BACKGROUND: Organized in Jerusalem in 1953 and having headquartered in London, Hizb-ut-Tahrir aims at establishing a single Islamic Caliphate incorporating all Central Asian republics of the CIS, along with the Muslim regions of Russia, China, and the northern Caucasus. Proclaiming a non-violent way to a theocratic state, this transnational movement, in Arabic the “Party of Islamic Liberation” has had some success at grassroots level, not only because of a well-organized underground activity and external support in finances and training, but also because of the perceived political exclusion of youth, increasing poverty, and unemployment in Central Asia. Supporters of the Islamic Caliphate advocate free trade and no borders between Muslim states. Their cells are actively functioning in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, disseminating anti-Western and anti-government propaganda in local languages and Russian, calling for disobedience to authorities and boycotting any elections. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir do not officially cooperate with each other; but both movements plan various types of caliphate, yet neither has an economic program or a political concept for the purported future ideal state. Hizb-ut-Tahrir has several arguments that attract common people. It pretends to express the interest of all Muslims regardless of their national identity and educate post-Soviet Muslims in the right way. All Central Asian countries lack proper literature on Islam in the vernacular, consequently many young people eager to learn more about Islam pay attention to underground the teaching of the HT cells. One of the most powerful arguments of HT is advocacy of regional cooperation across borders. The idea of a unified state, reminiscent of the Soviet era with no national borders between Central Asian states is supported by traders, customers and many others involved in cross-border trade, which supplies the livelihood of a significant part of Central Asia’s population. The anti-governmental agenda and the use of the theme of corruption, inequality and religious intolerance has also become popular, especially in areas where political parties are not allowed. In such regions, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has effectively substituted political parties. For example, in Uzbekistan, HT has the most favorable conditions as opposition political parties are muzzled and unable to operate. Another issue is that as a rule, many secular political parties except the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan close their eyes to the religious peculiarities of the region. The simplicity of HT’s ideology, including in its conceptualization of the concept of the Caliphate and its simple Islamic prescriptions for all the illnesses of the current turbulent times attract the attention of the young and less educated population. Moreover, overseas sponsors lavishly support HT cells by equipment and money to produce thousands of books, pamphlets and leaflets.

IMPLICATIONS: National governments have responded differently to the new challenge posed by Hizb-ut-Tahrir. In Tajikistan, over 600 members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir were jailed since 1998. In Kyrgyzstan, the persecution of hundreds of HT supporters has aroused a sound public discussion on whether HT should be registered or its members detained. The Uzbek leadership severely punishes anyone suspected of HT activity. Human rights activists in Uzbekistan complain that even during Ramadan, unfair repressions against Hizb-ut-Tahrir members continued. The political exclusion of ethnic minorities, youth and cross-border population could also further contribute to the growing activity of HT. Despite these processes, the movement has some limitations. Often, Hizb-ut-Tahrir members deliberately exaggerate the number of their members. Compared to the activity of the rich Protestant churches from the U.S., South Korea and some European countries in Central Asia, Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s purported success does not look as great. For instance ten thousand citizens of Kyrgyzstan,, the majority Kyrgyz by ethnicity and originally Muslim have reportedly been converted by protestant missionaries in the north of the country. Meanwhile, an estimated three thousand natives of Kyrgyzstan have joined Hizb-ut-Tahrir cells. A similar situation exists in Kazakhstan, where more Kazakhs have converted into Protestantism than have been converted by Hizb-ut-Tahrir rhetoric. In Tajikistan, the 40,000-member Islamic Renaissance Party effectively restricts the spread of HT across the country. The influence of HT cells is close to insignificant in regions and cities marked by higher political participation, and multiparty activities on the mobilization of various ethnic groups and youth. Secondly, the HT doctrine mistakenly appeals to anti-Semitic feelings, which are practically absent in Central Asia. It is also very unlikely that pan-Islamic initiatives and a supra-regional agenda could be successful today among the fragmented subregions of the Central Asian countries. Focusing on criticism of the clandestine Hizb-ut-Tahrir, local decision-makers overlook other utopian movements openly seeking the restoration of the Soviet Union or the mass out-migration of hundreds of thousands of people to other countries in order to survive. In general, the overwhelming majority of local people observes traditional values and rituals, and have little interest in foreign Islamic literature and organizations and the politicization of Islam. Even seventy years of enormous pressure and propaganda under the Soviet regime could not change the importance of traditional Islam in the region. The role of everyday Islam has greatly increased over the last decade, as a shortage of educated home-grown mullahs led to low resistance on the part of the youth to religious extremism. Some young people inevitably join religious extremist movements as a sign of protest against the old values of the Soviet generation that are discredited and irrelevant today, against the current economic hardship and the damage to trade done by regional disintegration.

CONCLUSIONS: National governments, official religious leaders and the public at large have a good opportunity to start a dialogue with Hizb-ut-Tahrir leaders and members in Central Asia to find a non-violent solution for preventing radical extremism. Politicians would be well served by considering some of the more reasonable criticism voiced by the radicals, which is actually what gives the movement popularity, such as corruption, social injustice, groundless repressions, neglect of unemployed young people, etc. Several years of Hizb-ut-Tahrir activity and persecution of its members has made the urgent need of higher political participation at the grassroots level and in particular by the youth evident, if the expansion of rich foreign religious groups in Central Asia is to be halted. On the whole, in all Central Asian countries, the prospects for religious extremism will much depend on continued reforms, political participation, especially by ethnic minorities and voters in remote and cross-border regions.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Anara Tabyshalieva is a visiting fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS.