By John C. K. Daly

March 9, 2018, the CACI Analyst

In December 2017 during a meeting in Beijing between Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan and Afghan Defense Minister Tariq Shah Bahrami, China’s Central Military Commission vice chairman Xu Qiliang stated that China would build a military facility in Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province to “strengthen pragmatic cooperation in areas of military exchange and anti-terrorism and safeguard the security of the two countries and the region, making contributions to the development of China-Afghanistan strategic partnership of cooperation.” China’s main motive is to interdict the flow of Uyghur militants to and from Xinjiang, yet the initiative potentially has wider implications for Afghanistan and the region. 

 By Sudha Ramachandran

January 10, 2018, the CACI Analyst

On November 11, a consignment of 15,000 tons of wheat arrived in Afghanistan from India via Iran’s Chabahar port. This is an important milestone for the three countries as it marks the operationalization of the transit trade agreement they signed in 2017. In addition, the first phase of the development of Chabahar port has been completed. It is expected to energize Iran’s economy and provide India with a gateway for overland access to Afghanistan and the Central Asian states. Importantly, landlocked Afghanistan now has another outlet to the sea, reducing its dependence on Pakistani ports. This will reduce Islamabad’s influence over Afghanistan.

 By John C. K. Daly

December 1, 2017, the CACI Analyst

On November 15 during the 7th Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA-VII) in Ashgabat Turkey, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an agreement providing for a major international trade and transport corridor stretching from Turkey to Afghanistan via the post-Soviet Central Asian republics, named the “Lapis Lazuli Corridor.” While many practical problems remain, the development and operation of such a railway corridor has enormous implications for the countries along its route, particularly Afghanistan.

 By Sudha Ramachandran

November 13, 2017, the CACI Analyst

The attack at Mirza Olang village in Sayad district of Afghanistan’s Sar-e Pul Province on August 5 is reported to have been a joint operation by the Taliban and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), the local branch of the terrorist organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Khorasan is an old name for the region that includes parts of present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia). If the Taliban and ISKP did indeed join forces to carry out the attack, this is bad news for the Afghan government and people. However, given the huge differences and tense relations between the two armed groups, cooperation, if any, is likely to be local, tactical and short-lived.

 By John C. K. Daly

September 27, 2017, the CACI Analyst

On August 22, after nearly 16 years of war in Afghanistan, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his intention to increase the U.S. military presence there, extending the longest war in U.S. history and adding billions more dollars to its cost, now estimated to over US$ 1 trillion since 2001. In searching for revenue streams to support this outlay an idea that has been around for more than a decade is being revived: exploiting Afghanistan’s rich, underused mineral wealth. Despite the extent of the country’s mineral deposits being well known, many impediments remain to their development despite international interest.