Thursday, 26 November 2009

GEORGIAN YOUTHS REMAIN IN TSKHINVALI AFTER NEGOTIATION FAILURE IN GENEVA

Published in Field Reports

By Maka Gurgenidze (11/26/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The mediated talks between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Geneva on November 11 failed both to produce an agreement to release the four Georgian teenagers detained by South Ossetian authorities and to address the insecurity of the breakaway regions at a more fundamental level.

The South Ossetian authorities detained four Georgian teenagers on November 4 on charges of illegal border crossing. The Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian sides have been negotiating over the issue with the active participation of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), however without results.

The mediated talks between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Geneva on November 11 failed both to produce an agreement to release the four Georgian teenagers detained by South Ossetian authorities and to address the insecurity of the breakaway regions at a more fundamental level.

The South Ossetian authorities detained four Georgian teenagers on November 4 on charges of illegal border crossing. The Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian sides have been negotiating over the issue with the active participation of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), however without results.

The eighth round of the Geneva talks was the Georgian side’s main hope to achieve the release of the school boys from Tirdznisi, a village in the conflict zone located two kilometers away from the de facto border.

Lacking other effective levers, Tbilisi applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and called on the international community to pressure Russia to free the teenagers. The Council of Europe, the U.S. Congress and the Foreign Ministry of France expressed their concerns over the incident and requested the instant release of the young Georgians, who still remain under arrest.

The arrest of the teenagers was preceded by similar incidents, as the post-war elusive administrative demarcation has proven problematic for people residing close to the conflict zone. In order to survive, residents of bordering villages frequently collect firewood in neighboring forests and pasture their livestock in the fields surrounding their villages, thus running the risk of infringement and arrest. Twenty-one Georgian citizens were detained by the South Ossetian authorities when collecting the firewood for their families on October 26, and accused of illegally crossing the administrative border with the breakaway region. However, in this case the Georgian side and the international negotiators proved more successful, as Tskhinvali released the prisoners after several days in jail.

During the latest Geneva meeting, the Georgian, Russian and U.S. negotiators, as well as the representatives of Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities, focused on the elements of the non-use of force treaty, an issue on which discussions had commenced in September at the seventh round of the Geneva talks. Russia insists on the principal importance of signing such an agreement between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, as well as between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. Georgia, however, argues that an agreement on non-use of force should be signed between Moscow and Tbilisi and should visualize a "de-occupation" of the breakaway regions of the country.

Through urging Georgia to sign the agreement with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian sides, Russia seeks to regain the status of mediator, masking its direct participation in the conflicts on the one hand and creating legal obligations for Tbilisi towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia to concede their independent status on the other.

The Georgian government has two basic problems with the treaty. First, Georgia is urgently interested in engaging international forces to provide stability in the territories of the conflict zones. The version of the document proposed by the co-chairs of the Geneva talks included this type of security mechanisms. However, Russia rejected the current version claiming it needs a two-month period to study and make amendments to it. Second, a non-use of force treaty satisfying Russia would imply a ground for independence of the breakaway regions rather than their "de-occupation", which directly contradicts vital Georgian interests.

The suspension of the UN and OSCE monitoring missions in the territory of Georgia earlier this year, and the fact that the EUMM cannot monitor the breakaway regions, increases the urgency of international engagement in the conflict areas – not least in light of the recent cases of detained Georgian citizens in the vicinity of Abkhazia’s and Ossetia's administrative borders.

Within the framework of the Incident Prevention and Reaction Mechanism, EUMM considers a gentlemen’s agreement as way to eschew similar cases in the future through achieving an accord between the conflicting parties on returning trespassers appearing on any side of border without detention. In an effort to ease the tensions over the post-war border arrangements, the U.S. has discussed the possibility of "a status-neutral approach" with Russia, via creating a buffer zone that could be monitored by the UN and the OSCE.

EU officials presented another mechanism in Tbilisi on November 13 (after the EU’s ambassadors had visited the conflict zones in Georgia) for preventing large-scale clashes through satellite monitoring of the separatist regions. Though technical and financial details have not yet been negotiated, talks on the rationality of establishing satellite surveillance have already been started within the EU. This initiative aims to observe any military movement in the breakaway regions, providing early warning of conflict escalation.

While these initiatives might serve short-term stability, a durable security arrangement can only be built upon mutually beneficial and acceptable elements.

The main impediment in this respect, however, is the absence of any single point of reference between the conflicting parties. Georgia appeals to the universality of the principle of territorial integrity while Russia continues its attempts to legalize the independent status of the breakaway regions, referring to the Kosovo example. Thus, while Georgia keeps moving out of the Russian orbit, it will not accept security arrangements questioning its territorial integrity.

The sole progress achieved on the eighth round of the Geneva talks was an agreement to hold the next meeting on January 28, 2010. However, the insufficient international pressure on Russia to fulfill the six-point agreement mediated by France, and unwillingness on part of both Georgia and Russia to make painful concessions, suggest that the parties will hardly be able to make any breakthrough at the ninth round of Geneva Talks either. 
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