Wednesday, 31 March 2010

NO BREAKTHROUGH IN KARABAKH TALKS

Published in Field Reports

By Haroutiun Khachatrian (3/31/2010 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The latest meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Sochi on January 25 was marked by some progress in agreeing on the Basic principles for the settlement of the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, giving rise to certain expectations of further rapprochement. In particular, it was reported that during the meeting in Sochi, which was organized by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, presidents Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan reached an agreement on the preamble of the Basic principles of a settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh. It was also reported that shortly before the Sochi meeting, an amended version of the Madrid principles of the Karabakh settlement were presented by the mediators (the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group, the U.

The latest meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Sochi on January 25 was marked by some progress in agreeing on the Basic principles for the settlement of the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, giving rise to certain expectations of further rapprochement. In particular, it was reported that during the meeting in Sochi, which was organized by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, presidents Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan reached an agreement on the preamble of the Basic principles of a settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh. It was also reported that shortly before the Sochi meeting, an amended version of the Madrid principles of the Karabakh settlement were presented by the mediators (the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group, the U.S., Russia and France) to the two presidents. If agreed upon, the Madrid principles were to serve as the basis for completing the Basic principles of the settlement. In turn, the Basic principles are expected to be the foundation of a future Peace agreement.

While Azerbaijan stated in early March that it finds the amended Madrid principles satisfactory for continuing negotiations, Armenia has reportedly presented some new proposals concerning these.

The Madrid principles, initially made public in late July by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group at the G8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy, contained a great deal of uncertainty. In particular, they included provisions for the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories around it, and for holding a plebiscite for determining the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan had opposite opinions about the priority of these events. Azerbaijan insisted that refugees should return first, while the Armenian position is that refugees can return only after the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh is established. The contents of the “amended” version of the Madrid principles has not yet been disclosed, nor was the content of the agreed preamble of the Basic principles published. In early March, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia had intense contacts with high-ranking diplomats in Moscow and met with the Minsk group co-chairs in Paris on March 5 and March 16, respectively.

The presidents of France and Russia had stated at a summit in Paris on March 2 that the two countries were determined to work together on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. On March 9, the President Sargsyan paid a three-day working visit to Paris and had a meeting with French President Nikolas Sarkozy. Thus, Russia and France seem to be the principal pair of mediators at this stage of the talks.

On March 20, Sargsyan made a suggestion to Azerbaijan to sign an agreement with Armenia on avoiding the use of force. In an interview with EuroNews, he claimed such an agreement would “instill trust in the Armenian people of Karabakh and Armenia”, as trust is what the sides lack for reaching success in the settlement process. Azerbaijan responded that it would sign such an agreement only if Armenia concedes that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. This implied a de facto refusal of the Armenian proposal on Baku’s part and a continued threat of the use of force as an option in the Karabakh issue.

Meanwhile, officials on both sides continue to make public statements in favor of their preferred versions of the settlement process, and nothing new is said about progress in amending their positions. The positions continue to be mutually exclusive as Azerbaijan considers Nagorno-Karabakh to be Azerbaijani territory and Armenia refuses any reduction of the region’s current status as de facto independent.

It appears that the recent intense contacts have not resulted in any acceleration of the settlement process. The three Minsk group co-chairs arrived in the region on March 29 for the next round of negotiations. The impression is that the Minsk group-led negotiations are as slow as before, and the high-level contacts between the conflicting parties and the mediators have failed to result in any breakthrough. In addition, the domestic political situations in Azerbaijan and Armenia are not favorable to any significant compromises.

The Azerbaijani authorities will find it difficult to implement the proposed solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue due to a prevailing mood in Azerbaijani society unfavorable to compromise, a mood which the authorities have encouraged rather than pacified. In Armenia, a wave of resistance is mounting against a possible withdrawal of Armenian forces from the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, which is the formula of the compromise the authorities have long suggested (territories against recognition of independence of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan). An increasing number of parties, including the ARF Dashnaktsutiun, a former member of the ruling coalition, term these territories ”liberated” rather than ”occupied,” implying that they, like Nagorno-Karabakh proper, should be considered historical Armenian lands and that returning them to Azerbaijan would endanger the security of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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