Many in Georgia are concerned over the new wave of public discontent and violent crackdown on protesters in Kyrgyzstan last week. Shortly after the bloody events in Kyrgyzstan, Zurab Noghadeli, former Georgian prime minister and leader of the pro-Russian Movement for Fair Georgia, proclaimed that the “Bishkek scenario” would take place in Tbilisi if the government dares to falsify the results of the Tbilisi municipal elections scheduled for May 30.

A public opinion poll carried out by the reputable International Republican Institute (IRI) in Georgia in March, revealed that Noghaideli’s pro-Russian alliance, the National Council, enjoys a mere 3 percent of approval among the population. The poll also disclosed that about 46 percent of Tbilisi inhabitants support the ruling party’s mayoral candidate Gigi Ugulava. He is followed by the opposition leader Irakli Alasania at 11 percent.

This opinion poll demonstrates that it is highly unlikely that the National Council’s candidates will perform well in the municipal elections. Thus, Noghaideli’s increasingly seditious tone when stating that “every method will be used to destroy and uproot this government,” gives rise to suspicions that Noghaideli and his allies may seek to destabilize the situation as their chances of coming to power are very slim. 

When President Saakashvili officially accused Russia of interfering in Kyrgyzstan's internal affairs and linked the Kyrgyz revolution with Russian “geopolitical games,” this stirred concern among many in Tbilisi that the municipal elections could stir developments resembling the Kyrgyz scenario.

Earlier this year, President Bakiyev intensified Kyrgyzstan’s ties with the U.S., pledging that his country would assume the role of a supply center for NATO operations in Afghanistan and would support further military installations at Manas airport outside Bishkek. In response, Moscow imposed new duties for Kyrgyz energy imports, which exacerbated social problems and supposedly accelerated the insurgency.

Similarly, Russia in 2006 introduced a food embargo and increased gas prices for Georgia in retaliation for Tbilisi’s pro-western orientation. Nevertheless, the Georgian government managed to find alternative markets and energy sources, thus preventing massive social unrest.

Another notable difference lies in the character of the protests erupting in Kyrgyzstan. The revolt in Kyrgyzstan was sparked by poor people in remote regions such as Talas and Naryn whereas, in the Georgian case, radical forces willing to overthrow Saakashvili represent the former political and business elite and are concentrated in the capital. During the 2009 demonstrations, they failed to convince Georgians that they would be able to eradicate high level corruption, re-establish territorial integrity and conduct more effective liberal reforms.

Further, the protesters in Kyrgyzstan succeeded in seizing police stations and weapons, demonstrating that the Bakiyev government failed to deal with internal destabilization. In contrast, Georgia’s Interior Ministry prevented a military coup in 2003 (organized by pro-Russian powers and led by former national security chief of the Shevardnadze regime Igor Giorgadze), as well as armed provocations in Spring 2009, when the ministry disseminated video footage of members of different opposition parties buying firearms just before the beginning of the months-long opposition protest rallies downtown Tbilisi.

Though the internal political situation in Georgia is not as fragile as it is in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia’s international environment is worsening as the May municipal elections draw closer. Georgia has lost several strategic partners since the 2008 August war.

Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, a likeminded politician and close friend of Saakashvili, lost his political power after the recent presidential elections and was replaced by the Russia-leaning Viktor Yanukovych.

The tragic death of Polish President Lech Kaczynski last Saturday shook Georgia and its government. A well-known opponent to Russian imperialism and a forthcoming supporter of Georgia’s sovereignty, Kaczynski was a close friend and strategic partner of Saakashvili. A continued loss of strategic allies in the region would arguably reduce Georgia’s capacity to resist "Noghadeli's outside support".

Though the internal distribution of political forces and the effectiveness of state institutions are quite different in the cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, both are strategically important for Russia. While regime change in Kyrgyzstan could provide Russia with a larger say regarding NATO operations in Afghanistan, regime change in Georgia would suspend NATO enlargement to the east. Thus, a comparison between the potential post-election scenarios in Georgia and the events in Kyrgyzstan are not entirely far-fetched. The Russian ambition to reestablish its sphere of influence in Kyrgyzstan applies equally to Georgia, which at present has fewer internationally advocates than in a long time.