institute at the Columbia University (New York). He is an author of the Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan (2004) and The Cultures and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2006, forthcoming). In Spring 2006 he supervised a joint SIPA-UNDP (Kyrgyzstan office) project on democratic governance in Kyrgyzstan.