By Joseph Epstein

On June 7, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won the country’s parliamentary elections with just under 50 percent of the vote, enough under Armenia’s electoral system to govern alone with a comfortable majority. The nearest challenger, the Strong Armenia bloc fronted by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, trailed near 23 percent, and every opposition force that cleared the threshold campaigned on some version of repairing ties with Moscow. Civil Contract cast the vote as a choice between a return to Russia’s orbit and a more independent Armenia drawn toward the West, and the electorate sided with the latter. Yet the win alone will not seal Armenia’s fate. The country must still pass the constitutional change widely seen as the final barrier to normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and Pashinyan’s victory does not mean Russia will quietly concede a country it has dominated for two centuries.

BACKGROUND:

Armenia under Pashinyan has moved steadily away from Russia, above all since the 2020 defeat to Azerbaijan in the Second Karabakh War, a forty-four-day conflict that cost Yerevan roughly three-quarters of the territory Armenian forces had held since the early 1990s. The remainder of Karabakh fell in September 2023, when Azerbaijan retook the enclave and more than one hundred thousand ethnic Armenians fled. Out of that collapse Pashinyan built the vision he calls “Real Armenia” versus “Historic Armenia”: the argument that unless the country relinquishes irredentist claims on its neighbors, it will never enjoy genuine independence.

Pashinyan is often cast as the ideological successor to Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who late in his tenure pushed for a settlement with Azerbaijan to end Armenia’s isolation and strip Russia of its ability to leverage the conflict. He warned, almost prophetically, that Armenia would one day be forced to ask for what it was then rejecting and would not receive it, “as it has happened more than once in our history.” That push cost him his office and triggered the rise of the Karabakh-born politicians who ruled until the Velvet Revolution brought Pashinyan to power in 2018. Ter-Petrosyan was right too early, and Armenia paid for it in 2020.

Pashinyan, who early in his premiership pushed for unification with Karabakh, reversed course entirely after the war, concluding that the only way forward was a deal with the stronger party. That trajectory produced the breakthrough of August 8, 2025, when Trump hosted Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the White House, where the two leaders initialed a peace agreement and committed to a U.S.-brokered connectivity project across southern Armenia.

One obstacle remains, and it is constitutional. Armenia’s constitution, through a preamble invoking the 1990 Declaration of Independence and, with it, the 1989 act of “reunification” with Karabakh, still carries an implicit claim to territory that the entire international community—Armenia included—recognizes as Azerbaijani, and over which Baku reestablished full control in 2023. Removing that language is less an Azerbaijani demand than a load-bearing element of the peace process itself: so long as a founding document lays claim to a neighbor’s recognized land, the conflict cannot be considered definitively closed.

IMPLICATIONS:

The step is not the aberration its critics suggest. Other democracies have rewritten founding texts to settle territorial disputes: Ireland surrendered its constitutional claim to Northern Ireland by referendum in 1998 under the Good Friday Agreement, and a reunifying Germany renounced its claims east of the Oder-Neisse line to normalize relations with Poland. What makes Armenia’s case hard is procedure and politics, not principle. Its Constitutional Court has ruled the preamble immutable, so the only path is an entirely new constitution, ratified by national referendum. Civil Contract has the votes, and a draft shorn of the preamble was finalized in March 2026. The referendum, expected around 2027, is the real test, and Pashinyan’s task is to sell it at home as the completion of the peace rather than a capitulation to it. Clear that hurdle, and Armenia gains overland access to Europe and Central Asia.

Moscow, however, will not concede, and recent reporting shows how much it was willing to spend even as its war in Ukraine strained its resources. OCCRP traced an influence operation, through leaked documents, to Russia’s Social Design Agency—already sanctioned in Washington, London, and Brussels—working under the direction of the Presidential Administration. The agency ran a dedicated outlet aimed at Armenian dual citizens living in Russia, a bloc its own planning documents called potentially decisive, blending fabricated scandals with AI-generated content. The Insider identified the officials managing the Armenia portfolio and the officers dispatched to Yerevan, alongside a plan to bus Russian Armenians in to swing the result.

The influence campaign ran in parallel with economic coercion. At an April Kremlin meeting, Putin told Pashinyan that Armenia could not belong to both the EU and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, citing discounted gas as leverage. Moscow then restricted imports of Armenian produce, flowers, mineral water, and alcohol on pretextual grounds and threatened to scrap the 2013 agreement guaranteeing duty-free gas, oil, and diamonds. At the Union’s summit in Astana in late May, Putin invoked the “Ukrainian scenario” and demanded that Yerevan choose. Armenia’s own history supplies a darker warning: in October 1999, gunmen stormed the National Assembly and killed Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Speaker Karen Demirchyan, whose reformist coalition had just sidelined then-President Kocharyan, who consolidated power in the aftermath—a reminder that an inconvenient reform government can be removed by means other than the ballot box. Russia retains real leverage over Armenia’s economy and a meaningful share of its population, and it has now demonstrated its capacity to run sophisticated active measures inside the country.

