BACKGROUND: The opposition and the ruling party representatives engaged in a fist-fight in the parliament on July 1. This confrontation followed the overnight riots which broke out in a courtroom as the Tbilisi City court decided on three-month pre-trial detention of two wrestling champions detained on extortion charges. The riot police broke up the rally after protesting friends and relatives blocked the main thoroughfare of the city, Rustaveli Avenue. The opposition parties joined the rally and criticized the state for excessive use of force. The brawl in the parliament was also preceded by tension between the ruling party and the opposition over the new rules of electing the Tbilisi City Council and the City Mayor, recently adopted by the parliament. The Law was rushed through the first hearing in the parliament by the ruling National Movement, which commands an overwhelming majority, just days after the draft has been introduced. Following the brawl in the parliament, the opposition walked out and the majority adopted the law in the second and third, final, hearings, clearly showing disregard to dissenting opinion. The law on election of the Tbilisi City authorities is important because almost a third of Georgia’s population lives in Tbilisi. The newly adopted law represents an improvement over the old one that stipulated that the mayor is a presidential appointee. However, as the opposition points out, the new system of electing the councilors – through first-past-the-post (majoritarian), “winner takes all” system in multi-mandate precincts – will disproportionably favor the ruling party. The opposition also opts for the direct elections of the Mayor, rather than the Mayor’s election by the Council, as foreseen by the new law. Some of the opposition parties threatened to boycott the Tbilisi City council elections and to initiate a referendum on the direct election of the Tbilisi mayor.

IMPLICATIONS: The ruling National Movement, which now staffs both the central and local governments, is acting with apparent arrogance towards dissenting opinion. The National Movement came to power with overwhelming majority while the opposition is marginalized. Some former members of the National Movement coalition – such as the well-established Republican Party and the relatively new Conservatives – moved into opposition since, but still struggle to consolidate supporters and present viable policy alternatives. The National Movement has repeatedly failed to consult the opposition on important draft legislation, which is often rushed through the parliament with confidence, which borders arrogance. Just after acquiring power, the National Movement rushed through the parliament the constitutional changes that, on the total, have increased presidential powers. Other important legislation, including the rule of composition of the election authorities and the law on the Adjara Autonomous Republic, have been passed without consulting the opposition. Many of the legislation pieces have significant merits and can be viewed as improvements, however overall the process whereby they were adopted demonstrates a lack of transparency and lack of will to consult with other forces in society. The June confrontation is an alarming signal that as the parties are not able to engage in meaningful dialogue, the political landscape becomes more polarized and extremist actions and statements become acceptable. It shows that the political landscape of Georgia has failed to develop significantly since the times of Eduard Shevardnadze. Then as now, the opposition is inclined to challenge or at least question not only the ruling party, but also key institutions of state – such as the courts, law enforcement or the credibility of the parliament – to gain popular acclaim. Although the extent of such challenges is not extensive yet, the repeated incidents would undermine President Mikheil Saakashvili’s claim that the country is moving towards more established, respected and accessible state institutions. In difference with Shevardnadze’s administration, President Saakashvili nevertheless still commands significant popular support. In these conditions, the authorities managed to turn the public debate which ensued after the rallies and the incident in the parliament in the media in their favor. Express polls the next day showed public opinion in Tbilisi almost evenly split – around forty percent of the surveyed supporting and around the same number disapproving of the opposition’s actions. The joint opposition rally to protest “government violence” has attracted less than thousand protestors, most of them from the radical-populist Labor party. There are grounds to fear that the National Movement would understand this failure of the opposition to rally the voters as a carte blanche for more unilateral decisions. This assessment could be misguiding. The weakness of the opposition does not warrant inflated self-confidence on the part of the National Movement. Many Georgians, including influential middle-class and business leaders as well as ordinary citizens, are disgruntled by various government policies. Most of these groups do not share the same agenda, and the policies favored by some might well be resented by the others. However, the reluctance of the government to consult with stakeholders on vital decisions could be the factor that would unite these interest groups. More extensive consultations would lead to a more legitimate and inclusive political process. The opposition would get the chance to feel the constraints the government faces. Such consultations will also increase the legitimacy of the government, and will help to create an environment in which all players on the political arena would agree on the rules of the political game, preserving and strengthening the pillars of democracy and the rule of law.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgian politics remain prone to recurring political crises, leading to the overall weakening of both the ruling party and the country as a whole. After the summer lull, the political skirmishing is likely to heat up by early fall, and reach its climax with by-elections to the parliament, which are tentatively scheduled for October. A decision by the opposition to boycott the local elections would lead to a dead end and might seriously destabilize Georgia’s politics. Any reversal of such decisions can be interpreted as a window of opportunity for enhancing the political dialogue.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Blanka Hancilova, Ph.D, is a researcher on post-conflict politics in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. She authored policy briefs on Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia’s Pankisi valley. She currently serves as Democratization Officer at OSCE Mission to Armenia.