Over the last decade, Astana came up with a number of confidence-building initiatives aimed at developing a constructive dialogue between India and Pakistan, speaking out for peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict, and even hosting a Congress of World Religions. Kazakh diplomacy was quite successful in gaining a positive assessment of country’s foreign policy on the international scene from the European Union and the OSCE. Behind these tempestuous activities, Kazakhstan’s own strained relations with its next-door neighbors, particularly with Uzbekistan, can hardly serve as a model of good-neighborly, not to speak of brotherly, relations. On his June visit to Astana the Uzbek president Islam Karimov recognized Kazakhstan, for the first time perhaps, as an uncontested economic leader in Central Asia. But he remained eloquently reserved about the political leadership of the neighboring country. The deployment of the American air bases in Uzbekistan apparently whipped up Islam Karimov’s ambitions to gain more political and military independence from Russia. The cooling of relations between Moscow and Tashkent had negative reverberations on the Kazakh-Uzbek dialogue, to the extent that shooting incidents along the border has become an almost daily occurrence.

But at a press-conference in Dushanbe held after the recent summit of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CAC), Islam Karimov made an unexpected twist signaling a softening of his attitude towards Moscow, saying that “We regard Russia not simply as a donor on realizing economic projects, but also as a guarantor in solving those conflict situations which may arise between us. Russia always, at all times had been a power which settled many problems”. This profuse eulogy for Moscow left Russian observers guessing at true intentions of the enigmatic Uzbek leader. Karimov, speaking of “conflict situations”, made no direct reference to Kazakhstan. But given the strained relations with the northern neighbor in the face of increasing threat of incursions from alleged terrorist nests in South Kazakhstan, Tashkent appears to be willing to use Russia’s influence in the region to normalize its ties to Astana.

In turn, Kazakhstan welcomed Russia’s joining the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, attaching importance primarily to Russia’s potential to stabilize the geopolitical situation in the region and to accelerate the process of integration in Central Asia following the pattern of the European Union or the Common Market of the Asia-Pacific region. According to observers, the agreements on the implementation of a joint free trade zone and the approval of the concept of water, energy and transport consortium in Central Asia formulated in the Tajik capital means a significant progress in integration efforts.

Russia’s decision to redeploy its 201st motorized rifle unit in Tajikistan and its reiterated call for joint protection of the CAC countries point to Moscow’s intention to use the region as a buffer against potential Islamic extremist attacks, expanding at the same time Russia’s military presence in Central Asia. It would be in Russia’s best interest to forge closer Kazakh-Uzbek relations against Islamic militants in the region. But it is hard to tell to what degree Russia’s entry into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization will be conducive to the improvement of relations between Astana and Tashkent. Despite all reciprocal reassurances of friendship, Kazakhstan and Russia have enough problems to unravel. The border delimitation process, which is to be completed in the end of this year, in all probability will drag on painfully long, although officially the 7,400 kilometers long border stretch has been agreed on already. After his October 8 talks with the Russian prime minister Mikhail Fradkov in Astana, Kazakhstan’s prime minister Danial Akhmetov told journalists that the remaining eight disputed border areas between Russia and Kazakhstan present a knotty problem. The biggest apple of contention seems to be sizable gas deposits found in one of the border areas. “We realize clearly enough how big these reserves are” Danial Akhmetov scantly commented to journalists.

Authorities usually do not disclose the details of border talks with Russia for fear of provoking public protests against territorial concessions to Russia. Not long ago, the opposition press revealed the handover of the tiny Ogneupornoye village in Kostanay region to Russia. The government motivated the decision by the fact that the majority of the village residents had Russian citizenship. It is doubtful, given serious impediments in border talks, that the delimitation process will be over soon. It is hard to convince anyone that Russia, which has so many territorial headaches with Kazakhstan, will genuinely act as reliable guardian of peace and integration in Central Asia.