As a result of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Tajikistan, Moscow and Dushanbe agreed to “equal rights military cooperation”. This means that from now on Russia will pay for its military base in Tajikistan, which is the largest in the region with 6,800 servicemen. In turn, Russia will sell arms to Tajikistan at market prices and conduct military trainings for Tajik soldiers for a certain payment.

The main reason for the visit was the signing of an act on the completion of the Sangtuda-1 hydropower station on the Vakhsh River in the south of Tajikistan with a capacity of 670 megawatts. The value of this joint project is estimated to around US$720-800 million and is owned to 75 percent by Russia and to 25 percent by Tajikistan. The relationship between Moscow and Dushanbe in this sphere seems quite problem-free. Both sides term Sangtuda-1 a vivid example of successful cooperation between the two countries. As Dmitry Medvedev announced during the visit “a number of new projects in the energy sphere between Moscow and Dushanbe are under development”.

Nevertheless, problems do exist between Russia and Tajikistan. Tajikistan insists that Russia must change the format of military cooperation between the two countries and change the status of the 201^st Russian military base in Tajikistan. As was confirmed by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, the conditions for hosting the Russian military base can be changed. As a result of negotiations between Medvedev and his counterpart Emomali Rahmon, all documents on the new status of the base should be prepared in two months, before a planned meeting of the intergovernmental commission on military cooperation.

Simultaneously with Tajikistan’s proposal to change the status of the Russian military base to that of a commercial base, Moscow in turn promised to establish military-technical relationships with Tajikistan on the basis of market principles. The Russian President’s Advisor Sergey Prikhodko declared that the deployment of Russian military bases in Tajikistan and the provision of Russian defense technologies and arms to Tajik Forces should be treated as one complex issue. Consequently, Russia will provide military equipment to Tajik Forces only at market prices. Furthermore, Prihod’ko reiterated that “almost 100%” of the arms possessed by Tajikistan are of Russian production. According to unofficial sources, the amount of subsidies received by Tajik forces from Russia during the last decade are estimated to “tens of millions of U.S. dollars”.

According to the expert Arkadiy Dubnov, the issue of military cooperation is not the only stumbling block in Russian-Tajik relations. For instance, the superficially successful cooperation in the energy sphere also has its stumbling blocks. Tajikistan still owes Russia the funds for its 25 percent share of the Sangtuda-1 hydropower station. Moreover, Tajikistan’s debt is growing since Dushanbe is not fully refunding payments for energy coming from Sangtuda-1. According to different sources, Tajikistan’s debt to Russia amounts to US$18-30 million. Another delicate issue is the Rogun hydropower station project, which despite years of delays remains a distant dream for the Tajik government. Finally, Russia is very displeased with the new draft of the Law on state language which is now under consideration of the Tajik Parliament and which will lead to the complete removal of the Russian language from official use in Tajikistan.

Arkadiy Dubnov terms these “very delicate, critical and uneasy problems in the Moscow-Dushanbe relationship, where any issue of cooperation could cause a domino effect. While considered the closest partners in CIS, the whole cloth of Russia-Tajikistan relations could easily tear apart and in practice seems far from problem-free”. The expert claims that although both Presidents are seeking to mollify problematic issues in their official statements, the problems are far from being solved.

All in all, unresolved problems in the Moscow-Dushanbe relationship could potentially cause significant changes in the cooperation between the two countries. According to Russian experts, Moscow could adequately respond to Dushanbe’s demarches with corresponding measures. For instance, Tajikistan’s proposition for Russia to pay for the accommodation of the military base may result in the introduction of restrictions on accepting Tajik labor migrants or, even worse, the introduction of a visa regime between the two countries. On the other hand, Russia seeks to avoid a worsening its relationship with Tajikistan, as Moscow needs the support from Dushanbe for establishing and structuring the Common Rapid Response Forces in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Furthermore, Russia still considers the Central Asian region, and particularly Tajikistan, as a strategic region in its foreign policy. The same goes for Tajikistan, which is highly dependent on Russia since hundreds of thousands of Tajik labor migrants are thought to be working in Russia. Therefore, despite some experts’ predictions and unresolved issues it is hardly to be expected that Moscow and Dushanbe would bring their strategic relationships to a standstill.