Wednesday, 31 March 2010

FAKE WAR – REAL CONSEQUENCES?

Published in Field Reports

By Jenny Söderström (3/31/2010 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On 13 March the Georgian television audience was – unknowingly – subjected to what can be described as a large-scale socio-psychological experiment. In a special edition of its prime-time news bulletin, one of Georgia’s bigger TV channels, Imedi, broadcasted a mock report of a Russian invasion of the country. An announcement before the show explained that a fictive ‘special report’ would follow, illustrating a worst-case scenario of how the situation in the country could develop, if Georgian society does not unite against Russia.

On 13 March the Georgian television audience was – unknowingly – subjected to what can be described as a large-scale socio-psychological experiment. In a special edition of its prime-time news bulletin, one of Georgia’s bigger TV channels, Imedi, broadcasted a mock report of a Russian invasion of the country. An announcement before the show explained that a fictive ‘special report’ would follow, illustrating a worst-case scenario of how the situation in the country could develop, if Georgian society does not unite against Russia. However, no caption was displayed during the 30-minute program, entailing that viewers who missed the announcement saw what they believed was a report of real events.

According to the report, political turmoil after local elections and an attempt on the life of South Ossetian secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity had triggered a Russian military attack on Georgia. In addition, President Saakashvili was reported assassinated. With the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 in fresh memory, many Georgians panicked as they saw (archive) footage of Russian tanks and troops advancing. People started stocking up on food, petrol and cash and mobile networks went down as people tried to get in touch with relatives and friends. Another feature of the report was the portrayal of opposition leaders Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Nogaideli as instigators of the political instability and as siding with the Russians. Burjanadze and Nogaideli both recently visited Moscow to meet with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, a move that was criticized by the Georgian government.

The report was condemned by the opposition and sparked protests against Imedi television as well as the government, which is accused of giving its consent to the show – and by some, even of having scripted it. The government’s motive would allegedly have been to undermine and cause further splits in the already divided opposition ahead of the local elections scheduled for May this year. Government officials strongly refute these allegations, and underline that Imedi is a privately-owned TV-station. However, the ownership relations of Imedi remain unknown and the head of the company is a former government member and a close ally of President Mikheil Saakashvili. Speculations about government involvement were intensified in the week following the show, as recorded phone conversations surfaced between Imedi staff on one hand and government officials on the other, seemingly confirming the rumors. The authenticity of these recordings is disputed, however, and they have been discarded by officials as a product of the Russian security services.

The President’s response to the incident has also been taken as an indication that the ‘special report’ was produced with the government’s knowledge. In a public meeting on the day after the incident, the President seemed to defend the program, saying that there should have been a caption announcing that the news bulletin was fictive, but that it nevertheless portrayed a very realistic scenario of what the enemy, i.e. Russia, is planning. This was sharply criticized in Georgia and the following day the President expressed a different view, underlining that the report was harmful to society and that the events depicted in the show were unrealistic. He also called upon the media to treat journalistic standards responsibly. Parliamentary speaker and Saakashvili ally, David Bakradze, however, clearly condemned the report from the beginning, stating that it was impermissible to produce programs that shock people and scare off investors.

Regardless of the government’s possible role in the ‘special report’, and regardless of whether it will have any effects on the upcoming elections, Georgia will have to bear its broader consequences. The episode has played right in the hands of Russia and the breakaway regions, which could use it to their advantage in the conflict resolution process or as a pretext for confrontational counter-measures. South Ossetian leader Kokoity has stated that the TV show is a provocation that should be addressed in the next round of peace talks in Geneva. Russian officials blame the incident directly on President Saakashvili and draw parallels to the developments leading up to the war in 2008. The Russian representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, has taken the rhetoric further, stating that Georgia is preparing for war. The official Russian response to the incident, however, has been rather restrained and is more or less in line with the reactions of other key actors, such as the EU and the U.S., pointing out that the action is irresponsible and could lead to increased tensions in the region.

The incident has, moreover, tainted Georgia’s image in the eyes of the EU, whose leaders have been emphasizing the significance of adhering to democratic principles before and during the upcoming local elections, and the importance of a constructive conflict resolution process. Although José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, in recent statements reiterated the EU’s strong commitment to democracy in Georgia and its support for Georgia's territorial integrity and conflict resolution efforts, he also pointed to the discrepancy between goals and reality in the country.

The EU’s Eastern Partnership, launched last year, offers Georgia an opportunity for closer ties with the Union and might in the long run also result in concrete support for its territorial integrity. Such a development, however, is dependent on Georgia’s own performance and democratic progress. Considering that Georgia is currently trying to garner support and allocate funds for its recently adopted strategy for engaging with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the timing is – mildly put – unfortunate.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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