Thursday, 10 December 2009

GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION FAIL TO AGREE ON ELECTORAL CODE

Published in Field Reports

By Maka Gurgenidze (12/10/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Despite loud objections from several opposition parties over the threshold for the Tbilisi mayor elections, the Georgian parliament approved the amendments to the electoral code in a first hearing last week.

Despite loud objections from several opposition parties over the threshold for the Tbilisi mayor elections, the Georgian parliament approved the amendments to the electoral code in a first hearing last week.

The draft amendments to the law on local elections, making the mayor of Tbilisi directly elected, will undergo second and third hearings in parliament this month. However, the draft amendments have been the subject of heated debate since early this year.

Eight parties (the United National Movement, the Christian Democrats, the Democratic Party, On Our Own, Georgian Troupe, the National-Democratic Party, the Labor Party and the Industrialists) signed the “Code of Conduct for Political Parties Willing to Participate in the Election Legislation Working Group” in February 2009, with the facilitation of the U.S. National Democratic Institute. Adhering to the principles of the Code of Conduct, the inter-party group started the work to reform the election code. The Alliance for Georgia (uniting the New Rights, Republican and Our Georgia-Free Democrats parties) joined the working group in September with proposals endorsed by four other opposition parties not participating in the meetings. The proposals sparked disagreement mainly between Alliance for Georgia and the ruling UNM on the threshold for Tbilisi’s mayoral elections. The UNM initially envisaged no threshold for the competitors, meaning the candidate garnering most votes would win without a runoff. Contesting this rule, Alliance for Georgia proposed a 50 percent threshold, which was later lowered to 45 percent with a second round if no candidate clears the threshold in the first round. The UNM eventually agreed on a 30 percent threshold, which proved unacceptable to the opposition. The UNM refused further concessions, bringing the talks to a deadlock.

Although initially agreed proposals should have been voted through as one package, the standstill in negotiations poses a risk to the whole progress achieved within the inter-party work group. The parliament is thus more likely to vote on the agreed proposals separately.

These proposals include amendments to the election law for the Tbilisi City Council (Sakrebulo). Under the draft amendments, the number of Council member will increase from 37 to 50 members, 25 of which (instead of 12) will be elected through a majoritarian and 25 through a proportional system from the party lists clearing the 4% threshold.

Another change concerns to the divisions of electoral constituencies. 10 electoral districts will be divided into 25 single-mandate sub-districts. The candidate with most votes wins each sub-district. The draft amendment also modifies the law on electing the chairman of the 13-member Central Election Commission (CEC). The President will nominate three potential candidates for the position of CEC chairman and the CEC’s opposition members should choose one of them. If they fail, the Parliament selects one among three candidates.

However, the threshold level of the mayor election is far more important to both the ruling party and the (mostly non-parliamentary) opposition parties. The opposition parties argue that the 30 percent threshold is favorable to the ruling party's candidate since those votes will be concentrated to one particular person (most likely to the President's ally and current incumbent Tbilisi mayor Gigi Ugulava), while votes for the opposition will be split among several candidates. A high threshold and a "second round tactic" would therefore make a victory of the ruling party's candidate in the first round more difficult, even if he garners more votes than his competitors.

Meanwhile, the first round will enable the opposition to determine their highest rating candidate and will increase their chances to win the second round through uniting around him or her. Such deliberations indicate that while opposition parties realize the benefits of agreeing on a common candidate for the Tbilisi mayor elections, they consider a two-round competition strategy the only possibility to do so.

President Saakashvili criticizes this strategy and accuses the opposition of intending to grab the Tbilisi mayor post in order to position themselves for the next presidential elections, rather than to deal with Tbilisi’s communal issues. While this may well be true, Saakashvili himself used a similar strategy as head of the Tbilisi Council in 2002. Aware of the political importance of mayor posts, Saakashvili did not implement the promise made at the UN General Assembly in September to introduce direct elections of the mayors of four other key cities. He has also expressed doubts on the appropriateness of direct elections for Tbilisi’s mayor. On the other hand, by urging two-round mayor elections, the opposition parties indirectly acknowledge that none of the opposition candidates might be stronger than the one supported by the ruling party.

To agree on a common opposition candidate, some of the opposition parties recently announced that a primary should be conducted, though it is not yet clear which parties will take part in it. They have so far not been able to offer a common candidate to their supporters. In addition, the opposition parties need to consider that the current political context requires more refined means to win the battle than was the case in 2002. In this regard, an alternative program for meeting the city residents' social demands should be brought into focus instead of merely viewing the mayor post as bridgehead for higher political ambitions. 
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