By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

On February 26, Pakistan launched Operation Ghazab lil-Haq (Righteous Fury) against the Taliban regime in Kabul. The operation is widely interpreted as an attempt by Islamabad to pursue regime change in Afghanistan. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has effectively become a base for terrorist activities targeting not only Pakistan but also other Central Asian states, including Tajikistan. Russia has warned that Afghanistan-based ISIS seeks to expand its so-called caliphate in Central Asia, while China has expressed concern over the presence of Uyghur militants and other anti-China groups in the country. In this context, regime change in Kabul has emerged as a strategic priority for Islamabad and Beijing. Meanwhile, the persistence of terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan and the ongoing war has stalled major trans-Afghan connectivity projects intended to link Central Asia with Pakistani seaports. 

BACKGROUND:

Since 2021, following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal under the Doha Agreement, Pakistan has experienced a significant increase in terrorist attacks. Islamabad has accused Afghanistan-based militant groups of conducting cross-border operations within its territory. Prominent among these are Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which have been responsible for numerous high-profile attacks. Pakistan has repeatedly urged the Taliban government to take action against these groups, which continue to operate from Afghan territory with relative impunity; however, these requests have largely gone unheeded.

China, which shares a 47-mile border with Afghanistan, has long been concerned that the country could become as a sanctuary for Uyghur separatists in proximity of its Xinjiang region. The Taliban government has assured Beijing that Afghan territory would not be used for activities against China. In return, China has offered economic assistance and investment to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, and has since emerged as the largest foreign investor in the country.

Other anti-China groups operating from safe havens in Afghanistan include the TTP and the BLA. Both organizations have been implicated in several high-profile attacks targeting Chinese nationals in Pakistan.

In March 2024, a suicide attack on a van killed five Chinese engineers working on the Dasu dam project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A similar attack at the same site in 2021 resulted in the deaths of nine Chinese engineers. The TTP was implicated in both incidents. The BLA, in turn, has conducted more attacks on Chinese nationals and assets than any other separatist organization. Notably, in 2022, the BLA deployed its first female suicide bomber, who carried out an attack outside the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi, killing three Chinese instructors.

Although China has pursued a pragmatic engagement policy toward the Taliban since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, investing in mining, energy, and infrastructure, the Taliban have shown limited willingness or capacity to dismantle militant networks such as the TTP and BLA operating from Afghan territory.

Tajikistan, which shares a 1,400-kilometre border with Afghanistan, has also been affected by cross-border militancy. In December 2025, five individuals, including two Tajik security officers, were killed in an armed confrontation on the Tajik–Afghan border when militants attempted to infiltrate Tajik territory.

Russia, the only country that has formally recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has expressed concern that the regime undermines regional stability by allowing jihadist groups to operate from Afghan territory. These concerns intensified following a suicide attack on February 24 outside Moscow’s Savyolovsky Railway Station, which killed a police officer. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov linked the incident to Afghanistan-based groups. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has estimated that Afghanistan hosts between 20,000 and 23,000 militants, including approximately 5,000 to 7,000 affiliated with the TTP. Notably, Russia released this assessment of terrorist networks in Afghanistan two days before Pakistan initiated its military campaign against the Taliban, a move that may be interpreted as implicit political support.

The Taliban have also moved closer to Pakistan’s regional rival, India. Islamabad has alleged that groups such as the TTP and BLA operate as Indian proxies, a claim that New Delhi denies. The Taliban’s growing engagement with India has further raised concerns in Beijing. Amid mounting frustration over the Taliban’s inaction against militant groups operating from Afghan territory, Pakistan launched a large-scale military operation against the Taliban government on February 26, involving airstrikes across major Afghan cities, including Kabul.

IMPLICATIONS:

Operation Ghazab lil-Haq can be interpreted as an attempt to impose regime change in Kabul, though Pakistan is unlikely to achieve such an objective independently, without securing China’s support and involving Tajikistan. It must also obtain backing from anti-Taliban groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Tajik leader Ahmad Massoud, son of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud. Tajikistan presently hosts the NRF leadership. Pakistan’s airstrikes against the Taliban regime may create opportunities for the NRF and other opposition forces to weaken the Taliban’s internal control over Afghanistan.

Officially, Beijing has called on both Islamabad and Kabul to exercise restraint and has advocated a ceasefire. However, Pakistan’s ongoing military campaign against the Taliban likely carries tacit Chinese approval and support for a potential regime change effort. For such an operation, Islamabad would first need to secure control over the Wakhan Corridor in northeastern Afghanistan. This narrow strip of territory, often referred to as Afghanistan’s “Chicken Neck,” extends approximately 350 kilometers to China’s Xinjiang region, separating Tajikistan from Pakistan. Control of the corridor would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan and Central Asia beyond Afghanistan. For China, the Wakhan Corridor represents a critical node for safeguarding its strategic connectivity with South and Central Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While China appears to be adopting a cautious, “wait and watch” approach, Pakistan is actively seeking to reshape Afghanistan’s political landscape.

The Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict is likely to adversely affect trans-Afghan connectivity projects aimed at linking Central and South Asia, whether in the planning, negotiation, or implementation stages. For example, regional connectivity featured prominently in Pakistan–Kazakhstan discussions during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Islamabad in February 2026. A proposed US$ 7 billion railway project envisaged connecting Kazakhstan to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar via Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.

Similarly, the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway project is a trilateral initiative designed to connect Central Asia with the ports of Gwadar and Karachi through Afghanistan. Envisioned in 2021, the 850-kilometer corridor is expected to provide the first direct railway link between Central and South Asia. The US$ 4.8 billion project, scheduled for completion by 2027, will connect Tashkent to the Pakistani city of Peshawar via Kabul.

The US$ 10 billion Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline is a major strategic energy project intended to transport gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field, the world’s second largest, to energy-deficient markets in South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan. However, the project has already been delayed for over three decades due to persistent instability and conflict in Afghanistan.

Regime change in Kabul that ensures peace and stability in Afghanistan would facilitate a conducive environment for the implementation and completion of strategic connectivity projects between Central and South Asia. Conversely, if such efforts intensify conflict in the already war-torn country, these projects are likely to face indefinite delays.

CONCLUSIONS:

Officially, Islamabad frames its military campaign as an effort to compel the Taliban regime to withdraw support for Afghanistan-based militant groups targeting Pakistan. However, the operation also appears intended to convey that regime change is a clear option, should the Taliban fail to take verifiable action against such groups operating from Afghan territory. For a comprehensive regime change effort, Pakistan, China, and Tajikistan would have to align their positions on the jihadist threats emanating from Afghanistan, which, after more than four years of Taliban rule, has effectively become a safe haven for militant groups. The outcomes of the current operation will in turn have a significant impact on the future of trans-Afghan connectivity projects.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.

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