Wednesday, 05 October 2005

ENGAGING ISRAEL: BLESSING OR CURSE FOR MUSHARRAF?

Published in Analytical Articles

By Naveed Ahmad (10/5/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: Historically, the Muslims of South Asia stood for Palestine as far back as March 23, 1940, when they gathered in Lahore to demand the creation of an independent homeland of their own. It was no coincidence that after passing the Pakistan resolution, the Muslims of the subcontinent had also unanimously adopted a pledge on Palestine. The resolution recorded, “.
BACKGROUND: Historically, the Muslims of South Asia stood for Palestine as far back as March 23, 1940, when they gathered in Lahore to demand the creation of an independent homeland of their own. It was no coincidence that after passing the Pakistan resolution, the Muslims of the subcontinent had also unanimously adopted a pledge on Palestine. The resolution recorded, “. . . no arrangements of a piecemeal character should be made in Palestine which are contrary in spirit and opposed to the pledges given to the Muslim world.” The resolution further warned against “the danger of using force in the Holy Land to overawe the Arabs . . . into submission\". Since the creation of Israel on May 14, 1948, the Islamic republic does not recognize her as a sovereign, legitimate state and fully backs the Palestinian standpoint. In early 1948, Pakistan’s founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah wrote to US President Harry Truman that the creation of Israel is a crime and history will never forgive those responsible for committing it. Soon, Pakistan voted against Israel’s admission into the UN. Interestingly, various Jewish studies record presence of some 2,000 Bene Yisrael Jews living in Karachi and a few hundred lived in Peshawar in 1947 with two synagogues in both the cities. Given the strong pro-Palestine sentiments, the Jewish community migrated either to India or Israel, leaving behind today some 50 to 60 families (some 200 odd individuals) living a low-profile, anonymous life in Pakistan. About a dozen of them are employed with the government. The synagogue in Peshawar is closed while the one in Karachi’s Rancore Lines area was razed for construction of a plaza in the 1980s. Until 1992, Pakistan’s refusal to recognize Israel led to prolonged Indian restraint in having diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. New Delhi believed that such a decision may bring the Arab states closer to Islamabad. Violent protest rallies asked the government to send Pakistani troops in aid to the Arab nations fighting against Israel in 1967. Later, the Pakistani pilots flew Jordanian and Syrian fighter jets in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and shot down the Israeli planes. However, Pakistani premier Benzair Bhutto wanted to become the first foreign leader to visit the West Bank in 1994 but the ‘honour’ went to Tancu Ciller after the Israeli refusal. While Israelis kept visiting Pakistan during and after the Afghan war, using their American or European travel documents, a very small number of Pakistanis also traveled to the Jewish state on special visas. Though the two chronic US-allies have a history of secret contacts at the diplomatic level abroad, nothing was visible till Shalon-Kasuri meeting and now Musharraf’s 30-minute address to Jews in New York.

IMPLICATIONS: In his speech to the American Jews, Pakistani military ruler Pervez Musharraf asked Tel Aviv to allow the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, as this would give Israel security and diplomatic ties with Pakistan. The New York audience rose to applaud him when Musharraf said, “What better signal for peace could there be than the opening of embassies in Israel by Islamic countries like Pakistan?” He told an Israeli newspaper that he had no timetable for such ties. \"We need to sit down and talk more [with the Israelis],\" he told The Jerusalem Post, \"and see how to move forward. We ought to be taking more steps.\" Undoubtedly, Musharraf used the event to pledge that Pakistan ultimately intended to cement full diplomatic relations with Israel. Under international law, recognition of a state can either be formal or implied. Formal recognition is conveyed to the state concerned by means of an express notification and implied recognition takes place through acts which, although not referring expressly to recognition, leaves no doubt as to the intention of doing so. By far, the predominant majority of Pakistanis finds this sea-change in the country’s foreign policy ‘uncalled for’ and ‘in conflict with the decade-old principled stance’. More than the content of his speech, the Pakistani intelligentsia and common people alike question the very decision and timing to engage Israel at the highest level. He raised more eyebrows after he termed the last six decades in Muslim-Jewish relations an ‘aberration’. But then under Musharraf-run democracy, there is little room for public opinion on such fundamental issues. Naturally, the discontent against the military dictator is bound to soar at home. However, serious analysts and politicians are stunned by this unilateral, hasty and tacit nod for recognition of Israel. While the Israelis claim that the Pakistani gesture is long overdue, General Musharraf and his team seem to believe that good ties with Jerusalem must no longer be hostage to the vagaries of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Key figures in the military regime privately also admit that Jews are too difficult to be ignored for an improved perception of Pakistan in Washington and also for containing ‘disturbing’ Indo-Israeli strategic cooperation. Wishfully, Islamabad hopes to curtail the burgeoning Israeli-Indian relationship, which has grave implications for its security. Factually speaking, the containment of Indo-Israeli military cooperation – based on highly sophisticated, long term and in large financial volumes - is near-impossible for a new friend. The Musharraf regime also realizes that Pakistan is a latecomer in the rapprochement with the Jewish state and should have kept the option open to seek more leverage with the Arab countries. The use of unilateral withdrawal from Gaza may not go down well at home as a convenient pretext for such a policy turnaround. Such a feeble face-saving excuse may not convince a highly sensitized Muslim nation which holds Sharon responsible for the massacre of the Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila.

CONCLUSIONS: So far, Musharraf has interpreted his every action, from minor policy adjustment to absolute U-turns, in the best of national interest and for the greater benefit of the Muslim Ummah. Since his bloodless military coup in October 1999 and particularly 9/11, Musharraf dependence on support from Washington and other European allies has been on the rise. The move of engaging Israel has not just silenced but startled certain circles in America, which were finding Musharraf too vulnerable to be relying on as an ally in Afghanistan’s neighborhood. Whatever the public sentiment, Musharraf’s allies know that an army general can only take such critical U-turns and still get away with. The engagement may help Pakistan improve its ranking within influential quarters in the U.S. and Europe, particularly led by the Jewish community, and mellow down its hostile projections in social life and media. Since the Istanbul meeting, Islamabad has been on the receiving end from the Arab world in particular and Muslim world in general. The Palestinians quickly shot down Islamabad’s hot air balloon by publicly rebuking its claim of their support. Islamabad may need hectic diplomatic campaign to cool down her Arab friends. Neither the Muslim world nor the Pakistani public is ready to accept the logic of resolution of the Palestinian problem by way of Israel’s recognition. The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel by four major Muslim countries — Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Mauritania — and trade links with Morocco, Tunisia and Qatar did little to resolve the Palestinian problem. General Musharraf could be over-optimistic about his ‘statesmanlike’ profile while expecting to play a role in the creation of a viable Palestinian state. The lines separating democracy, national interest and Musharraf’s autocratic rule have of late been blurred beyond recognition. The course to hasty recognition of Israel may not serve the Palestinians at all but would significantly add to the profile of both Israel as well as General Pervez Musharraf.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist, broadcaster and academic whose work regularly appears in the Pakistani daily newspaper, The News, and the monthly magazine, Newsline. He also hosts a 30-minute current affairs talk show, Insight, for Radio Pakistan’s News and Current Affairs Channel. He serves on the panel of the Global Journalists Program, which is associated with the International Press Institute and U.S. National Public Radio.

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