Wednesday, 26 September 2001

COLLECTIVE SECURITY EXERCISES

Published in Field Reports

By Aziz Soltobaev, student of the American University in Kyrgyzstan (9/26/2001 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The Collective Forces of Quick Deployment (CFQD) of the Collective Security Treaty have been carrying out joint military exercises. The main goal of these exercises is the improve the CFQD to combat international extremist groups. It is assumed that the collective troops will become the force that will enable the member-states of the Collective Security Treaty to repulse the attacks of Islamic extremists on Central Asian territory, and possibly, the Afghan Taliban movement.

The Collective Forces of Quick Deployment (CFQD) of the Collective Security Treaty have been carrying out joint military exercises. The main goal of these exercises is the improve the CFQD to combat international extremist groups. It is assumed that the collective troops will become the force that will enable the member-states of the Collective Security Treaty to repulse the attacks of Islamic extremists on Central Asian territory, and possibly, the Afghan Taliban movement.

The scheme of the exercises is based on battle tactics of the Islamist insurgents during the intrusions into Batken oblast, Kyrgyzstan, in 1999 and 2000. However, it seems that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has changed its pattern of battle actions. The IMU has changed its tactics of large-scale and massive intrusions to targeting vast territories, primarily in southern Kyrgyzstan.

The military exercises are aimed at preparing the CFQD troops for large-scale clashes with the enemy. Due to the IMU’s change of tactics, the CFQD troops may nevertheless turn out to be less effective. The factors that urged the IMU insurgents to change their tactics and battleground are likely to be as follows:

Firstly, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is unable to establish itself as a permanent opposition movement on the territory of Uzbekistan and conduct a long-lasting war. The army of Uzbekistan has suppressed the IMU and driven its insurgents out of its territory. Moreover, unlike in Kyrgyzstan, the military and technical base of Uzbekistan’s army is in better shape. Not being able to fulfill their desires at this stage, the IMU shifted the borders of the Islamic ‘Caliphate’ from the Fergana valley to the south of Kyrgyzstan.

Secondly, the political system and regime of Uzbekistan was not disturbed despite the attempts of the IMU to ignite a war and to plot assassinations against president Islam Karimov. Quite to the contrary, the regime has shown its resolve and rigor in dealing with Islamic insurgents and political dissent. The Supreme Court of Uzbekistan has already sentenced Juma Namangani, the leader of the IMU, in absentia to death on charges of terrorism, plotting to assassinate the Uzbek president, and provoking national and racial conflicts in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek authorities consider Namangani as the organizer of terrorist act in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, which killed 16 people. In Kyrgyzstan, on the contrary, the political system and regime has shown the weakness of authorities, mass emigration, and the inability of the Kyrgyz army to effectively repulse the attacks of the IMU insurgents.

Bishkek cannot tell exactly whom the insurgents of 1999 and 2000 attacks presented, and how they happened to be in Batken oblast. The Minister of Interior of Kyrgyzstan, Tashtemir Aytbaev, declared that the IMU would not attempt to attack, but after the exchanges of fire that occurred in July/June, 2001, Bishkek assures its neighbors that Kyrgyzstan is ready to repulse the enemy. Defense Minister Topoev said the IMU would try to cross the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, and added that the Ministry of Defense does not know when, where and how the attack could happen.

It is possible, however, that information about a new intrusion can be spread with the purpose to compel certain governments in the region to sign certain agreements of military and political cooperation. For example, the agreement on the creation of an antiterrorist group staff of the Shanghai Group on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.

In religious matters, the Kyrgyz authorities have been active as well. The government tried to impose difficulties for religious missionaries and sects, some of which are forbidden in other countries. The employees of the Ministry of Interior of Kyrgyzstan assert that the majority of mosques are being built through funds coming from foreign countries, where the official dogma is Wahhabism. There are about 130 mosques in the Chui oblast, and the majority is unregistered. This means that religious extremists have already spread throughout Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the government intends to carry out attestation procedures for mullahs to check their knowledge of the Qur’an and other sacred writings of Islam.

Thirdly, since large detachments of the IMU are unable to fight on the territory of Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz territory is a convenient battleground. The mountainous regions of Kyrgyzstan can be used for penetration of small insurgent groups of the IMU. Besides, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have problematic relations. The Uzbek authorities have not ratified the military and political agreement between the two countries signed last year in Bishkek. Now divisions of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Defense have begun mine clearing operations on the 32-hectares adjoining to the Uzbek Sokh enclave in Kyrgyzstan. 19 mines were found and 100 people were involved in the process of mine clearing. Minister of Defense Topoev said that the Uzbek side had a negative attitude towards these activities on Kyrgyz territory.

Concerning the presence of IMU troops on the territory of Tajikistan, the Tajik authorities have asserted that IMU troops were never present in Tajikistan, and even if they were, they would be in remote mountain tracks. In addition, the Tajik authorities negotiated with representatives of the late Ahmad Shah Masoud, who was assassinated last week. The Northern Alliance of Afghanistan promised to take every action to stop the Taleban movement from entering Tajikistan. Representatives of the Northern Alliance emphasized that they will destroy IMU supporters without hesitation, as Juma Namagani has become an enemy of the Rabbani government since he started participating in Taleban military operations against the Northern Alliance.

Insurgent troops have switched to new tactics of battling. Taking into account the two-year experience of attempts to break into Uzbekistan, having completed the aim of drawing the attention of the international community to their activities, the IMU has now passed to the next stage of its plans. Now the aim is to influence first the population of Uzbek enclaves and inhabitants of the Ferghana valley and eventually of the whole population of Central Asia. Appearances of hitherto unknown armed group in the region with intentions to fight against the Kyrgyz army prove that they have received concrete tasks and clear instructions on how and when to act. Insurgent troops have changed tactics from large-scale actions to small injections on vast territory. Taking into account that all the antiterrorist forces of Central Asian states have come together, such tactics my turn out to be quite effective.

Aziz Soltobaev, student of the American University in Kyrgyzstan

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