BACKGROUND:Spread over 350,000 square kilometers, Baluchistan remains extremely underdeveloped with only marginal access to education and health facilities, even in the major towns. The strategically placed energy-rich province bordering Afghanistan and Iran meets 40 percent of the country’s needs of natural gas. Marred by security threats from India and the absence of a consistent democratic regime, Pakistan has been mismanaged by successive governments since 1947. This led, among other, to uneven development patterns among the country’s regions, causing frustration amongst those left behind. Eventually, East Pakistan decided to part way with Pakistan and establish its own state, Bangladesh, in 1971. Today, a sense of relative deprivation seems to be on the rise in Baluchistan, and appears directly proportionate with development taking place in other parts of the country, especially the most populous Punjab province. The cautious Baluch population and tribal leadership receive with suspicion news of mega-projects such as the deep seaport at Gwadar, a new coastal highway, and mining contracts. Many Baluch nationalist leaders fear the strategic military facilities would be used by American forces against neighboring Iran, while Islamabad would pump out the region’s natural resources. While General Musharraf’s repeatedly refused to listen to the Baluch ‘noise’, militant attacks by the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) have emerged. The BLA was last heard of during the Soviet-inspired armed insurrection in the 1970s. The Pakistan Army at the time suppressed the rebellion with full force. Though Baluch tribesmen were given a free hand during the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s in reward for accommodating Afghan refugees, no concrete development activities were initiated to address grievances. For decades, the tribal chiefs have been benefiting from the lucrative smuggling route from Spin Boldak to Chaman. Estimates of the total value of smuggling into Pakistan through the border crossing ran as high as $5 billion in 1999, out of which the Taliban got $70 million to finance their $100 million war budget. Pakistan’s loss through smuggling of electronic goods and other wares may have been ca. $600 million in 1999. While the black economy generated through the Afghanistan-Baluchistan route is a serious portion of the country’s GDP, the tribal chiefs are the real beneficiaries. When General Musharraf’s government announced mega-projects along with a decision to erect new military bases, the same fears of being used and dumped were sparked. The prolonged denial of political participation to the Baluch people has now led them to militancy, according to Senator Sanaullah Mengal. However, the nationalist parties are no angels either. They are working hand in hand with the Baluch tribal elders who seek to restrict government control in their respective spheres of influence. Tribal leader Akbar Bugti said in a recent interview, “The more the mega-projects, the greater the government would be!” Tehran, with its significant Baluch population, is allegedly backing the BLA activists with training and sanctuaries. Iranian diplomats in Islamabad reject the allegation. While violence in Baluchistan makes headlines in the Indian national press, the state-run Indian radio – Doordarshan – daily airs a program to propagate the alleged atrocities of Pakistani forces in the military operation. Ershad Mahmud, a Kashmir expert and columnist, said “it seems that the Indian government has decided at a top level to highlight the Baluchistan issue, equating it with the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.” Given the developing India-U.S. strategic relationship and Washington’s opposition to the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, New Delhi may also use the Baluchistan card at a latter stage to pull out of the multi-billion dollar energy deal. The U.S. has already offered India greater access to nuclear technology to meet its energy needs. Moreover, the Indian foreign ministry’s spokesman twice ‘advised’ Pakistan to exercise restraint in dealing with the Baluch issue. Pakistan responded by accusing India of supporting militants from its consulates near Pakistan’s borders in Afghanistan (Kandahar and Jalalabad) and Iran (Zahedan). India denies the charges. Paradoxically, the Pakistani army does not deal with the problem as a political issue but instead as an administrative one, which could be resolved by the use of force. Limited access provided to the media and human rights groups further undermines the credibility of official claims of silencing a few enemy-aided miscreants and resolve to socio-economic development.

IMPLICATIONS:The Baluch nationalists, eager to limit government intervention, are playing the card of ethnic marginalization of the ingenious population in wake of the mega projects’ completion. Undoubtedly, the insecure and less skilled Baluch people may not compete with more educated and skilled labor. Moreover, the Gwadar deep seaport is set to attract the best manpower in the country and real estate prices in the hitherto little known tiny city has skyrocketed, involving the nation’s best land developers. The government does not seem to move beyond a mere lip service and agree on contentious issues by allocating quota for the local labor force and opening technical and vocational colleges in the region, for example. The fueling militancy could affect the economic growth of the country. Over the past couple of years, Pakistan’s growth rate has been over 6 per cent. Continuous attacks on petroleum and natural gas pipelines carrying Baluchistan’s energy resources are unlikely to be effectively met by military action. Indeed, Pakistan is among the countries where natural gas-run vehicles are increasing at phenomenal pace, further heightening the importance of defusing the problems in Baluchistan. The unrest in some parts of Baluchistan may also damage the U.S.-led campaign to apprehend al-Qaeda’s leadership, a war which has inflicted the highest peacetime casualties ever to the Pakistan Army. Manning a long treacherous Baluchistan border is already a huge task at hand. Finally, there is the risk of a domino effect, with Baluch nationalism kindling grievances amonf other smaller and marginalized ethnic groups such as the Siraiki in southern Punjab.

CONCLUSIONS:Undoubtedly, the Baluch nationalist leaders are small in number and unable to bag electoral victories, yet the BLA is making their message reach louder and farther than political rhetoric. The Baluch tribal elders, for their part, are opposed to development in general, fearing a backlash among the poor tribesmen who may like to break free of the feudal controls if educational and economic opportunities arise. However, there is no genuine, alternate leadership for the poor people to look to, owing to the limited political space for politicians. Like his predecessors, General Pervez Musharraf appears comfortable dealing with strong individuals and pressure groups instead of elected representatives or genuine leaders. However, there exists strong political consensus in the parliament for giving Baluchistan increased autonomy. For that matter, the military as well as defiant tribal leaders would require some rethinking to reach a middle ground. The military would have learn to respect the diversity of opinion and ethnic shades, by creating room for federating units to choose their own path to development and prosperity; while the Baluch representatives in parliament would have to avail the option of political dialogue to win a negotiated victory for the people of Baluchistan. While the Baluch nationalism of rebellious tribal elders could be steered from isolated to productive directions, General Musharraf would also have to mellow down his threatening tone. Like Washington and London, Islamabad also needs to address the root causes of terrorism in his own backyard before it is too late.

AUTHOR’S BIO:Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist, broadcaster and academic whose work regularly appears in the Pakistani daily newspaper, The News, and the monthly magazine, Newsline. He serves on the panel of the Global Journalists Program, which is associated with the International Press Institute and U.S. National Public Radio.