BACKGROUND: Large migration waves have become a common phenomenon in the era of globalization, as millions of people have left their homelands, legally or illegally, in search of political stability and/or economic opportunities. The similarities of migration trends end here, though, as governments concerned by immigration have been maintaining different policies dealing with this issue. The size of migration, the political and economic environment, and past experiences play crucial roles in shaping government attitudes. During most of the 20th century, the borders between Kyrgyzstan and China were tightly sealed. In the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet authorities closed the Kyrgyz borders with China in an attempt to stop the outflow of Central Asian people escaping brutal sedentarization, collectivization and sovietization policies. The sealed borders cut off numerous family, tribal, commercial and cultural ties between the largely Muslim population of Western China and Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan. Only in the 1950s were the borders with the newly established People’s Republic of China and the USSR temporarily opened. Many ethnic minorities who lived in Xinjiang – Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uighurs, Dungans (Muslim Chinese) and others – received the opportunity to travel freely to Central Asia and, in few exceptional cases and under strict control, to settle in the region. However, the growing confrontation between the Soviet and Chinese authorities in the 1960s and 1970s led to the re-establishment of the iron curtain and the highly strained situation on Central Asia’s border with China. Kyrgyzstan’s borders with China were opened for free trade, travel, and cultural exchange following independence in 1991. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Kyrgyzstan became an attractive destination for temporary and permanent immigration (numbering in the thousands each year) from China for several reasons. First, Kyrgyzstan has a much smaller population (about 5.1 millions) than Xinjiang (about 20 million) and a much lower population density in urban areas. Second, living standards in Kyrgyzstan, especially in metropolitan areas are still considerably higher than in Xinjiang. Third, the underdevelopment of the retail, catering, intensive agriculture and services sectors provided golden opportunities for those with appropriate skills and expertise. Finally, immigrants from Xinjiang find communities of compatriots who historically lived in Kyrgyzstan. In fact, Chinese entrepreneurs quickly found their niches in the Kyrgyz market, filling the gap in the consumer retail and service markets that emerged after the collapse of Kyrgyzstan’s trade and technological ties with the former Soviet block. Chinese goods captured up to 60-70 percent of the local market for consumer goods and processed food. Chinese entrepreneurs established several large business and trade centers that expanded their trade well beyond Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan’s mass privatization program, completed in 2003, provided another opportunity as Chinese managers and farmers were able to lease enterprises and farms. Recently, the Chinese business people entered the lucrative construction sector, regularly winning deals and contracts. Hence the Chinese community has been steadily growing and became more visible, especially in major metropolitan areas of Kyrgyzstan. According to various estimates, between 20,000 and 120,000 Chinese (if Hans, Uighurs, Dungans and others are counted) have moved to the country during last 15 years, a number likely to double in the next decade. Not all moved to Kyrgyzstan legally: there are reports about Chinese who overstay their visas, moved in through third countries (like Kazakhstan), and obtained Kyrgyz passports through marriage to local women or by simply buying Kyrgyz documents on the black market.

IMPLICATIONS: The growth of the Chinese community will have several important implications. First, if unchecked, this growth will put additional pressure on the labor market (where about 60,000 people are officially registered as unemployed) and especially on the business community. The most worrying development is that during the last 15 years Kyrgyzstan has experienced a steep decline in the quality of its education. Although the official literacy rate remains around 95-97 percent, many local students are falling behind in such important skills as entrepreneurship, mathematics, sciences, computing, and various business skills. Chinese migrants are especially competitive in these fields. Therefore, there might be considerable direct competition for jobs and business opportunities; and serious tensions and in the worst case scenario – open conflict between the indigenous population and the newcomers. Second, there is also a widespread fear that the Chinese immigrants with their market skills, entrepreneurial spirit and hard working capabilities will establish control over the most important and lucrative sectors of the national economy. Recent economic developments in Kyrgyzstan and particularly its privatization program also contributes to this perception. The privatization process has been neither open nor competitive, but rather distributive and corrupt. Groups of businessmen acquired enterprises, properties and farms thanks to personal connections to patronage networks, or acquired deals through corrupt transactions. Incompetence and a lack of capital and skills have been driving many enterprises out of business for years, and rumors that successful Chinese businessmen buy businesses through clandestine deals and run them successfully have been around for long. Corrupt Kyrgyzstani politicians and crony entrepreneurs would be the first to resist political and economic transparency and the establishment of the rule of law, which might expose their criminal activity in full light. Third, the Chinese community has all the potential to amass more economic influence and with it – ethnic exclusiveness. There is already a visible trend in Kyrgyzstan that ethnic or clan-based groups establish exclusive control in niche markets, driving all competitors out of business by both legal and illegal means. Examples include retail gasoline trade, catering and processing of ethnic food, intensive green house agriculture and many other sub-sectors. This trend leads to a further fragmentation of society and opens new avenues for inter-regional, inter-ethnic and inter-communal disputes, grievances and conflicts. Fourth, red tape, corruption and political uncertainty often push businesses into the shadow economy. It is particularly true with businesses controlled by the Chinese. If the government fails to integrate the Chinese business people into the legitimate business sector and to provide legal guarantees and the rule of law, this community will be forced to operate in the black economy. This could lead to them merging with the criminal world and moving to illicit drugs trafficking and distribution. Fifth, if the Chinese newcomers are not integrated into Kyrgyz society, and if they are not treated as legitimate citizens, uncertainty would develop regarding their political loyalty to the Kyrgyz state. Due to the ambiguity of their status, they might invest into building of their own political base or into existing political groups, creating political imbalance in the country where two large groupings (often called clans) compete for political power. Evidently, already during the March 2005 unrest, the Chinese business community hired its own militia, not the state security forces, to protect their businesses from mobs.

CONCLUSIONS: Chinese immigrants already play an important role in the economic and social development of Kyrgyzstan. So far, the Kyrgyz government has failed to acknowledge their presence and their contribution to the development of the country. In the meantime, some political groups continue to politicize the immigration issue and to stir up xenophobic attitudes. There is an urgent need to establish clear rules about how the government should deal with legal and especially with illegal immigration. There is a need to promote a public awareness about the positive contribution of the Chinese community to the economic development of the country. The government also needs to make sure that the Chinese business community should be provided with equal rights and should be encouraged to operate in a legal environment, pay taxes and custom dues and support economic and political transparency. Finally, more efforts are needed in the integration of the newcomers into Kyrgyzstani society, making them loyal citizens and utilizing their skills for the benefits of the country.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is an adjunct lecturer at the Harriman Institute at the Columbia University (New York). He is the author of the Freedom House reports on Kyrgyzstan (2002 and 2003) and of the Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan (2004). At present he is working on a book, The Kyrgyzs: A Modern History.