Wednesday, 18 May 2005

KYRGYZSTAN HOSTS THOUSANDS OF UZBEK REFUGEES AFTER VIOLENT RIOTS IN ANDIJAN

Published in Field Reports

By Erica Marat (5/18/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Andijan, Uzbekistan’s fourth largest city, is located forty kilometers from Kyrgyzstan and is the closest Uzbek city to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘southern capital’ Osh. Zumrat Salmorbekova, an NGO leader currently working in Batken, says the number of refugees reached 6,000. According to the Kyrgyz Ombudsman Tursunbai Bakir, if the tensions in Uzbekistan continue the number of Uzbek refugees might rise up to a million.
Andijan, Uzbekistan’s fourth largest city, is located forty kilometers from Kyrgyzstan and is the closest Uzbek city to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘southern capital’ Osh. Zumrat Salmorbekova, an NGO leader currently working in Batken, says the number of refugees reached 6,000. According to the Kyrgyz Ombudsman Tursunbai Bakir, if the tensions in Uzbekistan continue the number of Uzbek refugees might rise up to a million.

Most refugees were reported to escape through a bridge in the Karasuu town that separates Kyrgyz and Uzbek territories. The bridge was unilaterally shut by the Uzbek security structures in 1999 and completely ripped up in 2002. On May 15 Andijan refugees rebuilt the bridge within several hours. Along with refugees, the restored bridge instantly boosted local trade in fruits and vegetables. The Ferghana Valley’s largest bazaar is located on the Kyrgyz side of the bridge. During the Soviet times Karasuu residents used the bridge on everyday basis for family and trade communications.

As the conflict in Andijan mounted, it was clear that the bulk of immigrants will try to escape to Kyrgyzstan and not Tajikistan because the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley is economically better developed. There are thousands of seasonal labor migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan already working in Kyrgyzstan’s southern cities.

Refugee flows continued for several days, after new clashes broke out in Pakhtaabad on May 16. A number of people injured by Uzbek military were hospitalized in Kyrgyzstan. All refugees are accommodated in tents provided by the Red Cross and Kyrgyz Special Forces in a neutral area. It is not clear how many people seeking asylum in Kyrgyzstan were directly involved in the Andijan riots.

A representative of the Kyrgyz government Almanbet Matubraimov, and governor of the Osh oblast Anvar Artykov met with the Uzbek refugees. People demanded full restoration of the Karasuu bridge to allow communication between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek refugees in Kyrgyzstan are also revealing new facts about the Andijan massacre. Many say they fled because of poverty and unemployment.

Kyrgyz military forces are mobilized at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek frontier, and Osh local law-enforcement structures alone stationed twenty-five additional military centers. But according to the Kyrgyz media reports, the situation along the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border remains calm. Kyrgyz security structures opened the border for five days for the Uzbek citizens, although the possession of entry visas is required.

In the first days after the riot the Uzbek security forces were not capable of controlling the border. Kyrgyz and Uzbek citizens crossed the border, experiencing unaccustomed freedom of movement. Uzbek refugees destroyed the border post in Karasuu and border guards abandoned it to escape from the angry crowd. The border control was restored by Monday, May 16. However, the Kyrgyz news agency Aki Press reports that the control of the border is currently conducted only on the Kyrgyz side.

The Kyrgyz government is worried that insurgents and former prisoners freed in Andijan will cross the border along with the civilians. The control of immigrants from the Kyrgyz side is minimal and the likelihood that criminals might have already fled Uzbekistan is high.

Since Tashkent officially refers to Andijan and Pakhtaabad protestors as Islamic militants of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Akromia movements, the Kyrgyz government will likely face disapproval from president Islam Karimov for allowing criminals on its territory. At a May 14 press conference Karimov said that many terrorists escaped in Kyrgyzstan. Some Kyrgyz experts worry that on the basis of these statements, Uzbekistan might launch unilateral activities that will contradict Kyrgyz interests.

Previously, Karimov has accused the Kyrgyz government of hosting Islamic radical groups on its territory. During the Batken conflicts in 1999-2000 the Uzbek president blamed the Kyrgyz and Tajik governments for allowing the IMU to challenge state borders. While all CIS members offered military and humanitarian aid to Kyrgyzstan following the Batken conflicts, Karimov conducted unilateral military actions on the Kyrgyz territory that infringed the country’s sovereignty.

The dangerousness of religious radical movements in Kyrgyzstan’s stability is widely debated among local politicians. Felix Kulov, a leading politician from northern Kyrgyzstan, is alert to the allegedly growing activity of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the Ferghana Valley, but a representative from the south, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, thinks that the problem is not as important for the domestic security.

Karimov also shut the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border during the March events in Kyrgyzstan. The country is delaying with its promise to de-mine borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Naturally, any changes in the border regime directly affected local residents.

Another problem Kyrgyzstan might face is Uzbek refugees’ reluctance to return to Uzbekistan. Kyrgyz Colonel-General Myrzykan Subanov thinks that the Kyrgyz side must refrain from identifying the Uzbek immigrants as people in exile and it is up to international organizations to decide on their official status. Mr. Subanov also added that independently from their status, Uzbek citizens cannot remain on the Kyrgyz territory because this will undermine Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations. He referred to the bilateral agreement on “Eternal Friendship” between the countries.

Bloody events in Uzbekistan raised a wide disapproval among the Kyrgyz public. There are protests in southern Kyrgyz cities and in front of the Uzbek Embassy in Bishkek in support of Andijan residents. Uzbeks abroad compare the recent events with holocaust, naming Andijan a city of dead.

In the wake of presidential elections these are unwanted problems for the Kyrgyz interim government that is struggling to establish a stronger state. Financial and human resources will be diverted from setting voting stations, settling issues of spontaneous land seizures in Bishkek and investigating Akayev’s corruption records.

However, Kyrgyzstan has an ample experience in hosting large flows of refugees in the past. In the mid 1990s up to 20,000 Tajik refugees, mostly women and children, fled to Kyrgyzstan. The country also dealt with several thousands of immigrants from Afghanistan. This practice allowed the local NGOs and individual experts to learn strategies of dealing with immigration issues. It is also clear that many refugees see Kyrgyzstan as a transit point for further exodus to Russia, Europe or North America.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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