Sukhumi temporary withdraws from the five-party Geneva talks due to disagreements over key security issues, the head of the Abkhaz presidential administration Nadir Bitiyev declared on June 23rd. Tbilisi appraised this move as an attempt on Moscow’s part to undermine the Geneva talks through its proxy regime in Sukhumi.

The Geneva process is one of the provisions of the ceasefire agreement between the French, Russian and Georgian presidents on August 12, 2008, which was restated through an agreement on September 8, 2008. The process deals with security and stability in the region and addresses questions related to displaced persons and refugees. The format of negotiations was established with mediation of the EU, OSCE and UN and involves Georgia, Russia, and the U.S., as well as representatives of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali as parties.

The Abkhaz delegation refused to attend the next round of talks scheduled for July 27 after the most recent, eleventh round of the Geneva process on June 8. The withdrawal would last unless “a concrete document that includes propositions from all parties” on the non-use of military force is worked out, Bitiyev said.

In his statement Bitiyev acknowledged the significance of the Geneva talks but lamented that the question of signing a binding agreement among Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia on the non-use of military force is highly neglected by Georgia.

Georgia, in its turn, considers the ceasefire agreement of August 12, 2008 (brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili) legally binding. Though the agreement already contains a commitment not to use force, Tbilisi is ready to sign a new agreement on the same commitments with Russia, but not with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia fully implements its commitments under the agreement and expects Russia to act in the same manner, said Giga Bokeria, Georgia's first deputy foreign minister.

In contrast, Bokeria’s Russian counterpart, Grigory Karasin claims that the August 12 and September 8 agreements insufficiently meet the security concerns of the Abkhaz and Ossetian populations and thus do not ensure that hostilities in the conflict zones will not recur.

Russia, therefore, insists on the need for a new trilateral agreement on non-use of force between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Not considering itself one of the conflicting parties, Moscow refuses to be a signatory of such a security treaty. 

The U.S., like Georgia, does not see the expediency of such a formal document, since the first point of the Sarkozy-Medvedev cease-fire agreement encloses a pledge not to use force. Furthermore, a statement of the U.S. delegation, issued in the wake of the latest Geneva talks, outlines that Russia’s commitment to withdraw its forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to positions held before the 2008 war has not so far been met.

The EU, a co-mediator of the Geneva process, maintains a more moderate stance regarding the conflict regions, which is reflected in its “engagement without recognition” strategy. Before the last Geneva meeting, the EU co-chairman of the Geneva talks, Ambassador Pierre Morel, said that he considered an agreement on the non-use of force as a key issue of the Geneva process, but did not mention which parties should sign it.

Divergence on who should sign the proposed treaty on non-use of force places the Geneva talks in a deadlock, which is signified by Abkhazia’s decision to keep out of the next meeting.

Several rationales underpin these problems. Russia categorically wants Georgia to arrive at an agreement on non-use of force along with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, thereby indirectly forcing Tbilisi to acknowledge its breakaway regions as independent states.

The Georgian strategy regarding the rebel regions is conversely based on non-recognition of those regimes and the enlargement of international security mechanisms such as international police and peacekeeping missions to the occupied territories. Tbilisi’s “State Strategy on Occupied Territories” in addition, intends “to take active steps to provide the local population [of the conflict zones] with an opportunity to have normal education, healthcare, to engage in economic projects”. In this way, Georgia seeks to find direct channels to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian populations to mitigate Russian influence. The chief irritant to Moscow is Georgia’s insistence that the conflict resolution processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia be internationalized, meaning that the conflict zones be opened to international observers. From a Georgian perspective, Abkhazia’s withdrawal from the Geneva talks mirrors Moscow’s frustration with such pressure on its client regime and motivates its insistence on a binding agreement on the non-use of military force as a key issue at stake, whereas Tbilisi, in line with its priorities, persistently puts forward the question of displaced persons in accordance with the “recognized principles and practice of post-conflict settlement”.

Though official Tbilisi does not consider Abkhazia to be an independent actor, its exclusion from the Geneva talks may anticipate a crisis for the Geneva process. This could well imply that the only international mechanism where the all conflict parties can exchange ideas and close their positions is endangered.