On October 10, the Intermediate People’s Court of Shaoguan City of Guangdong Province in southern China sentenced one man to death and another with life imprisonment for their roles in leading the beating of Uyghur migrant workers at a local toy factory on June 26. The deaths of two Uyghur men that resulted from the beating was a direct cause for the riots in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi on July 5 that took the lives of nearly 200 people and injured more than a thousand more. On October 12, it was reported that six people were sentenced to death by an intermediate court in Xinjiang for murder and other crimes committed during the Urumqi riot.

The brawl in June started with a rumor that a Han Chinese woman had been raped by migrant Uyghur men. Mr. Xiao and Mr. Xu, the two men who were sentenced on October 10, led and incited their co-workers to join the beating of the Uyghurs. They also forcefully prevented medical personnel from helping the victims.

Reportedly, thousands of Uyghur people from many districts of Xinjiang participated in the Urumqi riot on July 5, which was triggered by the Shuaoguan incident. Two days after the riot, tens of thousands of Han Chinese marched the streets of Urumqi to protest the killing in the capital city. Urumqi has since been under tight control by armed police. The situation took a different turn, however, on September 3 and 4 when hundreds of people, mostly Han Chinese, were stabbed with syringe needles on the streets of Urumqi. It was reported that these attacks were perpetrated even by Uyghur women and children. Waves of demonstrations following the needle-stabbing incidents resulted in more deaths and more panic. By mid-September, needle-stabbing was reported to have spread to several other cities in Xinjiang.

In retrospect, the widespread participation of Uyghurs in the riot and their alarmingly intense resentment against the Han and the government were instigated largely by the government’s handling of the Shaoguan incident. Information about the ill-treatment of Uyghur migrant workers, including of the two men who were beaten to death by their Han co-workers, was practically sealed. It was only after the Urumqi riot that news about what had happened in Shaoguan was reported to the general public in China.

In contrast to the handling of the Shaoguan brawl, the sentencing of the two men in Shaoguan was widely publicized in China. This is indicative of the government’s intention to offset its image of indifference, at least in appearance, to the mistreatment of the minority people in the June incident in Shaoguan. Yet this gesture will in no way diminish the delicate and complicated nature of ethnic relations in China, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet where the separatist campaigns for the independence of the respective regions remain especially sensitive issues. The Chinese government has implemented many policies in order to help increase the status of ethnic minorities and maintain national unity. The one issue on which the Chinese government exercises zero tolerance is the attempt to separate regions inhabited by ethnic minority populations such as in Xinjiang and Tibet from China. Yet, separatist ideas and movements have emerged frequently, especially since China started reforms in the 1980s.

After isolating itself from the outside world for decades, China opened up several cities along Xinjiang’s border to neighboring countries for trade and tourism. What has been channeled through these port cities is more than just material goods, however. Information, literature, religious influences and other cultural exchanges have also crossed the borders, promoting autonomy and self-determination for particular groups and minorities. China is facing a serious dilemma. As long as China keeps pursuing policies for economic development and maintaining a trade relationship with neighboring countries, there will also be an influx of elements that will make it difficult to keep separatist ideas at bay. The death sentence of six men over the riot in Urumqi, for example, will most likely make the situation even more intense.

The revolts against the Chinese authorities by the Uyghur seem to have become increasingly more frequent and violent in recent years. In August 2008, a bus with explosives was driven into a group of police officers who were jogging in Kashgar, killing 16. Both the 2008 attack in Kashgar and the 2009 riot in Urumqi were considered by the Chinese government to be terrorist activities instigated by exiled Uyghur dissidents who advocate the independence of Xinjiang. Assuming these charges are true, the question is how and why these forces were able to stage such atrocities in Xinjiang.

Furthermore, there are implications of the proximity in time between the two court rulings to issue death penalties to those responsible for the killing and other crimes in Shaoguan and Urumqi respectively. On the one hand, these sentences are indicative of the government’s determination to prosecute those responsible for the crimes. On the other hand, the death sentences may generate even more unrest, particularly in Xinjiang.

To fundamentally solve the problems of interethnic conflict, the Chinese government needs to carefully review historical patterns of ethnic relations in China, particularly under the PRC, and try to come up with the most appropriate strategies in dealing with racial tensions. Such a long-term solution should be the product of joint efforts by intellectuals and leaders and legislators representing all ethnic groups. First and foremost, the Chinese government has to win the trust and confidence of all ethnic minorities that it has the determination and ability to find such solutions. This is a difficult and daunting task that the government of China cannot avoid.