Wednesday, 16 November 2011

PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV DISSOLVES PARLIAMENT’S LOWER CHAMBER

Published in Field Reports

By Georgiy Voloshin (11/16/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On November 16, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a decree dissolving the lower chamber of the country’s Parliament, thus responding to the request of a group of 53 Majilis deputies submitted a week earlier. As the representatives of this initiative group explained during a press conference, such a move had become inevitable in order to adjust to current international circumstances, with the second wave of the economic crisis threatening to bring down Kazakhstan’s financial system and cause irreparable damage to its economic prospects. The deputies believe that the dissolution of the Majilis will enable the entry into Parliament of a second party whose role would be to reinvigorate political debate and present original solutions that the presidential party might have previously missed or ignored.

On November 16, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a decree dissolving the lower chamber of the country’s Parliament, thus responding to the request of a group of 53 Majilis deputies submitted a week earlier. As the representatives of this initiative group explained during a press conference, such a move had become inevitable in order to adjust to current international circumstances, with the second wave of the economic crisis threatening to bring down Kazakhstan’s financial system and cause irreparable damage to its economic prospects. The deputies believe that the dissolution of the Majilis will enable the entry into Parliament of a second party whose role would be to reinvigorate political debate and present original solutions that the presidential party might have previously missed or ignored. Finally, those who signed the petition are convinced that only a refreshed Majilis will be up to the task of bringing about necessary changes provided for in the Program for industrial and innovative development whose implementation is to be finalized by 2014.

Right after the announcement made by the deputies, President Nazarbayev’s advisor for political affairs, Ermukhamet Ertysbayev, promptly reacted to the news by saying that the head of state will most likely support the deputies’ idea, though “he had been against early parliamentary elections and stood by his promise by declaring on September 1 that there would be no such elections in 2011.” At the same time, Ertysbayev clearly indicated that if approved, early parliamentary elections could take place in January 2012. In fact, this is what has been practically decided: The two rounds of voting are now to take place on January 15 and 16. “There will be many problems [in 2012], and to spend time on a two- or three-month electoral campaign is unreasonable and imprudent. I think that our deputies have taken an important and responsible decision,” said Ertysbayev.  

National and foreign press has regularly referred to the possibility of organizing an early parliamentary vote. In July 2011, one of the main opposition parties, Ak Zhol, elected a new chairman, Azat Peruashev, whose previous position was in the National Union of Entrepreneurs and who is believed to have close affiliations with the presidential administration. The party’s former leader, a one-time opponent and strong critic of President Nazarbayev, unexpectedly changed sides by accepting the post of chairman of Kazakhstan’s Agency for public service and practically leaving the political scene. Peruashev’s later comments in the press created the impression that the Ak Zhol party under his leadership was seriously preparing to vie for power alongside its competitor Nur Otan. In early November, he even presumed that Ak Zhol might easily gain the support of 15-20 percent of Kazakh voters, thus obtaining a few scores of seats in the Majilis and gaining access to the real levers of influence on legislative decision-making.

After it became clear that Peruashev’s party was not the only one to aspire for a second place in the legislative assembly, the course of events took an even more interesting turn. On October 4, the Almaty inter-district court banned the Communist Party of Kazakhstan from carrying out any political activities, including electoral campaigning, for a period of six months citing its chairman’s participation in the unlawful association The People’s Front. This association was created by a group of unregistered political organizations with a view to confronting the Nur Otan party and its monopoly on power, by various public actions promoted mainly with the help of volunteers. As if this were not enough, the chairman soon came under attack from his own comrades who accused their leader of corruption and unfaithfulness to the ideals of the communist ideology. In the opinion of many experts, this case highlighted the artificial character of any political transformations proposed to the public by the country’s leadership, as all steps seemed to have been carefully planned and “sponsored” by the presidential administration.

Andrey Grozin, an expert on Central Asia and Kazakhstan at the CIS Research Institute based in Moscow, believes that the idea of holding early parliamentary elections stems from the fact that in the current circumstances defined mainly by the ongoing crisis the Nur Otan party cannot be sure of getting all of its deputies reelected next spring. Thus, in order to avoid a major political failure, it was collectively decided to hamstring the opposition by forcing the normal course of events in the desired direction. “At the same time, it is clear that the current one-party Parliament is incapable of effectively serving the goals of stabilization in the case of force majeure. For instance, if the process of power transition to a successor meets some difficulties of social nature, such as the growth of protest activities or social unrest,” Grozin says.
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