Against that pressure, U.S. engagement has been unprecedented. In February, JD Vance became the first sitting U.S. vice president to visit Armenia, advancing a civil nuclear deal and offering Yerevan a place in a U.S.-led critical minerals bloc. In late May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio signed a strategic partnership charter and the corridor framework in Yerevan, and days later Trump issued his “complete and total endorsement” of Pashinyan—the first time a U.S. president has openly backed a leader squarely within Russia’s traditional sphere. The centerpiece is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a roughly twenty-seven-mile corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province that would link the main body of Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and onward to Turkey, built and operated by a development company in which the U.S. holds 74 percent for an initial forty-nine-year term. Passage of the constitutional change would give Washington its strongest position in the South Caucasus since independence and, through TRIPP, a chokepoint of the Middle Corridor just as securing non-Chinese supply lines for critical minerals has become a first-order priority.

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s voters made the choice Civil Contract asked of them and handed the U.S. a strategic opening that did not exist a year ago. But an election is not a settlement. The referendum still lies ahead, carrying a real chance of failure, and Russia has shown it will spend, subvert, and coerce to keep Armenia within its grip; it will not stop because one vote went against it. For Washington, the work is beginning rather than ending. The endorsements and signing ceremonies were the easy part. Converting them into a durable foothold means seeing the constitutional process through, hardening Armenia against the next wave of Russian active measures, and breaking ground on TRIPP before the window closes. Pashinyan has staked his country’s future on the West, and the U.S. has every reason, and a narrowing amount of time, to ensure that bet pays off.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, an Expert at the N7 Foundation, and a Research Fellow at Bar-Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

By Irakli Laitadze

On June 7, Armenia held general elections with significant implications for both the country and the South Caucasus. Incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won 49.81 percent of the vote. Although falling short of a majority, the result still enables Pashinyan to form and lead the new government. The victory of Civil Contract is not merely an outcome of domestic politics. It signifies a rupture with Russia’s sphere of influence and the institutionalization of a pro-Western course. The collapse of the pro-Russian opposition, despite unprecedented pressure from Moscow, indicates that Armenian citizens made a strategic choice in favor of genuine sovereignty and European integration. This choice is likely to produce long-term changes not only in Armenia but also in the security architecture of the South Caucasus.

BACKGROUND:

Armenia approached the 7 June elections amid intense geopolitical turbulence. The country stood at a crossroads between two incompatible trajectories: deeper Euro-Atlantic integration or a return to Russia’s sphere of influence. Understanding this choice requires examining developments in the recent past.

Following its defeat in the 2020 Karabakh War, Armenia completely lost control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The country was confronted with a harsh reality: Russia, its ally and partner within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), failed to defend Armenia during the conflict. As a result, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s government intensified the already ongoing process of deepening ties with the EU and the U.S. In March 2026, the Armenian parliament adopted a bill initiating the process of accession to the EU. Consequently, the elections effectively became a referendum on Armenia’s foreign policy orientation and security strategy.

Russia responded with increased pressure. The election campaign was effectively transformed into an open confrontation between Moscow and Yerevan. Russian officials publicly warned that continued pursuit of a pro-Western course could expose Armenia to a scenario similar to that experienced by Ukraine.

The regional dimension is equally important. The South Caucasus is a region where the interests of Russia, Turkey, Iran, the U.S., the EU, and increasingly China intersect. Armenia has traditionally been a stronghold of Russian influence in the region: Russian forces are stationed at the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, an aviation component is based at Erebuni Air Base, and Armenia remains a member of the CSTO. Yerevan’s drift away from Moscow represents more than the loss of an ally; it is a strategic setback that could reshape the regional balance of power. This explains why the stakes were far higher than those of a regular parliamentary election.

IMPLICATIONS:

Russia’s attempt to influence the election outcome was not only unsuccessful but also counterproductive. In addition to extensive use of bots, disinformation, and fake news, reports suggest that Moscow was covertly preparing operations aimed at preventing Pashinyan’s re-election, allegedly including scenarios involving his physical elimination.

Russian economic pressure was systematic and sustained. Moscow banned imports of Armenian Jermuk mineral water, halted sales of Armenian brandy and wine, and reduced imports of meat and fish products. On the eve of the elections, Russia sent an official letter signaling its intention to suspend exports of gas, oil, and diamonds. Rosselkhoznadzor, Russia’s federal veterinary and phytosanitary agency, also banned imports of Armenian tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, and dried fruits. To influence the vote, plans were reportedly discussed to organize travel to Armenia for around 100,000 Russia-based Armenians.

