The upcoming parliamentary elections in Turkey should clarify whether Turkish-Armenian relations may improve in a short-term perspective, opening for a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional cooperation in the South Caucasus. Regardless of the outcome of the elections, it will clarify the fate of the Turkish-Armenian protocols signed in October 2009. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP party seems capable of securing a majority in the newly elected parliament and to form a new government. After the elections, the AKP will not be under the threat of instantly losing the support of voters due to opposition criticism, so its leadership may consider the ratification of the protocols safer.

Such a decisive move followed by an opening of the border, without explicitly linking the normalization of relations with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, would change the regional situation radically. The Turkish opposition and Azerbaijan’s government, which have opposed normalization, do not believe that Armenia will become more willing to make concessions if Turkish-Armenian relations are normalized. However, such thinking does not take into account that Armenia’s excessive dependence on Russia is the main issue requiring a solution.

When the normalization process came to a standstill, Russia easily persuaded Armenia to extend its basing rights. An agreement was signed in August 2010, during President Medvedev’s visit to Yerevan. In general, events during recent years have shown that the policy of isolating Armenia and the militaristic rhetoric of Azerbaijani officials will not bring about progress in the conflict resolution process on Nagorno-Karabakh through unilateral concessions from the Armenian side. Instead, Russia’s and to a certain extent Iran’s influence has been growing continuously.

At the same time, the internal political situation in Armenia, where the opposition has been organizing mass demonstrations demanding extraordinary presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as a complete failure of the financial and economic policy of the Armenian government should be taken into account. The weak legitimacy of President Sargsyan’s administration may induce him to seek international support and financial assistance. An opening of the Turkish-Armenian border would allow Sargsyan to save face and avoid criticism from the opposition and Armenian Diaspora for being “defeatist”. Before the standstill, Sargsyan had enjoyed the image of a realistic politician trying to put an end to a decades-long enmity and could make use of it again. It is telling that although the ratification of the protocols by Armenia’s National Assembly was suspended in 2010, Sargsyan has not called off his signature despite the opposition urging him to do so by.

An opening of the border would reduce internal political tension in Armenia, as it would partly relieve the economic hardship that the country’s population is experiencing. Besides, the possibility of transport communication via Turkish territory would reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia and promote mutual trust. Therefore, it would ultimately benefit also Azerbaijan and Georgia. Better opportunities to maneuver independently from Russia and seeking further international assistance for legitimating his rule would stimulate Sargsyan and the ruling coalition to be more flexible on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

At the same time, Sargsyan should not be considered a politician with truly progressive views. His approach is rather opportunistic. If the newly formed Turkish government refuses to ratify the protocols, Sargsyan will most probably seek legitimacy by playing to nationalist sentiments. By denouncing the protocols and actively exploiting the genocide issue politically, Sargsyan could secure the support of all factions of the National Assembly and mobilize the active support of the Diaspora.

In summary, the window of opportunity for normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations and stimulating regional cooperation in the South Caucasus will be open for quite a short time after the elections in Turkey. If the issue is not solved promptly, pressure by the opposition will very soon motivate Sargsyan to start advocating more hardcore nationalist policies. In fact, the 20th anniversary of independence in September could become a convenient starting point. It should also be remembered that sensitive issues such as Turkish-Armenian relations and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are unlikely to progress in pre-election periods. Campaigning for the May 2012 parliamentary elections in Armenia will begin shortly and will be followed by campaigning for the February 2013 presidential elections. Growing sentiments will also induce both government and opposition to compete for a more “patriotic” image while moving towards 2015 – the 100th anniversary of the genocide. Therefore, even the small opportunity to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations and advance the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may be lost, and that would benefit neither Turkey, nor Armenia, nor Azerbaijan.