BACKGROUND: The reversion of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy since 2003 was in fact the acknowledgement of an old geopolitical concept, according to which Central Asia is a zone of exclusive Russian dominance. The Russian influence in the region, which had weakened after 1991, is now being rapidly restored. It is very clear that the previously increasing American influence in Central Asia is rapidly melting away. Uzbekistan finds itself at the epicenter of this drama. The American military presence on Uzbekistan’s territory caused a very serious reaction from the traditional geopolitical rivals of the United States. Iran, Russia and China all exerted strong pressure to reverse this situation. It must be noted, however, that it was not so much America’s military activity in Central Asia, more precisely in Afghanistan, that caused Russian and Chinese resistance. In fact, from the very beginning of American military operations, it had been very clear that this activity based in the territory of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries posed no threat to these two countries. Indeed, it was not so much America’s military presence in Central Asia that challenged Russian, Chinese or other powers’ interests, as America’s democratic presence. The reason for all disagreements, discontents, suspicions and disappointments was the fate of democracy in Central Asia as a whole and in Uzbekistan specifically. The recent series of events has potentially important implications. At present, America may seem disappointed, Russia may seem triumphant – both because Uzbekistan seems discredited. The sense of triumph in Moscow seems to be fueling revanchism in the Russian policy in Central Asia; meanwhile, disappointment in Washington could cause revisionism in the U.S. attitude towards Uzbekistan. In the end, the discrediting of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy could lead to Uzbekistan’s reversion to a renewed dependence on Russia that it had so long tried to avoid. In this context, American revisionism would imply the reconsideration of the basic thinking that has laid the foundation for America’s policies toward Central Asia, and specifically Uzbekistan, since independence. This thinking focused on the central role of Uzbekistan in Central Asia, and advocated a close relationship as a cornerstone of U.S. policy. Revisionism would mean that Uzbekistan cease being a key country in U.S. policy toward Central Asia, let alone a strategic partner. Russian revanchism implies that by tying Uzbekistan closer to itself, Russia can (and already does) use an unique opportunity to seal its hegemony over this region for the longer term at the expense of the Central Asian states’ relations with the West, starting with Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s reversion would imply that Tashkent decisively abandon its policy of seeking a balanced relationship to the three major powers in the region, preferring alliance with Russia to strategic partnership with the United States – based on its belief in a mythic American threat, and more fundamentally because the U.S. demands something that Tashkent cannot afford, namely democracy.

IMPLICATIONS: These three parallel processes not only challenge U.S. interests in Central Asia. Indeed, the very fact that Russia’s goals remain thoroughly unchanged since the collapse of the USSR put into question the primary goals of U.S. policy and its ways of achieving them. The current Russian-American divergence over the fate of Central Asia is, in fact, a two-fold symptom in the process of the formation of a new post-cold war world order. On the one hand, the old balance of power mode of international relations appeared revitalized when it was expected to wither away. On the other hand, the central question of Russian-American divergence – the question of democracy in Central Asia – revealed that the intervention of geopolitics can not only modify policies of democratization but undermine them. The mixing of democracy with geopolitics has had very negative results for the region and for the U.S. It is obvious that the only way to overcome both destructive geopolitics of external powers and geopolitical distortions of internal democracy is to correlate constructively external and internal factors. Geopolitics are unavoidable, and eschewing democratization is undesirable. But a ‘democratization of geopolitics’ in the region is difficult as long as Russia is capitalizing exactly on the infusion of ideology in the region’s politics. Nevertheless, to make this more realistic, one could think of a larger internationalization of the issue of democratization. In this sense, the U.S. might promote the concept of democracy in a different light: not as a solely American plan or desire but showing convincingly that this is endorsed by the entire international democratic community. Central Asia is located in undemocratic surroundings. This means that a “zero-sum game” mode of geopolitics has been prevailing overall in Central Asian geopolitics. The countries of the region, as well as external powers, need somehow to pass from the zero-sum framework to a “win-win” model. The overall relationships between Uzbekistan and the United States, on the one hand, and Uzbekistan and Russia on the other, are asymmetric by nature. Washington can, but only in a longer-term strategy, seek to build on its relations with Tashkent by what has always been on the agenda, namely real internal democratization in Uzbekistan. Regarding the other direction, it is also necessary for Tashkent to index its improved relations with Moscow (not the other way round) on the democratization of Russian geopolitics –meaning, among other things, the admission of other great powers’ interests, their presence in the region, and their participation in regional affairs. Of course, the ‘democratization’ of Russian geopolitics in the short term is very unlikely, but is undoubtedly in both the west’s, the region’s, and eventually Russia’s own interest in the long term. At the present point, revising its democratic demands would not serve American foreign policy well. But continued focus on this will not work, and only marginalize America, unless it is paralleled by increased pressure on Moscow, in order to engage it in real post-cold-war processes instead of continuing its old cold war-style practice. A democratic environment is likely to emerge in Central Asia only if two processes occur: first, the interdependence of political processes in the regional countries is recognized, which would reduce the divide-and-rule policies by regional powers. And secondly, the development of regional cooperation mechanisms that are not dominated by foreign powers. This implies, among other, a regional collective security system, which would embrace the Central Asian countries. The restoration by these countries of their own regional structure may seem to be against Russia’s interests the way Russia defines them, but in the longer term this integrative development would leads to more secure, stable, and more democratic and peaceful Russian southern neighborhood.

CONCLUSIONS: The three tendencies of Uzbekistan’s reversion, America’s revisionism, and Russia’s revanchism are undesirable. All these tendencies, if realized, will serve only to freeze the current status quo in the region whereas it needs to be changed fundamentally, because the existing state of affairs in Central Asia just freezes or perpetuates the old Russian hegemony in its southern “underbelly”, whereas the foreign policy diversification of Central Asian states remain the matter of their real independence. It is also clear that Uzbekistan needs a foreign policy doctrine. Due to the key role of this country in Central Asian affairs, it might reincarnate itself as a motor of regional integration. The dramatic experience of its isolation from the West must be taken into account in working out a new foreign policy doctrine. It is also necessary for the West, primarily the United States, to demonstrate that it looks at democracy as a noble mission, not as a geopolitical project. The US ambitions need to be shown to be honest, and not subversive; and this implies a US policy that is predictable, long-term, and creates confidence in regional actors in its intentions in general, and regarding democracy specifically. Geopolitics and democratization must be separate and understood as such; the democratic choice of a country cannot be tied to its geopolitical apprehensions.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Farkhod Tolipov, PhD in Political Science, independent researcher, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.