The pro-Russian camp was represented by two key figures: Samvel Karapetyan and Ruben Vardanyan. Both embodied an alternative to Armenia’s Western-oriented course. Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire and leader of the Strong Armenia electoral bloc, lived in Moscow until last year and, in addition to Armenian citizenship, held Russian and Cypriot citizenship. He allegedly maintains links with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). Since June 2025, Karapetyan has been under house arrest on charges of encouraging the seizure of state institutions. Moscow openly demanded his release and participation in the parliamentary elections, turning the issue into a political instrument of pressure on Yerevan.

Another key figure was Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire who left Moscow to become State Minister of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Arrested by Azerbaijani authorities while leaving Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin Corridor, he is currently serving a prison sentence in Azerbaijan (Meduza). Vardanyan became both a symbol of the lost Armenian Karabakh and a reminder of the failure of the pro-Russian course, which ultimately provided Armenia with neither security nor genuine independence.

The election results reflected the Armenian public’s increasingly negative attitude toward Russia. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia alliance received 23.29 percent of the vote, while the Armenia bloc, led by former President Robert Kocharyan, a veteran of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and a prominent advocate of close ties with Moscow, won 9.93 percent. Combined, the main pro-Russian forces secured only about two-thirds of the support received by Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.

Western countries, particularly the U.S., expressed unusually strong support for Nikol Pashinyan. On May 27, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly endorsed Pashinyan on Truth Social. The previous day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed several bilateral cooperation agreements, including a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Charter. On June 4, following a telephone conversation with Pashinyan, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that Brussels was preparing additional support measures for Armenia, including €50 million in financial assistance.

The 8th Summit of the European Political Community (EPC) was held in Yerevan on 4 May 2026, with the participation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The event served as a clear signal of Armenia’s emerging European orientation and identity. Almost simultaneously, Turkey partially lifted the trade restrictions on Armenia that had been in place since 1993. The easing of this economic embargo marks a significant step toward the normalization of Armenian–Turkish relations and has the potential to reshape the region’s economic architecture.

A stable, pro-Western Armenia would be better positioned to finalize a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and secure the full lifting of Turkey’s long-standing economic blockade. Under such circumstances, Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO could become a realistic prospect in the near future. This step would deprive Russia of the principal legal framework underpinning its military presence in Armenia, further accelerating the country’s geopolitical reorientation.

Armenia is expected to continue developing its relations with the EU while maintaining membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, as confirmed by Prime Minister Pashinyan. This reflects tactical pragmatism rather than an ideological compromise: Armenia remains dependent on Russian gas imports and on the large Armenian diaspora residing in Russia. Nevertheless, the country’s strategic orientation toward Europe appears to have been firmly established.

CONCLUSIONS:

The elections of 7 June may prove to be a point of no return in the history of post-Soviet Armenia. Despite political pressure, economic coercion, and extensive Russian involvement, Armenian voters endorsed a genuinely sovereign choice and reaffirmed the country’s commitment to a pro-Western path of development.

Russia suffered a strategic defeat, as neither Karapetyan nor Kocharyan succeeded in challenging the pro-Western majority of Armenian voters. The Kremlin’s unprecedented pressure, including threats of a “Ukrainian scenario” and the use of economic coercion, failed to weaken Nikol Pashinyan and his supporters. Instead, these measures contributed to their further mobilization and strengthened Pashinyan’s image as a defender of Armenian sovereignty and statehood.

The electoral victory of Civil Contract and its parliamentary majority provide Armenia’s pro-European course with a clear democratic mandate to advance further along the path of European integration.

Armenia is entering a phase of profound transformation in its security architecture, moving from dependence on Russia toward a more diversified and multilateral security framework. This realignment is likely to reshape not only Armenian domestic and foreign policy but also the broader balance of power in the South Caucasus. For the first time in the post-Soviet era, Armenia, and, to a lesser extent, the wider region, is beginning to move beyond the logic of Russian dominance. The date of June 7, 2026, may be remembered as the day Armenia chose its own future.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Irakli Laitadze is an Adjunct Professor at Ilia State University (Tbilisi, Georgia) and Senior Fellow of the think-tank EU Awareness Centre (Brussels). He was previously a career diplomat, serving as a senior Counsellor in the Mission of Georgia to the EU and Director of the EU Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. After his diplomatic service, he was the CFO in GMT Hospitality and CEO of Publishing House Artanuji. He holds degrees from Tbilisi State University, the Diplomatic School of Madrid (Diploma), and Cambridge University (MBA), and a Ph.D. (Magna cum laude) from Tbilisi Free University. 

By Robert M. Cutler

May 11, 2021, the CACI Analyst

The implementation of the trilateral agreement brokered by Russia on the night of November 9-10, 2020, between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues in fits and starts. Most near-term questions have been resolved. How intermediate-term issues turn out depend upon the results of the snap parliamentary elections called in June by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. As for the longer-term outcome, this is more difficult to estimate, and it is path-dependent upon those elections. In this regard, events on the ground—but not only the elections—are still in control, even if these are no longer military events.