IMPLICATIONS: Assuming that Kadyrov is becoming a spent force in Chechnya, would Kakiev’s credentials suggest him as Moscow’s strongman in waiting? First and foremost, his impeccable record as an opponent of separatism, coupled with his self-styled image as a Russian patriot would obviously endear him to Putin and his inner circle. Similarly, with respect to the Russian military, these qualities would certainly assure him the somewhat qualified status of being, in their view, the least untrustworthy “loyal” Chechen field commander. Also, Kakiev’s tendency to eschew the political limelight might work in his favour. In recent months, a series of political demarches from Kadyrov have caused some embarrassment for his handlers in Moscow. The young prime minister is floundering in his attempts to kindle his fledgling political career while simultaneously striving to retain his status as local strongman. In fact, his recent travails suggest that it may be impossible to reconcile these two roles. This realization would hardly perturb Kakiev, who seems content to project himself as a bluff military man, quite unconcerned with the inanities of political office. Should he at some point assume the role of Chechnya’s gendarme, therefore, Kakiev would presumably be content to leave the political side of affairs to Alkhanov – something Kadyrov has resolutely refused to do. Indeed, if certain reports are to be believed, an Alkhanov-Kakiev axis (also including Sulim Yamadaev and the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantemirov) is already in the process of being formed. An alliance between Alkhanov and Kakiev would seem eminently logical given their shared history as career opponents of separatism. Unlike the other three ethno-battalions, “Zapad” contains no known amnestied separatists. In fact, Kakiev is an avowed opponent of the amnesty process in general, asking: “How can those who have been fighting us be utterly forgiven?” In this respect, he is certainly more inflexible than Kadyrov who readily accepted former separatists into his security structures. Kakiev apparently shares the zero-sum mentality of the Russian Generals with respect to the war against the separatists. Indeed, his hatred for the separatist president, Doku Umarov, is visceral, and personal: Kakiev blames Umarov and the late Ruslan “Hamzat” Gelaev for perpetrating the so-called “Dagestanskaya Street massacre” during the rebel occupation of Grozny in August 1996, in which thirty Kakievsty were allegedly murdered despite a promise of safe passage from the rebels. Kakiev, it should be said, is himself accused of egregious human rights violations. The prospect of negotiating with the separatist leadership is nevertheless as much an anathema to him as it is to Putin and the military. However, Kakiev does have some drawbacks as a potential strongman. For one thing, he does not possess the same clan-connections enjoyed by Kadyrov – connections which have underpinned the Russian strategy of “Chechenization” over the past several years. Furthermore, should Kakiev at some point receive the Kremlin’s blessing as its Chechen enforcer-in-chief (either explicitly or implicitly), one might well expect certain other pro-Moscow field commanders to react with jealousy and suspicion.
CONCLUSIONS: While it would be fanciful to sound Kadyrov’s political death knell just yet, his long-term viability depends almost solely on how quickly he learns to temper his evolving political persona. His carefully crafted relationship with Putin will doubtless buy him some time in this regard, but the indications from Chechnya itself are that Ramzan may well be ousted from “below”, as it were, before he is from “above”. The successive incidents catalogued at the outset show that there is, in fact, a loyal opposition to Kadyrov within Chechnya; and, perhaps more importantly, that there are others as capable of maintaining order as he. Mr. Kadyrov should perhaps hope that these apparent conclusions have escaped the notice of President Putin and his confidantes. Else, his political star could fall as spectacularly as it rose.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree in International Relations from University College Cork, Ireland.