By Armen Grigoryan
January 12th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
Further negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue seem to be practically postponed until Armenia completes its parliamentary elections in April 2017. At the same time, the government demonstrates an unwillingness to proceed beyond rhetoric with governance and economic reforms. The administration’s inability to deliver satisfactory economic results and ensure social development, as well as its close connections with Russia with a strong clientelism component, suggest a further growth of dependence and compliance with Moscow’s political agenda.
By Zaur Shiriyev
September 12th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
In the wake of the St. Petersburg meeting, it has become clear that two, distinct peace processes are in play. The OSCE Minsk Group is creating a technical conflict prevention mechanism, while Russia is leading a conflict resolution process. However, while they may appear distinct – and therefore potentially conflicting – these parallel tracks are complementary.
By Elman Gafarov
July 29th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
2016 has become the year of most active peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since its cease-fire in 1994. The reason is the deadly April clashes between the warring sides and the “wake-up” call to all mediators that the conflict can get out of control and cause serious damage to the regional security and stability in South Caucasus. Russia is particularly seen to be worried about this trend. Therefore, the high-level talks are held in an effort to change the status-quo on the ground and end the occupation of Azerbaijani territories. The positive trend can be nevertheless be derailed due to social and political unrest in Yerevan.
By Zaur Shiriyev
May 2nd, 2016, The CACI Analyst
In early April, the escalation of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in a so-called “four-day war”, which was ended by a truce reached under Russia’s auspices. The expectation was that after the end of this short war, international engagement would increase, with the re-energizing of the Minsk Group. But so far, Moscow is the only active party. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, is conducting “shuttle diplomacy” between Yerevan and Baku, the results of which will become clear in the coming weeks.
By Eduard Abrahamyan
April 27th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
The recent unprecedented escalation around Nagorno-Karabakh highlighted deep systemic shortcomings in existing international mediation initiatives. The OSCE Minsk Group, dedicated to settling the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, has become largely irrelevant in the new operational situation. The intense fighting erupted on April 2 and lasted for four days until a Russia-brokered ceasefire between the adversaries was mutually agreed upon on April 5. The fighting put an end to the 22-year-old ceasefire regime, and the security environment of the South Caucasus. The escalation was clearly a consequence of a shift in the military balance of power, consistently fueled by Russia’s distribution of advanced offensive arms to Azerbaijan and the evident impracticability of the Minsk Group.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst brings cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.