This summer President Saakashvili offered the opposition the possibility of directly electing all mayors of Georgia, a promise made in 2004, shortly after the Rose Revolution. This is especially relevant for the capital Tbilisi, where until now the mayor has been elected indirectly by a city council, similar to the British model with the exception of London. Obviously, controlling the government of the capital is an important political asset in the Georgian context. Saakashvili himself was head of the Tbilisi Assembly (Tbilisi City Council) between 2002 and 2003, a post that gave him a powerful platform to mobilize resources and social relevance for organizing the so-called Rose Revolution in November 2003.

The decision of allowing the direct election of mayors can be understood in the context of the failed protests held in Tbilisi between April and June this year, and as a Presidential concession to those opposition parties that look for a compromise with the governing elites. In this context, Irakli Alasania announced on September 22 that he would run for Tbilisi Mayor in elections expected to be held in May 2010. Alasania, a former close ally of Saakashvili who stepped down as Georgia’s ambassador to the UN in December 2008, joined the opposition in early 2009, heading the Alliance for Georgia with two other political parties and forming his own party, the Free Democrats. He has become a prominent opposition figure and kept a moderate profile during the protests otherwise largely demanding Saakashvili’s resignation. As part of his strategy, the option of becoming a directly elected mayor of Tbilisi is an obvious move which to some extent replicates Saakashvili’s pre-Rose Revolution strategy.

The next presidential elections are due in 2013, and the opposition has failed to obtain the president’s resignation or early presidential elections, in spite of Georgia’s defeat in the August war, complaints of autocratic practices and the world economic crisis. In that context, the option of holding the office of Tbilisi’s mayor during three years until the presidential elections is clearly a strategic and clever move. In addition, Tbilisi is considered the opposition stronghold, where Saakashvili was defeated in the 2008 presidential elections. Crucially, too, the democratic accountability of any election process in the capital is higher than in the rest of the country given the concentration of NGOs and international observers and diplomats there. This is extremely important for the opposition, as the population of Tbilisi is to a great extent critical of Saakashvili and have access to media that is not under government control or influence. Maestro TV and Kavkasia TV, both private cable TV stations critical of the current government, can only be viewed in Tbilisi. As an illustration of the difficulties experienced in public access to different sources of information, when the opposition blocked the main streets of the capital for two months and held regular demonstrations and rallies, some of them quite large, residents of some regions of the country were unaware of these facts. In essence, controlling the capital will certainly be an important political asset for any potential candidate ahead of the next presidential elections.

Finally, the candidature of Irakli Alasania for the Tbilisi mayor’s office may have important implications for future Georgian politics. Elections to the mayor’s office will probably be a matter between the official candidate and Alasania, given the reluctance of the rest of the opposition to compromise with the government. At the same time, Alasania has enough resources and international connections, especially in the West. A victory in Tbilisi and his potential for winning the next presidential elections would not be catastrophic for the government either, as he prefers an accommodating and compromising stance, in contrast to the more radical opposition factions. In addition, Saakashvili cannot constitutionally run for a third presidential mandate. Thus, given his profile, Alasania can prove capable of providing some continuity to the Saakashvili regime, along with international respectability. Importantly, he would also be in a position to grant certain security guarantees to the main leaders of Saakashvili’s United National Movement against political reprisals from certain factions of the opposition and those who have been losers in the sometimes radical reforms and changes undertaken during Saakashvili’s time in power. What remains to be seen is whether Alasania manages to secure a sufficient level of popularity among the Georgian public.